Österreichisches Institut für Familienforschung
Austrian Institute for Family Studies

Johannes Pflegerl, Sylvia Trnka (eds.)

Migration and the Family in the European Union

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Preface

This volume of the Schriftenreihe contains the papers presented at the Annual Seminar of the European Observatory on the Social Situation, Demography and Family in 2002. Although financial and other constraints considerably delayed the preparation of the manuscripts, we are convinced that the results of this Seminar will be of interest to the scientific community, policy-makers and the public at large, as it was among the first to focus on the link between migration and the family and explored this issue at a crucial point in time for the European Union, i.e. shortly before its enlargement to 25 Member States.

We would like to use this opportunity to thank all the authors for their inputs, support and patience throughout the lengthy preparatory phase of this publication. We are grateful to Susan Stephens who took care of the linguistic editing. We also want to thank the Austrian Institute for Family Studies for including this volume in its series.

Johannes Pflegerl   *Sylvia Trnka*

Contents

Johannes Pflegerl

Introduction

Over the past decade, migration-related issues have become increasingly important in the public and political debate among the 15 Member States of the European Union (EU-15). This was mainly because a rising inflow of migrants from different backgrounds and for various reasons began challenging the image that many European societies had hitherto had of themselves as—in many respects—non-immigrant countries.

In many European countries, immigration figures began to rise sharply in the late 1980s, and the trend continued into the 1990s. This was due to the radical political, economic and social changes that took place after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Communist system. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s migration was predominantly labour migration, in the 1990s migration patterns were to become more complex, comprising a larger number of asylum-seekers, highly skilled labour migrants and ethnic migrants. Regarding the overall immigration rates in Europe during that decade, we may say that not only Western but also Southern European countries turned into net immigration countries. In addition, many European countries have seen a remarkable increase in family reunification. This migration mode now constitutes a sizeable proportion of the inflows into most EU Member States.

The post-industrial migration wave has altered the social consequences of immigration and led to migrants participating in the socio-economic infrastructure to a greater extent than before. This involves both opportunities and challenges for European society. Participation in economic and social life constitutes the main route to integration for migrant groups and their families. Several studies have shown that the family plays an important role in the integration process. In turn, the successful integration of migrants into receiving societies is important both for their economic progress and for social cohesion. Promoting integration requires targeted policy efforts aimed both at immigrants and at the receiving societies. The fight against discrimination is particularly important. Barriers to social participation—whether embedded in the existing structures, capacities and attitudes of the receiving communities or in those of the newcomers—reduce the chances for successful integration and weaken social cohesion. In the EU, several policy initiatives were launched to support the integration. In the *European Strategy to Promote Social Inclusion*, for instance, the National Action Plans of several Member States have recognised the growing ethnic and cultural diversity as well as the higher risk of social exclusion faced by ethnic minorities and immigrants. Common policies in

the field of immigration and asylum are being built in line with the conclusions of the Tampere European Council. In order to manage migrant flows successfully and to cut illegal migration, the Commission has proposed a co-ordinated approach integrating all aspects of the migratory system and strengthening partnerships with the countries of origin.

It is a fact that, in the last 20 years, all Member States of the former EU-15, as well as most of the new Member States, have effectively become net immigrant countries. This has caused vigorous public debate on how to deal with migration movements into the EU and on how to manage them. Moreover, in the EU the issue of migration also gained increased significance at the political level when the Amsterdam Treaty went into force in May 1999. Under the new Treaty, all issues related to visas, asylum, immigration and external borders came under the jurisdiction of the European Community.

The topicality of migration-related issues encouraged the Co-ordination Team of the *European Observatory on the Social Situation, Demography and Family* to focus on the topic of migration and to monitor relevant developments in this field in the EU-15. For this reason, the Observatory network decided to dedicate its 2002 Seminar to immigration and family with the aim of analysing immigration into the EU Member States. With special attention being paid to the crucial role of families, the Seminar highlighted demographic, socio-economic and political aspects of the immigration process.

This volume, published in the *Schriftenreihe* series of the Austrian Institute for Family Studies, contains the papers presented at the Annual Seminar held in Helsinki from 8–10 June 2002. The Seminar was divided into four sessions, each highlighting different aspects of the immigration process and paying special attention to families. This structure is also reflected in the four sections of this volume.

- Section 1 deals with the *demographic aspects* of migration and introduces the overall topic.
- Section 2 deals with the key topic of the seminar: *the role of families and relatives in the immigration process*.
- Section 3 addresses *the socio-economic situation of migrants*.
- Section 4 analyses the potential impact of EU enlargement from different perspectives.

Section 1: Demographic aspects of migration

In the first paper, Heinz Fassmann provides reasons why the EU Member States have become immigration countries. According to Fassmann, in a growing number of European countries, migration now exerts a greater demographic impact on

population size and structure than does the balance of births and deaths. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the inflow of asylum-seekers, labour migrants and family members has been growing in leaps and bounds. Fassmann then proceeds to point out facts proving that the growth of the foreign population is not only due to an increase in migration but to other factors as well. Finally, he points to the necessary political measures, making it clear why European societies will require compensatory immigration.

The following two case studies—Ceri Peach's on Britain and Sirpa Taskinen's on Finland—clearly show that migration has not developed in the same way all across Europe. They also make clear that foreigners are unevenly distributed within the EU. In Britain, for example, the search for overseas labour took place 10 to 20 years earlier than in France, whereas Finland remained a country of net emigration for a long period of time. Both authors trace the development of migration in their respective country, dealing with main characteristics of and changes within the immigrant groups living in these countries.

Section 2:
The role of families and relatives in the migration process

Over the past two decades, family-linked migration developed into the most important form of legal migration within the European Union. Various researchers agree that the family plays a decisive role during the migration process, given that changing one's country of residence is a critical event entailing both opportunities and risks.

Raffaele Bracalenti's paper first highlights the main reasons why the family plays such an important role in the migration process. Bracalenti is convinced that, during the emigration process, various mechanisms weaken the traditional system of family relations by subjecting it to strong internal pressures. In order to analyse the family-immigration relationship, Bracalenti uses a model that examines three distinct fields:

- the *psychological-emotive field*, which focuses on family well- being,
- the *integrational field* which examines whether the family will be a support or an obstacle in the migratory process, and
- the *economic field* analysing the economic circumstances that encouraged families to migrate in the first place and how families act as an economic unit in the migration process.

For the very reason that many goals related to migration can only be legitimised and met with the help of family members, Bernhard Nauck in his paper emphasises the importance of intergenerational relations. Based on his own empirical research, Nauck contradicts the assertion that intergenerational differences will result in increasingly endangered relationships between generations. His findings make it clear that intergenerational relationships will become even stronger after migration, thus contradicting other results arguing that migration intensifies intergenerational conflict.

In the next paper, Pablo Pumares shows that migrant families develop different integration strategies. He develops a fourfold typology of integration based on a case study of Moroccan families living in Spain. His study reveals that *conservative* families stick firmly to their traditions and maintain close ties with their homeland. In these families, women are assigned the same position as minors. For *families in transition,* the role of religion is secondary and religious practices are no longer observed very strictly, even though the most common celebrations are still maintained. Families *in favour of assimilation* mostly come from rural areas and try to become as similar to the Spanish people as possible in order to be accepted. *Integrationist families* adopt a critical attitude towards both cultures, with the aim of choosing the most positive aspects of both. They are urban and have a relatively high level of education. Concerning the process of integration in general, Pumares regards the second generation to be decisive for its successful development. Besides the cultural aspect, however, it also is important to bear in mind two factors that have an impact on this process: the *discrimination* migrants face, and their *chances on the labour market.*

Section 3: Socio-economic situation of migrants

Labour-market integration being a key issue for understanding the socio-economic situation of migrants, Philip Muus analyses this process in an overview of the EU-15. Muus examines immigrants' incorporation into the labour markets of EU Member States with a view to changes in immigration patterns and the changing demographic composition of immigrant and national labour forces, as well as economic-structural and labour-market changes. He first deals with changes and new developments, pointing out that for migrants, both their heterogeneity and the number of countries of origin have increased. On the one hand, most of the North-western European Member States have experienced difficulties incorporating a large share of their resident immigrant population. On the other hand, they wish to attract highly skilled workers, while, at the same time, opening the doors wider to let in temporary foreign labour at the very bottom of the job hierarchy.

According to Muus, temporary labour migration seems to have made a significant comeback. By analysing labour-migration needs and policies, Muus underlines the fact that countries having a longer history of immigration tend to develop a more extensive policy framework to incorporate immigrants into working life. They also have more complex policies in the field of anti-discrimination. In his analysis, Muus comes to conclusions similar to those of Fassmann: Europe will need some sort of organised labour-market-related migration to partially fill in future demographic gaps.

The labour market, however, is not the only decisive element to consider when studying migrants' socio-economic situation and their integration process into the host society. Their living environment is also essential in providing a clear picture of how people are faring once they have migrated. In a qualitative comparative study, Katleen Peleman analysed the integration of women in two different Antwerp neighbourhoods. In her paper based on this study, Peleman is able to prove that living in an ethnically concentrated neighbourhood may have a positive impact on the integration of Moroccan women. She therefore challenges the negative image that these neighbourhoods normally have by highlighting the fact that the participation of Moroccan women in ethno-religious activities is most advanced in an ethnic neighbourhood and that it has made them more liberated and emancipated. On the contrary, living in a small ethnic community or isolated in the suburbs proves to be less supportive of their integration. Moroccan women who live in the suburbs do not participate in any kind of activities outside the home and only have few social contacts. This provides empirical evidence to disprove the myth that Moroccan women living in the suburbs are all independent and well integrated.

Another important issue concerning the socio-economic situation of migrants is the question of education. In her case study on Greece, Loukia Moussourou examines how immigrant children become integrated through the Greek school system. Moussourou points out that language problems and difficulties in navigating one's way through the new environment in the receiving country are the main reasons why many repatriate and foreign children are kept back in school. The fact that the educational system takes homogeneity for granted makes it more difficult for school children to integrate. Moreover, the reaction of both community and native parents are decisive factors exerting an impact on the integration of migrant children. Among other things, bilingual teachers are very important for building up common cultural characteristics and inspiring children's interest in the other culture. A large number of immigrant pupils in one grade makes it very difficult to implement optimal integration solutions.

Section 4: Potential impacts of EU enlargement

The accession of numerous East-Central European countries has led to many specu-lations about what impact this accession might have on migration. Many of these speculations were voiced—and nearly all studies carried out—from the perspec-tive of the current EU Member States. Almost all analyses furthermore neglect the view of the candidate countries. The only thing taken for granted is that these countries have an inexhaustible reservoir of migrants willing to move to the richer countries of the EU.

In his paper on the impact of EU enlargement from the perspective of Poland, Marek Okólski points out that this enlargement will lead to relatively small changes in migration movements between Poland and the EU. The current pattern of labour migration tends to preserve a rather weak trend towards migration on the part of the highly skilled. It also preserves the long-established trend of unskilled workers moving to the lower segments or the informal sector of EU labour mar-kets. Major worker shifts from irregular to regular employment, or from lower to higher segments, will not take place.

The findings presented in Claire Wallace's paper point into the same direction. She concludes that migration from East-Central Europe is likely to show a further decline as living standards rise. Furthermore, Wallace is convinced that there will be a noticeable increase in migration into and within East-Central European coun-tries, one that will need to be taken into account. Moreover, strong intergenera-tional family ties are a stabilising factor that prevents people from migrating per-manently. These family circumstances are further reinforced through an increase in property ownership and the role of the welfare states. In addition, much of the migration that does take place reflects the need to move back and forth between the sending and receiving countries. Therefore, migration increasingly involves a round-trip rather than a one-way ticket.

All the papers cover aspects of concern to migrant families. Hence, the Seminar documented in this volume represents a new approach to the issue of migration. Compared with other topics addressed by migration research, only a few studies so far have examined the specific role played by the family. This is due to the fact that, until now, migration research has mainly focused on the individual and has tended to highlight only the economic aspects. As Zlotnik (1995) says, many activities taking place within families cannot be measured in monetary terms and have therefore been more or less ignored. This makes Kofmann (2004) con-clude that, in policy terms, the issue of family is treated as a secondary form of migration. This volume endeavours to shed some more light on this aspect.

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Section 1:
Demographic aspects of migration

Heinz Fassmann

Immigration into the European Union: causes, patterns, future trends

Introduction

Spatial mobility is a crucial element characterising open societies. Only totalitarian regimes prevent their citizens from travelling abroad or emigrating, or force them to settle in certain areas. Democratic societies, in contrast, uphold the right of their citizens to freely choose their place of residence. This includes the right to emigrate. During the Cold War and the division of Europe, this was a central stumbling block between East and West. The perspective has changed fundamentally since the fall of the Iron Curtain.

Today, most Western societies are frightened by the possibility of mass immigration from Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, North Africa and Western Asia. The inflow of poor or persecuted citizens from these and other regions of the world is seen as a threat. The fact that, at least in the past, the countries of destination generally profited both demographically and economically from the immigrants hardly plays a role in the present public debate. Instead, migration has become one of the main topics of Western European domestic policy and is seen as an issue of national security as well.

This paper has three parts. In the first chapter, the simple question of how many immigrants are living in EU-15 will be answered by using stock and flow data. The data were taken from EUROSTAT's *New Chronos* database. The second chapter deals with the geographical pattern of European migration. Which countries are the regions of origin and destination, and which linkages between them can be observed? In the third chapter, the inflow will be divided into different groups. The question is who is immigrating and why. The paper closes with a discussion on main future trends.

Immigration into the European Union

How many immigrants are living in the EU-15? The question seems to be simple, but the answers are rather complicated. By using stock and flow data, it should be possible to draw a general picture of the current situation.

Stock data

One way to prove the importance of migration for the demographics of the European population is to look at the number and percentage of foreigners. The criterion of citizenship remains the lowest common denominator, offering a basis for comparison beyond statistical problems. Citizenship is a clearly defined legal concept everywhere, but access to citizenship varies. In many countries, not all immigrants are counted as foreigners in the relevant statistics, and not all foreign citizens are immigrants. Privileged groups (e.g. ethnic Germans from Russia) immediately get citizenship in the receiving country and thus 'disappear' from the relevant statistics. On the other hand, in nearly all European countries, the children of migrants receive their parents' citizenship by virtue of *ius sanguinis*. If their parents are foreigners, children also count as part of the foreign population, even if they have never seen their parents' country of origin. Nevertheless, the concept of foreign population as defined by citizenship offers one way to show the growing importance of migration for the European population.

At present, Western Europe (the EU-15) has a population of about 378 million (see also Table 3). Only an approximate retrospective estimate is possible of how many of these people are immigrants or emigrants. Of the 378 million inhabitants of the EU-15, 18.69 million (5.0%) are foreigners as defined by their citizenship. The last few decades have seen an extraordinary increase in the foreign population in almost all Western European countries. For example, whereas about 4 million foreigners lived in Western Europe in 1950, their number doubled within the next 20 years. Between 1970 and 2000, the number almost doubled again. This provides impressive evidence of the ongoing internationalisation of Western European societies. It also shows that today—in contrast to the 1950s—migration and immigration no longer affect only a negligibly small population group.

Table 1: Size of the foreign population in the EU-15, 1950–2000

Year	In thousands	In % of the entire population
1950	3,785	1.3
1970	10,728	3.2
1990	16,085	4.5
2000	18,692	5.0

Source: Fassmann & Münz 1994; for 2000: New Chronos Database (partially estimated).

The growing foreign population in Europe is not only a consequence of increased immigration. Several factors play a role in explaining the growing number of foreigners. One important factor is the higher fertility of most groups of foreigners as compared to nationals. Another factor is the younger age structure of the foreign

population, which automatically means a surplus in the number of births of foreign citizens relative to the number of deaths. Finally, the annual number of naturalisations is too low to keep pace with the growing number of immigrants.

Flow data

Stock data on foreign populations over a period of years are unable to show the dynamics of the migration system within Europe. However, data on the flow of the foreign population into Europe have only been available for a few years, and not for all countries of the EU-15. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to build up flow statistics, which are both more relevant and more sensitive when describing the migration process. Austria, for example, implemented flow statistics in 1996 as a consequence of the growing importance of the migration issue.

Table 2: Annual migration flow within, to and from the EU-15, 1960–1999

Period	Flow in	Flow out	Net migration
1960–1964	1,102,249		
1965–1969	1,213,170	712,305	500,865
1970–1974	1,370,186	799,043	571,144
1975–1979	986,702	955,904	30,798
1980–1984	1,010,533	1,003,647	6,886
1985–1989	1,459,269	929,145	530,124
1990–1994	2,136,923	1,197,244	939,679
1995–1999	1,869,401	1,259,100	610,300
Entire period (1960–1999)	1,393,554	924,698	468,857

Source: New Chronos Database (partially estimated and author's own calculation).

Flow statistics should be treated with great caution, because the real amount of emigration is especially underestimated. Emigrants often leave a country without registering. Some countries of the EU-15 later started to implement a system to register emigration, and therefore the 'outflow'; and net migration does not always reflect the real numbers. Nevertheless, by concentrating on these tendencies and the more recent period, one can emphasise three points:

1) The positive net migration in EU-15 is higher than in USA, the classical immigration country.
   The annual number of inflows into one of the 15 EU Member States from the outside or from other EU countries was 1.87 million for 1995–1999. During the same period, 1.26 million left one of the 15 EU Member States and either

migrated to another country or emigrated out of the EU entirely. The positive annual net migration for the EU-15 was around 610,000, which is probably more than the net migration for the USA: there, the official numbers for annual immigration stand at around 700,000. By simultaneously taking into account that emigration also took place, it is clear that the figure for net migration is much lower than the EU-15 estimate. As a continent for immigration, the EU-15 is still attractive; and it has developed, albeit without any official recognition, into a new immigration 'country'.

2) Migration is more important for population development than is natural population increase (births and deaths).
The annual gain due to the surplus of the inflow is much higher than the natural increase. During the second half of the 1990s the natural increase for the whole EU-15 was about +300,000; i.e. the number of births exceeded the number of deaths and the difference was about 300,000. This is half as much as the positive net migration. The population dynamics is more and more influenced by the in- and outmigration and less by the natural increase. This especially holds true for countries like Germany and Austria.

3) The temporal fluctuation of in- and outflows—parallel to economic cycles—is a significant phenomenon. Four phases are important:

■ *Take-off phase:* In the 1960s and early 1970s, Western, Northern and Central Europe attracted temporary migrant workers, first from Southern Europe and later from North Africa and Turkey, to meet their labour demands. This was during a period of economic boom coinciding with the small World-War-II birth cohorts then reaching working age. Between 1960 and 1974, the number of immigrants increased.

■ *Stagnation:* Since the second half of the 1970s (after the 1973 oil crisis), when restrictive immigration policies were introduced, the immigration influx has slowed down but nevertheless has continued at a lower level. Family reunification partially replaced the earlier type of migration, and the higher fertility of the migrants further increased the population of foreign origin, resulting in the production of a second generation of immigrants.

■ *Second take-off-phase:* At the end of the 1980s and during the first half of the 1990s, the fall of the Iron Curtain—coupled with deteriorating living conditions, ethno-political conflicts, civil wars and wars between countries—created new refugee flows and other migratory movements. These took place in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Turkey, Algeria and the CIS, both within these areas as well as from these areas to the West. Refugees, asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants entered Western Europe. The population holding foreign citizenship sharply increased in most European countries.

- *High level of stagnation:* In the second half of the 1990s, migration policy changed significantly. The so-called 'crisis of the European asylum system' led to new and more restrictive regulation ('safe country of origin', 'first safe country'). The 'pull policy' of most European countries to attract workers was replaced by migration restrictions or 'stop-migration' policies. Nevertheless, net migration was higher than in previous periods. By the end of the 1990s, the EU had seen an upturn in legal migration flows, especially as a result of the conflicts in Kosovo and the forced migration of ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo.

The 'geography' of European migration

Countries of destination

Of the 374 million people living in the EU-15, 5% are foreigners. This proportion seems very low and stands in clear contradiction to its political significance. One reason for this contradiction can be seen in the uneven distribution of foreigners. In some EU countries, the proportion of foreigners is only 1–2%, in others 8–10%. When looking a little closer and changing the scale of consideration, it becomes clear that there are urban areas where 20–30% of the residents are foreigners and rural areas without any relevant foreign population. This uneven distribution is an important factor in the 'geography' of migration in Europe and also an argument that helps to explain the different social sensitivity nowadays.

Around 2000, the highest numbers of foreigners were reported by Germany (7.3 million), France (3.3 million), the United Kingdom (2.3 million) and Italy (1.1 million). Switzerland would be in fourth place on this list were it a member of the EU-15. For the EU-15 as a whole, 40% of all foreigners live in Germany, 18% in France and 12% in the UK. 80% of all third-country nationals in the EU live in one of these countries. However, the highest proportions of foreigners in the total population of the country are to be found in such smaller European countries as Andorra, San Marino, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, where the foreigners represent one fifth of the total population. In Luxembourg, which is part of the EU-15, the share is 34%, i.e. one third of the population in Luxembourg is either a citizen of another EU Member State or of a country outside the EU. However, in the case of Luxembourg, non EU-citizens are a minority.

Table 3: Size, proportion and distribution of foreign population in the EU-15 in 2000

Country	Population	Foreigners	% of population	Distribution (%)	% EU foreigners among all foreigners
Belgium	10,239,085	853,369	8.3	4.6	66.0
Denmark	5,313,577	256,276	4.8	1.4	20.8
Germany	82,163,475	7,343,591	8.9	39.3	25.3
Greece	10,511,088	161,148	1.5	0.9	27.9
Spain	39,441,679	801,329	2.0	4.3	39.0
France	58,520,688	3,263,186	5.6	17.5	36.6
Ireland	3,786,931	126,533	3.3	0.7	72.9
Italy	57,679,895	1,270,553	2.2	6.8	11.7
Luxembourg	429,200	147,700	34.4	0.8	89.0
Netherlands	15,863,950	651,532	4.1	3.5	30.1
Austria	8,102,557	753,528	9.3	4.0	0.0
Portugal	9,997,590	190,898	1.9	1.0	27.5
Finland	5,171,302	87,680	1.7	0.5	18.6
Sweden	8,861,426	487,175	5.5	2.6	36.4
United Kingdom	58,614,448	2,297,947	3.9	12.3	37.4
EU-15	374,696,891	18,692,445	5.0	100.0	30.5

Source: New Chronos Database (partially estimated and author's own calculation).

Countries of origin and demographic hinterlands

Up to one third of all foreigners in any one of the 15 Member States are citizens of another EU Member State. Two thirds come from outside the EU-15. When looking at the ten most important receiving countries in Europe, one can see that Turkish nationals—among them both ethnic Turks and Kurds—are the largest expatriate community, not only in Germany, but also in Western Europe. Around three million Turkish citizens (one sixth of all foreigners) are currently living in one of the 15 EU Member States. The second largest group are citizens of the former Yugoslavia, mainly Croats, Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and ethnic Albanians. Third and fourth in line are Moroccans and Algerians.

Migration can be defined as a long-term or permanent change of residence. It therefore always involves a geographical and historical perspective. Among most of the European countries, for a long time now, there have been relatively stable patterns of immigration and emigration. Some countries have clearly attributable 'hinterlands' where labour and other economic migrants are recruited. The 'demographic hinterlands' of Europe's main receiving countries—especially of Britain, France and Germany—hardly overlap.

Great Britain

Immigration to Great Britain can clearly be explained by 'privileged' relationships between sending and receiving countries. Of the 2.3 million foreigners in Great Britain, about 60% are immigrants from African or Asian countries (all of them former colonies: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh). Immigration from Europe is comparatively low. Labour migration from Yugoslavia or Turkey is practically non-existent. Almost three quarters of all 'European' migrants come from Ireland, the demographic 'hinterland' of the United Kingdom. On the other hand, 73% of all foreigners in Ireland are EU foreigners and most of them are citizens of the UK.

Federal Republic of Germany

Germany is the most important receiving country for migrants from the Eastern and South-eastern parts of the continent. Immediately after the Second World War, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was the destination of about eight million displaced persons and approximately three million citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), who escaped before the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Between 1955 and 1965, the number of non-German immigrants in the Federal Republic was thus relatively small.

Until 1965, it was mainly Italians, Spaniards, and Greeks who came to the FRG, apart from ethnic Germans or East Germans. Ten years later, the situation had markedly changed. The absolute numbers of Italians, Spaniards, and Greeks had gone up, though their share in the foreign resident population had declined sharply. The reason for this development was an enormous surge of immigrants from Turkey, Yugoslavia, and other European and non-European countries. In the period between 1975 and 1988, for the first time, an increased number of immigrants from Portugal, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia also had some statistical impact.

France

Whereas the origin of West German immigration was almost exclusively restricted to the Eastern and Southern parts of Europe, the recruitment area for French immigration comprised the entire Western Mediterranean: Portugal (as the largest foreign minority group), Spain, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Italy. The number of migrant workers from Yugoslavia and Turkey has always been low. The structure concerning the origins of foreigners in France has been consistent over time. What has increased, however, is immigration from Morocco, Portugal, and the rest of the world (the category 'others').

A typology of European migration

18.7 million foreigners live in EU-15. Two thirds of them (13 million) hold citizenship in a country other than that of one of the 15 EU Member States. These immigrants migrated into one of the 15 EU countries in an unknown year, under various legal conditions and with different motives for their migration. When asking migrants why they chose to leave their former home, one receives a huge variety of answers and causes. Some were looking for a better job or a higher income or were escaping from political oppression. Others had to leave their country because of war, expulsion or ethnic cleansing. When trying to summarise the different causes and motives migrants have, three different clusters seem to be relevant:

1) Labour migrants and family members

   The first and most important cluster combines all motives related to income and job opportunities. Countries with a flourishing economy, a great demand for labour and high wage levels develop gravitational forces ('pull' factors). They thus become attractive to migrants from countries with high unemployment rates, low wage levels, and stagnating economies ('push factors'). Migrants looking for a higher income and better job opportunities tend to follow the gradients of economic disparity. They enter the EU as so-called 'economic refugees' with no legal legitimacy or as labour migrants (or family members) under the rules laid down by the national employment systems.

2) 'Ethnic' migrants

   The second cluster of motives, causes and migrants is a special one. For some countries in the EU, this cluster is important; for others, it is not. The major characteristic of ethnic migration is a country's responsibility for all those belonging to its ethnic community ('ethnic responsibility'). Hungary feels responsible for all Hungarians, including those living in Romania, Slovakia or Albania. Germany granted privileged status to all Germans, whether living in Poland, Romania or the former Soviet Union ('resettlers' or *Aussiedler*). In the same way, Israel favours all Jews, regardless of where they come from. As a rule, this method of entering Europe is strictly regulated on a bilateral basis. This form of migration does not occur spontaneously, nor does it obey the laws of the push-pull model.

3) Asylum-seekers

   The third cluster combines all motives for migration as a result of violence against individuals for political, racial or religious reasons. Asylum-seekers are not looking for a better job but for a safe haven. The causes for this type of emigration are defined in the Geneva Convention. The entry door of 'asylum' is and remains a narrow one only open for a few people. Entry to Western Europe was easier for the refugees coming from the former Communist

sphere of influence. Those managing to break through the Iron Curtain almost automatically enjoyed political asylum in Western Europe. However, since the middle of the 1990s, many European countries have acted together to make the asylum procedure more restrictive.

When trying to evaluate which of these three clusters of migrants and motives are important or not, one can divide the annual inflow into two different sources: labour migration (and family reunification) on the one hand, and asylum-seekers on the other.[1] The sheer number tells us which part of an annual inflow is relevant in a statistical sense and which is not. It bears repeating, however, that the basis for this type of data is incomplete (for Spain, the numbers of asylum-seekers are treated confidentially and therefore not reported; the same holds true for Italy) and that the interpretation should thus be handled with care. Notwithstanding, some important information on the characteristics of European migration can be gained.

The first and numerically most significant form of migration comprises all those migration flows occurring in line with the legal principles of labour migration and family reunification. More than three quarters (including the missing values for Spain and Italy) of all European migration flows were of this type. Although this form of European migration is in line with the push-pull model, it is usually regulated on a bilateral basis. This applies to labour migration from non-EU countries into the EU, but not to migration within the EU. Because the majority of labour migrants comes from the less-developed European 'hinterlands' and from the Mediterranean periphery, the picture of an uncontrolled wave of immigration is false. It is still true that the majority of labour migrants are 'summoned' and do not 'flood' Western European labour markets uninvitedly.

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[1] The ethnic migrants are strictly linked to the German migration regimes and they are not included in the annual number of immigrants. Therefore one can neglect this cluster of motives and migrants. More and more of these resettlers have been from the former Soviet Union and after a peak period in the first half of the 1990s the number was limited for administrative reasons.

Table 4: Number and distribution of asylum-seekers in the EU-15, 1999

	Asylum-seekers	Inflow	Asylum seekers as % of inflow	Distribution of asylum-seekers (%)
Belgium	33,253	68,466	48.6	10.3
Denmark	6,537	51,372	12.7	2.0
Germany	95,312	874,023	10.9	29.5
Greece	1,527	12,630	12,1	0.5
Spain	0	127,365	0.0	0.0
France	30,300	57,846	52.4	9.4
Ireland	7,845	47,522	16.5	2.4
Italy	0	162,857	0.0	0.0
Luxembourg	2,929	12,794	22.9	0.9
Netherlands	39,274	119,151	33.0	12.2
Austria	20,136	86,710	23.2	6.2
Portugal	307	14,476	2.1	0.1
Finland	3,065	14,744	20.8	0.9
Sweden	11,771	49,839	23.6	3.6
United Kingdom	70,410	354,077	19.9	21.8
EU-15	322,666	2,053,872	15.7	100.0

Source: New Chronos database (partially estimated and author's own calculation).

In the year 1999, about 16% of the inflow migrating to or within Europe fall into the category of asylum-seekers. In reality, there may have been a few more of them, but the number does not correspond to the public perception. Most would estimate the proportion of asylum-seekers to be much higher when compared to that of labour migrants. In fact, towards the end of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the proportion of asylum-seekers increased as a percentage of the total inflow. By 1991, asylum-seekers had already comprised more than 25% of all those migrating within and into Europe. This was the latest point at which the national authorities reacted by tightening asylum rules.

The third fact, which can be seen in Table 4, is once again the uneven distribution of asylum-seekers inside the EU. Three quarters of all annual asylum-seekers can be found in only four Member States: Germany, the UK (more recently), The Netherlands and Belgium. Taking into consideration their population size, Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria and The Netherlands take in more asylum-seekers than do other EU Member States. Especially in the Southern European countries, the number of officially recorded asylum-seekers is small. The idea of sharing the burden is not the reality, nor is it reflected in terms of equal distribution.

Future trends

Despite political efforts to reduce and restrict international migration within and into the EU, the area remains an important centre of international migration. In addition to the tendencies already described, the following four points should be emphasised:

1) *Labour migration and family reunification* are the most important types of entry for most of the European countries. As shown before, more than three quarters of the annual inflow come from this type of migration. With the more restricted policy and the reduction of new entries, one can observe a disproportionate growth of family reunification as compared to labour migration. Family reunification and 'marriage migration' comprise the largest share of legal migration from non-EU countries.

2) As a consequence, new 'gates' have been opened for labour migration, for both low-skilled and highly skilled workers. *Temporary labour migration* seems to have made a significant comeback. Germany recruits large numbers of temporary contract workers and guest workers under bilateral quota agreements. Additionally, Germany has established a system for seasonal workers, through which more than 200,000 seasonal workers have been employed in Germany. These temporary workers are neither allowed to stay longer than six months nor to bring along family members, and are restricted to work in a single sector (mainly agriculture, forestry, hotels and catering, and fruit- and vegetable-processing) in a determined geographical area. Similar tendencies can be observed in other EU Member States (e.g. Austria).

3) The *restrictive labour-migration policy* is not compatible with a growing international economy. Highly skilled and managerial workers, as well as investing entrepreneurs, are of growing importance in the global economy. Therefore, extra quotas (in Austria) or a special programme (a German green card for IT specialists) were introduced to provide and attract skilled foreign labour. While tightening up on other types of immigration, the Austrian, German and French governments are making new efforts to encourage or facilitate the entry of migrants with needed skills, managerial experience and/or investment capital.

4) As a consequence of closing the legal gates into Europe, the importance of *unauthorised migration* is increasing. The available information on this is always very sketchy and politically misused. Nevertheless, in countries like Austria or Germany, a growing number of foreigners apprehended after crossing the border illegally can be seen as a sign of a growing illegalisation of international migration. In Italy, the vast coastline is not easy to control. Many people enter Italy and plan to travel further on into Germany, Switzerland, France or other countries in the North. Some of the sub-Saharan Africans and Asians stay on

in Italy or Spain working as street peddlers, in the construction sector or in tourism.

5) The growing illegalisation of international migration leads to the problem of *immigrant smuggling and trafficking.*[2] With official controls so much stricter in Western Europe, it has become increasingly difficult for unauthorised migrants to reach the EU or another country of destination without the help of a smuggler. The stricter immigration controls in Western Europe appear to play into the hands of the organised and criminal networks, which appear to have become more and more internationally organised.

6) As a consequence of a more restricted policy, international migration has become increasingly 'privatised'. Indeed, the growing importance of smuggling migrants can be seen as sign of *the privatisation of international migration.* Low-skilled labourers have only a slim chance of entering the Western European labour market legally. They are forced to organise their migration on their own, without official help. Highly skilled migrants can rely on the ability of private companies to organise their legal stay in another country. However, in both cases, government activities and controls are bypassed and will be bypassed more and more if this trend continues.

7) All EU Member States have become immigration countries. At present, the *Southern European countries* (Spain and Italy, despite their long-standing emigration history) *are especially confronted with both legal and unauthorised arrivals of migrants* from Morocco, Albania and other Mediterranean and African countries who are seeking work in a well-established informal economy. The majority of Italy's immigrants come from Morocco, the former Yugoslavia, and Albania. The Egyptian population in Italy and Greece accounts for one third of all Egyptians living in the EU. The Moroccan population in Italy and Spain has increased more than tenfold over the last decade (see Collinson 2000: 196).

8) The *Maghreb countries are of growing importance as a region of origin for the EU.* In the Maghreb, the population has been growing more and more as a result of its high fertility and young age structure. Economic development cannot keep pace with demographic growth. Unemployment, underemployment and high pressure to migrate to the EU are thus the consequence. Economic refugees from Mediterranean countries stranded on the coast of Spain or Italy are regular news on European TV or in newspapers.

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[2] 'Trafficking in migrants' and 'smuggling of migrants' are terms often used interchangeably but can refer to quite different phenomena. 'Migrant-smuggling', or 'smuggling in people', are terms that usually refer to a smuggler facilitating unauthorised border crossings for a fee. Although this is also a common method used for entering a country of destination, 'trafficking' generally refers to a set of practices that go beyond merely facilitating unauthorised border crossings, where legal means may in fact be used to bring migrants into a country to illegally exploit their labour (Laczko 2000: 181).

9) Despite most predictions, *Central and Eastern Europe will not be the scene of large emigration waves.* Nowadays, most of the CEE countries can better be called emigration countries, though they are still transit countries and have experienced some immigration.

10) On the political side, the most important trend lies in efforts to create *a duty-free internal market.* This implies greater cooperation among the Member States in the area of external border control and the development of a common asylum and migration policy. Since the late 1980s, EU governments have been involved in a complex process of harmonising policies in the areas of admission, unauthorised migration control, labour migration, and the status of non-EU residents. The Schengen Agreement (and its incorporation into the Treaty of Amsterdam) was a milestone in this regard. Nevertheless, it is still impossible to talk about a common European migration policy. What has been achieved is a mosaic of different efforts, strategies and common arrangements.

Despite all the concrete efforts to develop a European migration policy, one issue is crucial: up to now—unlike the USA, Canada or Australia—no Western European country has seen itself as an immigrant society. Despite Europe's multifaceted experience, most Europeans still consider mass migration as the historical exception. People remaining in one place their whole life is considered normal. Therefore, public opinion oscillates between the desire for humanitarian solutions in individual cases, and the call for more rigidity towards potential immigrants.

The different self-concept of most of the EU Member States as non-immigration societies is an important factor for understanding the current debate. It is a very complicated and time-consuming process to develop new legal concepts, political instruments and institutional arrangements that actively deal with immigration (see the discussion on German immigration law).

Nonetheless, the need for a targeted migration policy will increase more and more in the years to come. European societies require immigration to compensate for the imbalance in the present age structure and to fill in the gaps in the labour market. Especially after 2010, when the baby-boomers will have reached retirement age, it will be necessary to have well-established instruments for a functioning immigration policy. Therefore, Europe has to develop concepts for concerted migration policies based on quotas and preferential criteria. At the same time, measures must be taken to integrate legal immigrants, to develop their human capital and to use their talents. Europe will have to shift from the present restrictive policy of control and avoidance towards a more pragmatic migration-management policy in order to use the human potential of immigration to increase European competitiveness.

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Sirpa Taskinen

From a country of emigration to a country of immigration.
Case study Finland

Emigration

Until quite recent times, Finland has been a country of net emigration. Actually, when talking about migration, Finns first think of people who have moved *from* Finland; and the literature on migration largely consists of books and articles on Finnish emigrants abroad. There still are only a few studies of immigration *to* Finland.

During the last 120 years, more than a million Finns moved abroad. The first big wave of emigration was at the turn of the 19th century, when nearly 500,000 people moved away, mostly to the United States and Canada. In some regions, almost whole villages were emptied by emigration. Widespread propaganda, even songs, launched the movement—with fantasies of a land where the streets were paved with gold. Because the inheritance laws of those days granted the land to the eldest son, the other children were attracted to seek their fortune abroad.

The second great wave of migration took place after World War II. About 75% of these 700,000 emigrants went to Sweden (Komiteanmietintö 1990: 46). After Finland had finished paying its war debts, many industrial workers were left without work. Modernising agriculture no longer needed huge numbers of people; but in Sweden, there was a labour shortage.

It has been estimated that, without emigration, the current population of Finland might be 6 to 7 million instead of the actual 5 million (Korkiasaari & Söderling 2001).

Table1: Emigration from Finland, 1860–1999

Destination	1860–1944	1945–1999
Sweden	(45,000)	535,000
Other Europe	(55,000)	125,000
United States	300,000	18,000
Canada	70,000	23,000
Latin America	1,000	5,000
Asia	500	6,000
Africa	1,000	4,000
Oceania	3,500	20,000
Total	476,000	736,000

Source: Korkiasaari & Söderling 2001.

The establishment of the Nordic Common Labour Market in 1954 meant freedom of movement between Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. More than one million Nordic citizens have availed themselves of this opportunity. Finnish migration, formerly to North America and more recently to Sweden, can generally be described as labour migration. In the 1960s and 1970s, unemployment in Finland and better salaries in Sweden—as well as a demand there for unskilled labour—were the primary motives for migration. Moving was relatively easy, since there were no legal barriers; and geographic, social, cultural and linguistic obstacles were relatively minor (Korkiasaari & Söderling 1998 and 2001).

The phenomena of Finland becoming a member of the European Council (1989), the European Economic Area (1994) and the European Union (1995) all created freedom of movement for citizens of other EU Member States. In addition to that, it entailed a political dependency on European conventions and regulations concerning e.g. asylum policy and human rights (Laari 1998). Thus, the emigration of the highly educated has increased. The new countries of destination are now Great Britain, Germany and Norway.

However, only one out of every four Finnish post-war emigrants has moved to countries other than Sweden. Emigrants to Sweden were and still are relatively young, with more males than females. The majority of other emigrants have been women, especially those moving to Western and Southern Europe. They have tended to be older and better educated than migrants to Sweden, and their motives for migration are different. For women, marriage has been the main reason; whereas recently, career advancement and desire for experimentation have been the reasons for male migration (Korkiasaari & Söderling 1998).

Emigration has generally followed economic development in target countries: during booms, it has increased; and during recessions, decreased. Although wide differences in welfare and employment opportunities are a precondition for emigration, they are not a sufficient condition; the decisive factor is the demand for labour in the receiving country (Korkiasaari & Söderling 2001).

Immigration and repatriation

The first immigrants to Finland were the Romany in the middle of the 17th century. When Finland established its independence in 1917, there were about 6,000 Russians in Finland. After World War I, the number of Eastern European refugees in Finland was more than 33,000, and half of them were Russians. Many of them, however, left for Russian colonies in Central Europe.

After World War II, when Finland lost 12% of her land, it faced an enormous task in having to set up living conditions for 420,000 Finnish Karelians (10% of the

total population of Finland of that time). They almost unanimously left their homes, which were in territory that had been surrendered to the Soviet Union. This was one of the biggest population transfers in modern European history and was also exceptional in Finnish history. Over the centuries, the boundary lines between Sweden, Finland and Russia changed at least once every century. In earlier times, the people had remained on their lands regardless of who happened to rule the territory—be it the King of Sweden or the Tsar of Russia. During the 1940s, however, it was widely known that in the Soviet Union, people were not necessarily allowed to stay where they lived—'Siberia' was a threatening word at that time. Accordingly, the Finnish citizens decided not to wait and see what might happen to them but instead chose to move away before the conquerors came. With the help of special laws, those hundreds of thousands of people found a home in what was left of Finland. However, very often the piece of land that they received was not sufficiently large to provide a family living for very many people. Thus, the seeds for the next movement were sown.

From the end of the 1940s to the 1960s, a great deal of internal migration occurred within Finland, with the most rapid industrialisation and urbanisation development in all of Europe. While paying its war debt to the Soviet Union, Finland was obliged to enormously expand its industrial sector, and great numbers of people moved from the countryside to the cities. Along with rapid economic growth, this brought about major social change and caused many social and cultural problems for families.

Up to the early 1970s, Finland did not especially attract immigrants; and when the immigration started, it was at first mostly return migration from Sweden of expatriate Finns. Approximately half of them ended up coming back; every year, 3,000–4,000 Finns return from Sweden. Other emigrants came back as well, e.g. from North America.

In 1990, return migration also started from Russia and Estonia, amounting to 2,000 persons per year. One special part of that, called 'repatriation of the Ingrian people', has been the topic of a major debate. Ingrians are descendants of Finns who, in the 17th century, settled in the area around present-day St. Petersburg, during a period when the surrounding area—along with the rest of Finland—were a part of the Kingdom of Sweden. In 1990, the then President of Finland, Mauno Koivisto, brought up the issue of the Ingrians, saying that Finns owed them an honorary debt. Mr. Koivisto called them returnees with the same domiciliary rights as other repatriates. This statement started a movement that has brought around 20,000 Ingrians to Finland, with a similar amount waiting for permission to migrate.

However, most of the Ingrians nowadays do not speak Finnish, and their identity is Russian. Among the Ingrian migrants to Finland, the crime rate has been notably high; and especially the youngsters have found it difficult to adjust to life in

Finnish society. The present discussion in Parliament seems to be going in the direction that the Ingrians should be treated in the same way as any other nationality seeking to immigrate. In order to be considered as repatriates, a person should at least have a minimum knowledge of the Finnish language, some MPs have suggested.

Table 2: Finnish emigration and repatriation, 1980–1996 (in numbers of people)

Country	Emigration	Repatriation
Sweden	73,000	95,500
Norway	6,200	4,800
Germany	6,100	3,400
United States	5,200	3,200
Denmark	3,500	2,900
Great Britain	3,500	1,900
Spain	3,300	2,100
Australia	2,000	1,300
Switzerland	1,800	1,000
Total	104,800	116,100

Source: Applied from Korkiasaari & Söderling 1998.

Actually, the 'real' immigration of people of foreign origin only started some twenty years ago. From 1981 on, the number of immigrants has exceeded that of emigrants by 6,000 to 10,000 persons yearly. A shortage of domestic labour at the end of the 1980s had some effect on immigration; but because of the recession of the 1990s, this did not last long. After that, the reasons for increased immigration were the collapse of the Socialist countries, civil war in the former Yugoslavia and developments in Asia and Africa that caused refugee problems.

Asylum-seekers, refugees and family reunification

Asylum-seekers began coming to Finland in the 1970s, first from Chile; the majority of them have since returned home or moved to another country. Vietnamese 'boat people' followed; and after them, people from 65 different countries, with the largest numbers from Somalia, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Turkey and Iran. Large groups of asylum-seekers have also included Slovakian and Polish Romany who, however, were not permitted residence since they were considered as coming from a safe country.

In all, from 1990 to 1999, more than 18,000 people applied for asylum in Finland. Of these, only 122 were granted refugee status; and 6,452, residence permits in Finland (Koivukangas 2000).

Although the absolute number of refugees remains low, regulations permitting family reunification have been applied relatively often, though often misused. At the end of the 1990s, Finnish authorities registered over 100 Somali children as missing, and their families gave no explanation to this. It was feared that some children might have been taken back to Somalia to be circumcised, for arranged marriages or to other disadvantageous situations. When the police started investigating these cases, it appeared that a great deal of these missing children had returned to Finland or Sweden with their name and identity falsified. The intention was to use these children as the core members for family reunification, since Finland generally accepted lone children as asylum-seekers. However, DNA tests revealed that all the applying 'relatives'—there could be over ten of them per child—were actually not related to the children. Because of these experiences, DNA tests will be applied routinely in all family-reunification applications.

'War children' and international adoptions

During World War II, some 80,000 Finnish children were evacuated to Sweden and Denmark to rescue them from the perils of war—a 'world record' in its kind. Many of them stayed there for a long time, and although most children returned home to Finland, some were left there permanently to later be adopted by their host families. Studies on the psychological impact of these transfers have shown dual results. Part of the children face an incurable trauma, but it appears that most of them survived without any major problems (Salminen 1998).

International adoptions in Finland follow the same pattern as migration: first out of the country, and more recently into the country. Up to the 1970s, a number of Finnish children were adopted by Swedish and Danish families. Since then, there have been very few children available even for domestic adoptions in Finland—a single mother bearing a child is no longer something to be ashamed of, there are reasonably good benefits for children, family-planning services are widespread, abortion is an option, etc.

The Adoption Act was renewed in 1985, with regulations for international adoptions. From then on, international adoptions to Finland have grown to 200 children yearly, and there are hundreds of families in line waiting to get a child through international adoption. In recent years, most adoptions in Finland have been from areas of the former Soviet Union. Earlier, the biggest adoption countries were in Asia, mainly Thailand, and to some extent Vietnam. Finnish parents

have also adopted children from South America, mainly Columbia. In Africa, the country providing the most children is Ethiopia (Kartovaara & Sauli 2001).

Foreign citizens in Finland

The foreign population living in Finland can be divided into four groups that partially overlap:

1) *People with Finnish roots* (about 25,000 people): The majority of these are Swedish citizens, former emigrants themselves, and their children (who emigrated in the 1960s and 1970s), as well as Russian Finns/Ingrians.
2) *Spouses of Finnish citizens* (about 22,000): Marriage has been one of the main reasons for coming to Finland. The vast majority of married foreigners have Finnish spouses—81% of the men and 85% of the women.
3) *Refugees*: The total number of asylum-seekers and refugees with resident permits was about 15,000 (17% of the total number of foreign citizens in Finland).
4) *Labour migrants, students, family members and others* (at an estimated figure of 20,000–25,000): The number of labour migrants in Finland is small. Usually they live in Finland for a specified time only, often as employees of a multinational company (Korkiasaari & Söderling 2001).

Table 3: The most common reasons for granting the initial residence permit within various national groups

National group	Most common grounds for initial residence permit
Former Soviet Union, Estonia	Finnish Ingrian repatriate
Somalia, Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Vietnam, and Afghanistan	Refugee
Sub-Saharan Africa	Student
Nordic countries	National of EU or EEA Member State
Oceania (Australia)	Finnish relatives
China, East Asia	Work
EU, Switzerland, Eastern Central Europe, North America, South America, Central America, Maghreb countries, Middle East, Thailand, Philippines, India, Turkey	Spouse of a Finnish citizen or of a foreigner who has a permanent residence permit

Sources: Ministry of Labour, Directorate of Immigration. In: Forsander 2001.

Foreigners in Finland speak some 150 different languages. The ratio of men to women varies according to ethnic group. The majority of Africans and Southern and Western Europeans are men, whereas the majority of Soviet citizens, Filipinos and Thais are women who have come to Finland for marriage. Approximately

2,000 foreigners marry a Finn every year. Finnish women marry a foreigner slightly more often than do Finnish men. The husbands come most often from Sweden, Turkey, the USA or Morocco. The wives, in contrast, come from the former Soviet Union, Sweden and Thailand. Divorces among these marriages are more frequent than among domestic marriages (Statistics Finland 2001).

The number of foreign citizens in Finland has always been very small. Even nowadays, only about 2.5% of the population (130,000 persons in 2000) are of foreign origin. This is a lower percentage than in any other European country. Of these immigrants, 90,000 come from Europe, 20,000 from Asia, and 10,000 from Africa. Citizens from the former Soviet Union form the largest single national group of immigrants (31,000 persons) in Finland today; Swedes are the second largest (28,000), though many of these are returnees of Finnish origin. Other relatively large groups of foreigners are people from Somalia (4,400), Iraq (3,000), and former Yugoslavia (2,500). From a total of 9,000 EU citizens, the largest groups come from the United Kingdom (2,200) and Germany (2,200). The United States is represented by 2,100 people (Statistics Finland 2001).

Although there is a great variation in educational background within all nationality groups, the highest median level of education is among those from China (though a bipolarised group), the former Soviet Union, Eastern Central Europe, North America and the Nordic countries. Their occupational segments are mostly health care, sales, business management, teaching and the technical fields. Southern Europeans, South Asians and Africans are more often found in catering and cleaning, where pay, socio-economic status and housing conditions are inferior. At the end of 1997, the highest proportion of entrepreneurs were citizens coming from Turkey (22%), the Middle East (7%) and EU citizens (7%) (Forsander 2001).

The rapid growth of the immigrant population from the beginning of the 1990s onwards coincided with a deep recession. It caused mass unemployment among the majority population, with young people and immigrants particularly affected. For immigrants, the 1996 unemployment rate was as high as 48%, and there were also major differences according to ethnic group. The unemployment rate for Vietnamese was 59%, for Russians 69%, and for Somalis 81% (Korkiasaari & Söderling 1998).

Employment has increased only very slowly since the end of the recession, and most immigrant groups are still two to three times more likely to be out of work than are Finnish-born people. However, the unemployment rates of US and EU citizens hardly differ from those of the mainstream population (Forsander 2001).

Regionally, immigrants are concentrated in the big cities. Half of the foreign population in Finland resides in the Helsinki metropolitan area.

Migration policies in Finland

Asylum and refugee policies in Finland have traditionally been very strict, and Finland has been heavily criticised for it—especially by the other Nordic countries, which have been far more generous in their policies.

The principles formulated by the Migration Commission were the policy basis in the 1990s (Komiteanmietintö 1990: 46):

1) Each country must secure its economic and social development using primarily its own labour.
2) Migration policy must further balance development in the labour market.
3) Migration policy must be based on the principle of reciprocity.
4) As regards the arrival of foreigners into a country, refugee policy and labour policy must be separate. Humanitarian grounds and principles based on the refugees' own needs must remain the criteria for acceptance.

In 1991 and 1993, the debate in the Finnish Parliament on the Aliens Act revealed that there were basically two positions. One stressed the rights of the state ("to protect the citizens against a flood of foreigners") and the other stressed the rights of the individuals and the needs of human beings for safe living conditions ("A person has to have the right to save her/his life!") (Laari 1998).

Some MPs argued that a small country like Finland has the right to think egoistically. The main fear was that there would be a large number of asylum-seekers who do not fulfil the criteria of a 'true' refugee but who would only come to benefit from the Finnish social-welfare system. When comparing social-welfare regulations and practices in Finland with those of other European countries, some MPs felt that the foreigners in Finland would receive better benefits than the Finns living abroad. Other MPs argued on the basis of international agreements and a common understanding of human rights. They emphasised that the legal protection of an individual, which is generally highly respected in Finnish society, applies to foreigners as well (Laari 1998).

In 1994, the Advisory Board for Refugee and Migration Affairs published a paper entitled *Principles of Finnish Refugee and Migration Policy*. The gist of the actions proposed for the various sectors of society was to ensure that immigrants were to be treated according to the principle of equality. The Board considered it important that, despite her special features and geographical position, Finland should not deviate greatly from the policies pursued by other Nordic countries. Bearing in mind the goal of integrating immigrants into Finnish society, the paper reviews in detail those measures designed to promote good ethnic relations and a comprehensive range of services (Komiteanmietintö 1994: 5). Following to the proposals of the Advisory Board, Finland's annual quota for refugees has been gradually raised.

Over the past few years, it has been the intention of Finnish legislation to maintain as well as possible the rights of refugee applicants, such that the review time for official applications is long, often even more than a year. Extension of residence has resulted, above all, in asylum-seekers residing in Finland reapplying for refugee status after initially being turned down for asylum. This has been one of the most noticeable defects in the Aliens' Act before the reform in 2000. The goal of changing the law was that an individual arriving from a safe country or another asylum-granting country would have his or her petition processed quickly. Also, the decision to repatriate the applicant could be made immediately and carried out post haste (Koivukangas 2000).

The 'Eastern enlargement' of the European Union creates special pressures for Finland. Provided economic integration and transformation succeed, according to some estimates (e.g. Fisher 1998) the Baltic region may well become a centre of economic gravitation within Europe. Thus, the successful economic transition and integration of the former Communist countries bordering the Baltic See is also of interest to Finland. The border between Finland and the former Soviet Union currently forms the biggest welfare and economic gap in the whole world. Will there be a flow of immigrants to Finland from the neighbouring Baltic states and from Russia?

The results of opinion polls vary considerably. In a poll made in Estonia in 2001 by Saar-Poll Institute, 49,000 Estonians were willing to move to Finland if Estonia joins the EU. However, almost half of these people were either unemployed, pensioners, housewives or students. Most of them had no foreign-language abilities, nor had they any contacts abroad. The researchers thus concluded that their wish to migrate was unrealistic. Another poll conducted in Finland by a labour union (SAK) estimated that 400,000 Estonians would be willing to move to Finland. A third poll by the Economic Commission (Talousneuvosto) only came up with 5,000 possible applicants, since the jobs now available require a high level of education and skills (Greijus 2001).

In conclusion, there is widespread agreement that already now and especially in the future, several ethnic groups will reside permanently in Finland. European integration will also increase the number of short-term residents. Finland is thus faced with the necessity of transition from a rather homogeneous to a polyvalent culture. This has required training public officials and civic organisations in how to provide services to foreign-born people. In the education system, taking ethnic aspects into consideration is a still growing task. The media have played and will continue to play an important role in disseminating information and in forming public opinion on migration affairs.

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Ceri Peach

The UK: Transition from immigrants to ethnic communities

Introduction

This book is focused on the family dimension in immigration and accommodation of minorities to their new societies. In explaining the British situation, there are two strongly differentiated models at play, the assimilationist and the multicultural. The assimilationist and the multicultural models manifest themselves in totally different family structures and residential settlement patterns. The assimilationist model is represented by the Black Caribbean population of Britain while the multicultural models are exemplified by the Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

The period since 1950 marked a radically different ethnic demographic experience for Britain from anything that had preceded it. Although data for the early period are not precise, the broad picture is clear. The minority ethnic, non-European population of Britain rose from about 80,000 in 1951 to 4,6 million in 2001.

British statistics for its minority ethnic populations differ considerably from those for other European countries (Peach 1997; Mühlgassner 1984; Musterd et al.1998; O'Loughlin & Glebe 1987; Ogden 2000). Before 1991, statistics were based largely on birthplace. However, since nearly half of the ethnic minority population had been born in Britain by 1991 and since a considerable number of whites living in Britain had been born in colonial territories, birthplace proved to be a misleading way of identifying minority populations. There are white Indians and black British.

In 1991 the British census, for the first time collected statistics on the basis of ethnicity. In effect, these were racial categories (Black, Asian, White, Other) sub-divided by national or regional origin (Caribbean, African, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi etc.). The British statistical situation is therefore very different from that in Germany or Austria where reliable ethnic data can be imputed from citizenship and from France where ethnic data is even less attainable.

The breakdown of the British figures is given in Table 1.

Table 1: The ethnic minority population of Great Britain, by census category 1951–2000

	Black			Asian					Other
	Caribbean	African	Black Other	Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Chinese	Other Asian	Other Other
1951	28,000			31,000	10,000	2,000			
1961	210,000			81,000	25,000	6,000			
1971	548,000			375,000	119,000	22,000			
1981	545,000			676,000	296,000	65,000			
1991	500,000	208,000	219,000	840,000	477,000	162,000	157,000	197,000	290,000
2000	529,000	440,000	317,000	985,000	675,000	257,000	151,000	242,000	459,000

Source: 1951–1991 from Peach 1996a: 28; 2000 estimate from Office for National Statistics 2002, Table 5.6.

Figure 1: Ethnic growth and composition, Great Britain 1951–2000

Source: 1951–1991 from Peach 1996a: 28; 2000 estimate from Office for National Statistics 2002, Table 5.6.

In order to make the discussion of this case study manageable, the paper concentrates its discussion on the contrasts in family structure between the Caribbean and South Asian populations. It is necessary immediately to indicate the immense difference between the Caribbean and South Asian family structures. These differences are due much more to culture than to economic position.

Brief history of the growth of ethnic population

Britain's search for overseas labour took place 10 to 20 years earlier than in France and Germany and while those countries turned first to European sources (Peach 1991) Britain had already turned to its colonial territories in the Caribbean from as early as 1948. In the 1960s and 1970s, immigration flows from South Asia (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) overtook that from the Caribbean (Figure 2). Since then, natural increase has been the largest source of growth so that the majority of the non-European ethnic populations are now British born. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there has also been a rapid increase in European asylum-seeking populations, but these groups are excluded from my discussion.

Figure 2: Dates of arrival in Great Britain of the Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi population present in 1988

Source: Last name of editor of Labour Force Survey 1990 & 1991, Table 6–39.

The Caribbean post war migration to Britain is usually dated to the arrival in 1948 of the ship the *Empire Windrush*, which brought some 500 immigrants from Jamaica (Glass1960). West Indian immigration was closely correlated with the demand for labour in Britain and fluctuations in arrival correlated closely with fluctuation in labour demand (Peach 1991). In contrast with the later immigration from the Indian subcontinent, Caribbean immigration was, from the earliest days, well balanced between men and women.

The Caribbean movement to Britain was generally working class and manual (see Figures 3 and 4). However, while the proportion of Black Caribbeans in socio-economic class 1 (professional) was the lowest of the minority groups, it is also the case that the proportion of Caribbean women in white-collar occupations was higher than it was for Caribbean men and much less different from the white female population than were black Caribbean men from white men.

Figure 3: Socio-economic class of men 16+ by ethnicity, Great Britain 1991

Legend:
- I Professional
- II Managerial
- III(N) Skilled - non-manual
- III(M) Skilled occupations - manual
- IV Partly skilled
- V Unskilled

Source: OPCS 1993, Table 16.

Figure 4: Socio-economic class of women aged 16+ by ethnicity, Great Britain 1991

Legend:
- I Professional
- II Managerial
- III Skilled - non-manual
- IV Skilled - manual
- V Partly skilled
- VI Unskilled

Source: OPCS 1993, Table 16.

Indian and Pakistani migration to Britain started rather later than that from the West Indies. West Indian arrivals peaked in 1955–1964, while Indian and Pakistani arrivals peaked ten years later in 1965–1974. Bangladeshi arrivals peaked later still in 1980–1985 (see Figure 2).

The early South Asian arrivals, in contrast to the Caribbeans, were over-whelmingly male and working class. Their motivation was to earn money, to save and to send remittances to their families in the sub-continent (Dahya 1974). (This is not to say that there was not also an important professional Indian class, particularly those who came to university in Britain and those in the medical professions.) However, British immigration laws, which were designed to restrict immigration, had the opposite effect. Instead of returning home and losing the opportunity of returning to Britain thereafter, South Asian men brought their families to Britain and became settlers rather than transients (Robinson 1986).

Indian immigration, however, was not simply from the subcontinent. 25–30% of the Indian ethnic population currently resident in Britain originated in (or are descended from those who came from) East Africa. This was a largely middle class, professional and entrepreneurial group who were expelled from Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania by the newly independent African governments (Twaddle 1990; Robinson 1986). It was also a group which arrived in families, rather than as single men, and for whom there was no myth of return. This was a literate, English-speaking, sophisticated population for whom Britain was a country of settlement rather than temporary abode.

Contrasts between the Caribbean and South Asian populations

Clear economic differentiation exists between Indians, on the one hand, and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis on the other. Indian men have a majority (56%) in white-collar occupations and 13% in the professional class 1, while Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have majority in the manual occupations (57–66% respectively) and only half the Indian representation in the professional class (see Figure 3).

On the other hand, all three South Asian ethnic groups show very traditional family patterns and very high degrees of social closure. Marriage is held tightly within the ethnic group. British data are rather crude in demonstrating this point since disaggregation of data is by national group only. Religion and caste cannot be established from official sources. However, even on this basis, the degree of national ethnic endogamy is arrestingly high. Another point emphasising the traditional structure is that married couple families account for over 85% of Indian Pakistani and Bangladeshi families. Lone parent families are very rare compared to other groups and cohabitation is practically non-existent (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Family type by ethnicity, Great Britain 1991

Source: OPCS 1993, Table 19.

Nearly all South Asians live in family households (see Figure 6) and there is a small but significant proportion of extended families (households with two or more than one families) for all three ethnic groups: Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. No other ethnic groups manifests an equally significant proportion of extended families.

Figure 6: Households by family type and ethnicity, Great Britain 1991

Source: OPCS 1993, Table 18.

Caribbean social structure

The social structure of Caribbean family life in Britain is still very strongly influenced by institution of slavery in the West Indies. The *slave trade* was abolished in the British Empire in 1804, but *slavery itself* was not abolished for a further 30 years. There was, in any case, a strong incentive for slave owners to encourage procreation from their own slave populations. Marriage was forbidden, promiscuity encouraged and rewards were given to mothers for producing children (Roberts 1957).

One of the continuing social effects of the history of slavery in the West Indies was that women led fairly independent lives. Society was, in many ways, matrifocal or even grand-mother-focal, since women were generally working mothers and children were often looked after by their maternal grandmothers while their mothers went out to work. Another feature of Anglo Caribbean society was that marriage was generally a middle-aged or middle-class institution. There might be a variety of fathers for children in the same maternal household. This does not mean that many of the consensual unions were unstable, but cohabitation rather than marriage was the norm. Marriage was regarded as a middle-class middle-aged institution. Marriage, for the working classes, was something that might be achieved after the process of child rearing had been completed. Figure 7 shows that over 40% of Caribbean families were lone families and that over 30% of Caribbean families were lone families with dependent children. Married couples with dependent children (traditional nuclear families) represent only 20% of the total Caribbean families. The two other black groups present (Black African and Black Other) display similar patterns.

Figure 7: Family type by ethnicity and presence of children, Great Britain 1991

Source: OPCS 1993, Table 19.

For South Asian households, the Caribbean position is reversed. Between 60% and 80% (Indians and Bangladeshis respectively) of families are married couples with dependent children (see Figure 7). In other words, the overwhelming majority of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi families show a traditional nuclear structure.

Household size shows parallel differences between Caribbean and South Asian groups. Caribbean household size is very close to the average for the population as a whole. The average household size at 2.6 is only marginally larger than average (2.5) while Bangladeshi households are more than twice as large (5.4) and Pakistani households at 4.8 are nearly twice as large. Indian households—although larger than average (3.6)—occupy an intermediate position (see Table 2 and Figure 8). Part of the reason for differences in household size is to do with the age of the populations. The older white (and total) population have more establishments where children have left home.

Table 2: Household size, by birthplace of head of household

Persons per household	1	2	3	4	5	6	7 or more	Average number of persons
Total households	27	34	16	16	5	2	1	2.5
Caribbean	27	27	20	15	7	3	1	2.6
India	14	20	15	22	15	8	6	3.6
Pakistan	8	11	11	15	16	17	21	4.8
Bangladesh	5	7	10	15	15	17	29	5.4

Source: OPCS 1993, Table H.

Figure 8: Household size, by birthplace of head of household

Source: OPCS 1993, Table H.

However, differences between the different ethnic minorities have more to do with the degree to which women are employed in the formal labour market. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations are 95% or more Muslim (Modood et al. 1997: 298). They are also largely from peasant backgrounds and there is a strong cultural antipathy to women working outside the home. In the Bangladeshi case, this is compounded by the fact that women are, on average, ten years younger than their husbands and have large numbers of children. Women's participation in the labour force tends to keep them out of childbirth. Caribbean women had the highest rate of engagement in the formal labour market of all ethnic groups in Britain (67% in 1991). Bangladeshi women had the lowest rate of formal economic activity (22%), followed by Pakistani women (27%). Indian women, on the other hand, had a higher than average participation rate (55%).

The Indian population is predominantly Hindu and Sikh (42% and 38% respectively, Modood et al. 1997: 298). Hindu and Sikh attitudes to women working are much more positive than for South Asian Muslims and in any case, the higher socio-economic class of the Indians also encourages women to work.

A further inhibiting factor for Pakistani Muslim women to engage in work outside the home relates to marriage partner preference in arranged marriages. All three groups, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis practise arranged marriage as the norm. In Pakistani peasant society, however, this is coupled with a preference for first cousin marriages within the same village (Ballard 1990). This has difficult genetic consequences with significant levels of congenital disability prevalent in Pakistani households. At all events, the combination of large household size, single earners in their households, high unemployment rates, cramped conditions with high levels of overcrowding has meant that the predominantly Muslim Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups are 50% more likely than whites to report negatively on their health in the 4th Survey of Race Relations in Britain (Modood et al. 1997: 229).

Ethnic intermarriage

In the introduction to this paper, I referred to the differences between the Caribbean and South Asian social trajectories as the difference between assimilation and pluralism. On the face of it, particularly in the light of American experience, it seems unlikely that the Caribbean population would be more likely to overcome the white stigmatisation of race (despite cultural affinities) than it would be for South Asians to overcome cultural differences despite phenotypical similarities. Yet this seems to be the case. By American standards, there is an extraordinarily large degree of intermarriage or cohabitation between Caribbeans and whites, while South Asian groups manifest almost exclusive homogamy. Table 3a shows that 27%

of Caribbean men, living with a partner, had a white partner. For Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men the percentages married to someone of their own ethnicity was over 90% (Indians 91%, Pakistanis 93% and Bangladeshis 93%).

The degree of female mixed unions was smaller. Table 3b shows that the percentage of Caribbean women, living as a couple, who had a white male partner, was 15%, or just over half the rate of exogamy for Caribbean men. For Indian and Pakistani women, the degree of homogamy was 95% and for Bangladeshi women it was almost complete, 99.5%.

Table 3a: Ethnic intermarriage and cohabitation, Great Britain 1991, male pattern

Unions expressed as percentage of male's ethnic group

	White	Black Carib	Black African	Black Other	Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Chinese	Other Asian	Other Other	Total	Total
Black Carib	27.3	67.8	1.0	1.2	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.4	1.5	100	825
Black African	17.1	5.7	74.0	1.4	0.7	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	100	281
Black Other	51.7	2.0	1.4	42.2	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.7	100	147
Indian	6.9	0.1	0.2	0.1	91.1	1.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.3	100	1,935
Pakistani	5.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.7	93.3	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.4	100	831
Bangladeshi	3.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	1.7	0.4	93.1	0.0	0.0	0.9	100	233
Chinese	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	86.7	0.0	0.0	100	270
Other Asian	14.7	1.1	0.3	0.3	1.1	1.1	0.3	0.5	79.1	1.6	100	374
Other Other	50.5	0.5	0.2	0.5	1.6	0.9	0.0	0.5	1.2	44.2	100	432
												132,131

Table 3b: Ethnic intermarriage and cohabitation, Great Britain 1991, female pattern
Unions expressed as percentage of female's ethnic group
Ethnic group of male partner

	White	Black Carib	Black African	Black Other	Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Chinese	Other Asian	Other Other	Total
Black Carib	99.3	14.8	15.4	43.8	3.8	1.2	0.0	24.4	32.0	38.5	126,803
Black African	0.9	81.3	3.0	6.9	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.7	3.3	825
Black Other	0.0	2.3	77.9	2.8	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	281
Indian	0.1	0.4	0.8	43.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.3	147
Pakistani	0.1	0.3	1.5	0.7	94.6	2.2	0.0	1.5	0.9	1.4	1935
Bangladeshi	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.3	95.1	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.8	831
Chinese	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.1	99.5	0.0	0.0	0.6	233
Other Asian	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	72.2	0.0	0.0	270
Other Other	0.0	0.6	0.4	0.7	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.6	64.9	1.7	374
Total	0.2	0.3	0.4	1.4	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.6	1.1	52.9	432
Total	126,989	688	267	144	1,863	815	218	324	462	361	132,131

Source: Peach, 1999.

Conclusion

This paper has reviewed the social and economic position of non-European minority ethnic groups in Britain, focusing in particular on those from the Caribbean and South Asia. Over the course of the second half of the 20th century the minority population has grown from 0.1% of the British population to just under 7%. The Caribbean population rose rapidly in numbers between 1951 and 1971 but has been stable in numbers at around 500,000 for the last 30 years, although the addition of children born to mixed couples would increase their number by 50 percent. The South Asian groups have continued to grow fast over the whole 50 years since 1951, and between 1971 and 2000 the Indian population increased from 375,000 to 1 million, the Pakistani population from 120,000 to 675,000 and the Bangladeshis from 20,000 to 260,000.

■ There are major differences between the Caribbean and South Asian populations.

■ In the first place, the Caribbean household structure has converged very closely to the British average while the South Asian households have remained

diverged. The British average household size in 1991 was 2.5 person and the Caribbean 2.6, while the average Indian household was 3.6, the Pakistani 4.8 and the Bangladeshi 5.4.

■ South Asian households continue to have a significant proportion of extended families, maintaining a strong cultural pattern from the subcontinent. This differentiates the South Asians from all other groups in Britain.

■ In terms of intermarriage and cohabitation, the Caribbean population has shown remarkable assimilative tendencies with very significant degrees of black/white unions. Over one fifth of the unions involving Caribbean women or Caribbean men were with white partners. The *4th Survey of Race Relations* showed that one third of Caribbean children who lived with both parents had one white and one black parent (Modood et al. 1997: 15).

■ The Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups, in contrast, show very high degrees of homogamy and social encapsulation, with arranged marriages and well over 90% of unions being to persons of the same ethnicity. The rates of intermarriage with white partners were 5%, 3% and 1% respectively for Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

■ South Asian families consist overwhelmingly of married couples of the same ethnicity, with children.

Caribbean patterns, in contrast, are extraordinarily fragmented and mixed. 42% of Caribbean families were of the lone-parent type compared with 13% for the total population, 9% for Indians, 12% for Pakistanis and 13% for Bangladeshis.

The conclusion seems to be that the Caribbean population is highly assimilated socially with the white population despite being economically more blue-collar in men's employment. Caribbean men have a higher proportion of white partners than Caribbean women. Caribbean women have a more white-collar employment pattern than Caribbean men and in socio-economic structure look similar to white women. On the other hand, they have a very high proportion of single-parent households with children and those in this position are economically disadvantaged.

The South Asian population has sharp economic distinctions in terms of economic success (Indians doing well and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis badly) but show strong cultural similarities in terms of social organisation. Family structure is overwhelming nuclear, married couples with dependent children are the norm. Marriages are arranged and ethnic similarity of partners is very high and extended families are still significant. Household size is related to ethnicity and social class. Indian households are smaller than those of the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. The latter two groups still seem deeply locked into traditional values and forms. The Muslim religion seems to have a major influence on their patterns.

There are thus sharply divergent economic and social trajectories between and within the black and Asian groups. The Caribbean population shows a remarkable degree of social assimilation with the white population (high degrees of inter-marriage, cohabitation and mixed race children; evidence of declining residential segregation and sub urbanisation). The Asian populations show high degrees of encapsulation, homogamous, often arranged marriage; nuclear families with children, extended families; marriage rather than cohabitation; residential concentrations are tending to increase (Peach 1996b, 1999). Despite similarities of social organisation within the South Asian groups, there are major differences in economic success, related largely to religious affiliation.

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Section 2:
The role of families and relatives
in the migration process

Raffaele Bracalenti and Moreno Benini

The role of families in the migrant integration process[1]

From deterritorialisation to post-national citizenship: the evolution of the significance and role of immigration

With the oil crisis in 1973 and its negative effects on the economy, migratory politics in Europe underwent a significant change. Immigration stopped being considered as the solution to the labour shortage, as it had been during the post-war period; instead, it became a 'problem'. Limiting immigration became imperative: within a few months, the European countries that had traditionally imported foreign labour either froze or cancelled their entry programmes for foreign workers.

These policies, however, did not fulfil the proposed objective—i.e. limiting the influx of foreign manpower—and actually gave rise to opposite effects. Not only did seeking political asylum become an important channel for getting around the limitations imposed by European legislation, but a large percentage of foreign workers began bringing in their families, thereby giving a permanent character to what had been thought of as temporary migration. The possibility of legal permanence was thus no longer exclusively associated with the availability of work, given that alternative entry channels for new types of immigrants began opening up (Penninx 1986: 951).

From individuals in search of work and temporary guests with roots elsewhere in the geographical, social and cultural place where they aspired to return following the migratory project, labour migration gave way to settled migration. Immigrants, along with their family members, started to gradually give shape to the phenomenon that Appadurai (2001) defines as the 'deterritorialisation of hope': A new and unpredictable world, fluctuating between periphery and virtual centres, proximity and virtual distances, super-imposes itself over local practices… With the recent increase in models of large-scale migration and deterritorialisation, an antagonism develops between the local reality and the homogenising influence of the nation state on one hand, and translocality on the other… Transnationalism becomes a kind of territorial paradox that is often superimposed with great conflict over the fragility of the nation state (Pandolfi, in Bhabha 1997: 10–11).

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[1]   This paper is based on the findings obtained in the Family Reunification Project (FARE), which was sponsored by the European Commission and coordinated by IPRS.

In other words, the 'fortress Europe' has been challenged by significant changes in the world order: the borders of the nation-state have been weakened and, on some levels, even torn down, thus loosening the control on goods and services. In this context, it is even more inconceivable to try to control people, the ideologies they follow and the motives for their transnational movements.

The conflict between locality and translocality has resulted in the emergence of internal conflicts within the nation-state; and difference, instead of being conceived of as a phenomenal dimension characterised by its relationship to the locality, is increasingly understood as a salient, permanent property of groups. National policies utilise mobilised cultural differences, in articulating group identity, putting up barriers between groups and invoking tensions between the demands presented by the locality and the vindications of new immigrants.

Going from invoking cultural difference to excluding political participation is a short jump. The imaginary frontier that aims to construct identity and self-definition is both erected by and inserted into the power relationships limiting the flourishing of space that consequently is never perceived as collective or community-based. National politics draw impetus from the effort to maintain a clear distinction between 'us' and 'them,' with all the opposition inherent to this definition, in its explicit regard for the principle of belonging to a different community and having a different cultural identity.

Migration policies seem to fully reflect this tension, particularly manifest in rigid entrance regularisation schemes that emphasise the existence of status differentiation among the individuals making up the national aggregate that immigrants join.

The larger issue of citizenship and all that it implies—protecting a nation's citizens and ensuring a certain standard of living for them in terms of education, employment, health services and housing—underlies the restrictions of immigration within a theoretical framework that makes the concept of belonging to a community the discriminating factor between opposing interests—not the least of all economic ones:

> "The modern western nation is a practical affair. It provides defense, civil order, a system of justice, an economic structure, a framework for industry and for commercial transactions, systems of transportation and communications, and so on. It demands solidarity among its citizens, which means their willingness to accept the moral and legal norms of the collectivity, to pay taxes and otherwise support the government apparatus from which all benefit, and to come to the common defense. Citizenship is a matter of obligations and reciprocal benefits…" (Pfaff 1994: 23).

Nonetheless, contemporary international migration, in great measure responsible for the evolution of diverse and multicultural societies, poses various new prob-

lems that do not exclusively imply political belonging or legal recognition. Indeed, translocality means that cultural mobility requires the migration discourse to reconsider the terms of national practices and to take into consideration the new and different ways in which the emotions, interests, and aspirations of immigrants increasingly cut across those of the nation-state. It is precisely the existence of these public *diaspora* spheres (Appadurai 2001: 26) that underline the inefficiency of national public spheres and the need to confront new cultural dynamics and connect them to the political sphere. This would, in turn, prompt a wider reflection, which includes and at the same time transcends contemporary reflection. Public *diaspora* spheres do indeed represent the testimony of a new, transnational political order in which the classical concept of citizenship and the rights associated with it must be restructured and reinterpreted in light of the inevitable negotiations between different worlds and the interests inspired by the movement of peoples.

In recent decades, the nature of both migration and citizenship has changed in fundamental ways. According to the classic nineteenth-century American model, immigration was a first step towards the acquisition of citizenship and all the rights associated with this status, a model that was not often applied in post–World-War-II Europe. Instead, the state neither offered immigrants the possibility of citizenship, nor did the immigrants themselves necessarily desire it. However, citizenship laws in Europe changed, bringing in its wake reduced centralisation within the nation-states. As a result, European nations have emphasised granting rights rather than citizenship. They are at the forefront of what has been called the 'post-national' model, in which non-citizen immigrants enjoy certain universally recognised entitlements and basic human rights as a function of their 'post-national citizenship', which approaches that of citizens:

> "…what were previously defined as national rights become entitlements legitimised on the basis of personhood. The normative framework for, and legitimacy of, this model derive from transnational discourse and structure celebrating human rights as a world-level organising principle. Post-national citizenship confers upon every person the right and duty of participation in the authority structure and public life of a polity, regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that community" (Soysal 1994: 3).

The recognition of a series of unalienable human rights, reinforced on many levels and laid out in the international conventions to which most countries adhere, shows that the concept of identifying rights exclusively within the national context is indeed too narrow. The existing recognition of universal rights not only introduces a new concept of citizenship but also expands upon it: beyond the existence of an exclusively political sphere, there is a recognition of the emotional sphere

and its importance. Rights and needs are no longer identifiable with a specific territory or community, but rather with humanity itself.

Nevertheless, migratory policies are still marked by the specificity of national discourse, and the term 'immigrant' continues to evoke a frontier separating 'us' from 'them.' An inevitable tension is thus generated between universally recognised rights and those which are effectively conceded. One example of how national policies reflect this tension is in family-reunification policy as a subsphere of migratory policy. Although the principle of family has never been outrightly denied, and reunification has continued to be allowed under certain circumstances, modification of the relevant requirements can be—and is— effectively used to systematically regulate immigration. The criteria motivating that regulation may indeed have little, if anything, to do with the principle of family, the rights of married couples, or the best interests of children; and this disjuncture is perhaps the most glaring inconsistency in current family-reunification policies.[2]

Therefore, on the one hand, the norms and principles according to which foreigners can enter a given territory and partake of its community are set down; on the other, although the importance of the emotional and family sphere is recognised as the basis of a person's well-being, the political/economic sphere is still considered to be of primary importance.[3] Family reunification inevitably implies immigration control: hence, even though the family principle may be recognised as basically central, this recognition is less relevant for reunified families.

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[2] In analysing such trends, dependent upon the various stages of integration into the host country, we must also consider the legal-administrative framework that might favour or obstruct any intention family reunification. The right of an immigrant worker to reunite with her/his family is a right recognised by the United Nations, established by the notion contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 16, Paragraph 3), that "the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State" (United Nations, 1998). Within the various conventions that have taken place over the years, the two conventions adopted by the International Labour Organisation need to be underlined. In the first, Convention No. 97 of 1949 Migration for Employment, there was agreement on the non-expulsion of the immigrant worker and his family, in the event that the worker might not be able to continue working following illness or any injury following entry. The second, No. 143, of 1975 regarding Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and the Treatment of Migrant Workers, invited each member state to take all necessary measures—even by means of collaboration between different member states—to facilitate family reunification for all immigrant workers (ibid). Furthermore, the two United Nations Conventions concerning the rights of the child must be added: that of 1989, which stresses the family unit as an element of well-being and harmonious development of the minor, and that of 1990 on the rights of migrant workers and family members.

[3] Another aspect of the economic dimension of the 'family and immigration' issue involves the costs that the host society must assume once immigrants are joined by their families. These family members, who are normally economically inactive, must be guaranteed social services.

There are factors, however, that go beyond the conflicts emerging from the presence of opposing principles regarding immigration, along with the relative importance given to the policies of the nation-states in whose context it would be impossible not to take into consideration reflections on the multicultural society and integration therein. Nevertheless, it seems evident that the diffuse recognition of the individual migrant's needs is indeed underway, in light of the already changed role and significance of immigration. The multiples spheres that constitute a person's everyday life (family life, cultural practices, religion, partnerships and associations, residential space, friendships, relocations and trips back to the country of origin) must by now be taken into consideration insofar as they are superimposed on the classic image of the immigrant labourer.

Therefore, the important question to ask today is not how the immigrant fits into an immigration scheme, defined as the process of uprooting and changing location, but rather, what the immigrant's place is and how that person's identity can be recreated in the host country that is becoming increasingly permanent, as well as how this society takes into account that person's diversified needs. An immigrant's departure is less to be interpreted as a single, personal act than as a collective one, inasmuch as the immigrant's departure has activated and still maintains communication with the symbolic-economic-emotive network embodied by the family. Furthermore, the immigrant's journey increasingly implies a further movement of people for the purposes of family reunification, and consequently the reconstruction of old nuclear family ties and the creation of new ones—all of which are processes that widen the network of potential beneficiaries once an expanded group of rights becomes recognised.

Beyond this, immigration—and particularly that connected to family reunification—is changing the host society, and not just with regard to issues of diversity and integration but also in terms of altering national identity and perceptions of the family. These changes are perhaps less immediately noticeable but are likely to have an even more profound effect on societies.

Nonetheless, how can the family be defined in today's world of continuous transformation, increasingly evolving into a stage of cultural diversity? And above all, how are we to get past the terminological impasse of international conventions adopting a Euro-centric language that has been transposed into national legislation defining migratory policies?

According to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, "the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State". This 'family principle' is of course a very old idea, one underlying all family-reunification programmes. The first problem it presents, however, is how to define the family. The traditional concept of a stable 'nuclear' family, namely a man and woman who have gone through a marriage

ceremony and live together under the same roof with their biological children—at least until the children reach maturity (usually age 18)—is of ever more limited application.

This traditional definition has been challenged on a number of fronts by extended and economically dependent families (who might include grandparents, aunts and uncles, or cousins), divorced families and the creation of separate households and single-parent families, the independence of minors, adoption, new birth technologies that challenge and stretch our definitions of what is a biological child, and the marriage-like cohabitation of different and same-sex couples who may also have children, biological and not.

The correct semantic interpretation of the family does not conceal the fact that it offers only a legal recognition for potential migrants. When a host society can actually provide for the needs and demands of a stable immigrant population, what becomes implicit is the need to take into account the new role of the family within a complex network of relationships amongst its members and the larger community—both in the host society and the country of origin.

Indeed, emigration is increasingly proving to be an articulated process connecting spatially separated individuals within a fixed relational network. In a world in which both the point of departure and that of arrival are in constant flux on a cultural level, thereby rendering the search for stable reference points very difficult, it is the family—reunited or separated, nuclear or clan-based—that represents the mediating factor between host country and the country of origin. The family is indeed the place from which is it possible to begin restructuring new forms of collective expression and intergenerational relationships and to exchange networks between the past and the present. In this fluid situation, technology seems to be allowing for the expansion and continuity of communication, by contributing to the maintenance of the network of relationships and by picking up the 'familial fragments' that have been dispersed over several localities.

If electronic media and mass migration are largely characteristic of this age, it is not because of their technical novelty but rather because of their capacity to incite and enrich the imagination: As Appadurai (2001: 17–18) points out, very few people in today's world are without a friend, relative, or colleague that is not about to go elsewhere or that has not already returned home, bringing with them stories and possibilities. From this point of view, both the people and the images overlap, often in an unforeseen way, beyond the certainties of the home, as well as the intended unifying effects of both national and local media.

To summarise, emigration is currently subjecting the family to strong internal pressures that weaken the traditional system of family relations.[4] It is also true that through the sharing of collective space—enlarged because of greater possibilities of movement—and the use of technology as a medium of communication between the country of origin and the host country, family relationships are being restructured.

Since immigration is itself a process composed of distinct phases and components, it makes sense to consider the family as a social aggregate capable of projecting its shadow on all phases of the process. Family is meant as a group of individual migrants, separated or reunited, as a relational network at a distance, and finally, as an imagined relational network. Therefore, the family becomes a rich field of research—not only for analysing the relationship between social changes and identificational reformulations in their singular components, but also for observing the state and evolution of intercultural processes. Studying the family also allows us to study migration from another perspective, which is very telling in terms of assessing the changes in society that migration is effecting—not only through the presence of ethnic enclaves in the commercial sector, but also in terms of cultural habits and how the family is conceptualised. These broader questions of culture and habit also affect the national identity of the host countries, and ultimately the self-image that comes out of sustained changes in the exchange with diverse cultures.

This paper therefore intends to analyse how much literature has been produced on the nature and evolution of socio-cultural transformations with the family along this composite and articulate migratory path. In examining related studies, we have used an analytical model focusing on three distinct fields in which the family-immigration relationship acquires structure and form: the psychological-emotive, integrational, and economic fields. The family is undoubtedly the place in which suffering, transformations, pain and difficulties will affect the individual and/or the group as a whole. As a stage for change, it is a useful indicator of the level of integration. And as an economic aggregate—a system of internal production and dispenser of goods—the family will allow us to understand the nature of the rela-

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[4]   An important process through which immigration—understood as participation in a political-economic model—has an effect on family models can be observed in the acquisition of a wide range of impersonal services offered by and acquired on the market. Despite such corporate family models as clans and ancestry that are involved in different types of capital accumulation and group protection, the modern form of political economy develops such models as more accessible bank services, public schools, political protection and various public services that allow for survival outside the family network. From the moment in which the services and help that had previously been obtained through the family network are obtained in another way, the controls exerted by individual families will weaken or the relations between single components will change (Goode 1982: XI-XII).

tionship between individuals involved in the *diaspora* and their communities of origin in their home country.

The psychological-emotional dimension of the immigrant family

Along their journey of hope, immigrants take with them a cultural heritage that is used to define and restructure the new environment in which they find themselves. Within this rite of passage, which has come to represent the migratory experience, a new spatial symbolism is gradually defined, one denoting a continuously reproduced zone of interaction. Through the manifestations of composite exchanges between multiple forms of life involving both the host society and the various realities of immigration, single and collective identities alike reflect both the instability and prospective profundities, especially in processes of sedentariness where stability implies greater cultural interrelationships. The space of uncertain identity opens up a multitude of interpretations, from exclusion and marginalisation, as represented by the "walls of solitude" (Ben Jelloun 1997) that contain the suffering of people like the Moroccan who finds himself outside of his family network, living alone in the French suburbs, where he nurses his stifled dreams, all the way to the opposite extreme, where Creole logic (Amselle 1998) invites transformations in the public sphere that give rise to manifestations of disjuncture between territory, subjectivity, and communities of origin that increasingly connote a translocal conscience. In this case, technology is used to surpass limitations and distances, similar to what Levitt calls "social remittances":

> "...ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital … are the north-to-south equivalent of the social and cultural resources that migrants bring with them which ease their transitions from immigrants to ethnics" (Levitt 1998: 926).

These play a fundamental role in transforming the political and social life of the communities of origin and in consolidating the formation of a transnational collectivity. Generating this information reinforces family ties and re-establishes contacts that had been severed by travelling and distance. However, it also causes changes disruptive for the country of origin, even if functioning with internal diversifications dependent on the impact of the social and political life on a series of complex variables, such as

> "...the nature of the social remittance itself, the way in which it is transmitted, the characteristics of the transnational organizational systems and networks through which it flows, and differences between individual and nation-state senders and receivers…" (Levitt 1998: 944).

In this transition process, the migratory process increasingly consists of reordering and redefinition, with diversified manifestations, signs and exterior symbols. Customs change, the practicability of space expands, roles and functions are restructured on the basis of the new labour market, and new individual prospects are opened up—all with evident repercussions on the social context.

As traditional interpersonal relations are transformed, conflicts within the family become manifest.[5] New roles are created through the immigration experience: women acquire independence and practicability, calling into question patriarchal logic and often subverting it. This is exemplified by Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Belgium (Schoenmaeckers et al. 1999: 901), who are postponing marriage and following the trends of family size in European countries. Furthermore, women have begun to foresee emigration as heralding welcome changes brought about by modernity, such as more egalitarian relations with their partners. This is the case of the Moroccan immigrants described by Lievens (1999: 717) who, despite being within the traditional marriage *iter*—the arranged marriage—successfully subvert the logic of dominance within the system.

More complex processes of transformation also exist. Female African immigrants in France have often been 'catapulted' from a strongly community-based family universe to an individualistic one in which they are removed from contact with their family and community. Contrary to the way in which men are accepted by groups within the community, most women have experienced marginalisation and exclusion even in their own home (Poiret 1996: 90). And yet, after an initially traumatic isolation period, African women have been able to gradually recuperate visibility and emancipation, largely because of the dynamics of both the sending and host societies: in the former case, owing to the fact that in many regions of Africa women have traditionally played a significant economic role and acquired autonomy influential in the evolution of power relationships between the sexes; and in the latter, as a consequence of work opening up spaces that represent new resources favouring female socialisation (Poiret 1996: 91).

Holding onto tradition is also a response to the hardships of immigration, in which differences between traditional values and those of the dominant culture

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[5]   Conflict within families seems to be more present in reunited families than in those who emigrated together. In the first case, if the reunification comes about in various stages, a situation of adaptability and gradual transformation is more likely than in the second case, where there is more intense conflict. Furthermore, if it is the mother instead of the father who reunifies the family, this seems more likely to favour the children's integration, since the mother herself is a factor of change in her role of social, cultural and linguistic mediator in the host culture, accelerating the restructuring of an internal equilibrium. Finally, the superior social position of children, acquired through the daily contact with the host society, is capable of generating acute forms of intergenerational conflict (Lazzarini 2002).

are accentuated. Quiminal has underlined the link between the precarious situation of the Soninke immigrants in France, the re-orientation of their family projects and the continued practice of polygamy. After immigrants' vain attempts to create an acceptable situation, leading them into a state of victimhood, they tend to reconsider their ties to French society. The more immigrants perceive their future in France as being one without any chance for positive integration—for both themselves and their children—the more they will base their conduct on their own needs in the host society, as well as those of their relatives in the village back home. In engaging this perspective, polygamy takes on a double meaning: an expression of upward social mobility in their country of origin, and an immediate factor for marginalisation in French society (Poiret 1996: 96).

Restructuring the definition of the family must involve the complex relations between parents and children, played out from the moment in which the two models of socialisation enter into conflict. Relationships will become increasingly complex the more the immigrant family experiences situations of hardship. The home is the place for negotiating and building new relationships, in the context of families' inability to both reproduce an adequate family model and conform to local family norms.

The home indeed represents the central place where parents preserve the collective memory, the sacred and symbolic place that watches over identificational references. At the same time, it is the place for conflict and exchange between generations interacting with different spatial-temporal points of view, where external and internal practices come together in a hybrid space:

> "L'habitat et le logement constituent non seulement un reflet et un vecteur des cultures et des rapports sociaux, mais également un champ structurant des processus, des modes de vie et des interactions sociales … matrice révélatrice des articulations entre conditions matérielles d'existence, socialement construites, et systèmes de dispositions mentales intériorisées" (Bekkar et al. 1999: 273).

In this atmosphere, identification with familial reference models strongly associated with ethnic and cultural terms becomes a catalyst for inevitable conflict. In discussing the general underestimation of parental figures, Epstein (1983: 252) writes, that it has commonly been observed in situations of emigration, that the second generation often rebels against parental authority, in particular the father, culminating in the refusal of the life and value system to which the parents remained tied. Instead of looking to his parents for a model and content of his social personality, the son places a complete barrier between himself and his parents' attempts to orientate him, and his 'life project' comes from outside models. Successive generations therefore become completely foreign and isolated from each other.

Therefore, the immediate family, inasmuch as it represents values and traditions that often conflict with those of the dominant culture of the host society and denigrated because of its exclusion from that context, hardly represents a positive role model for a minor.

At the very least, the concept of family carries with it ambivalent connotations, certainly more than it would have in a monocultural environment. On the contrary, in referring to the mechanisms of maintaining the culture of origin as well as the complexity of results from the migratory phenomena and subsequent identity-remodelling processes, Epstein (1983: 225) says, it is probable that in the second generation, the sense of attachment to an ethnic group has notably weakened. But if, in the successive generation, an affectionate and indulgent relationship came about with the grandparents (such as that typifying non-Western societies), the conflict between successive generations is counter-balanced by the identification that develops between alternative generations. Through the process of identification with grandparents, the child comes to connect with some of their values, and in this way, the grandparents assume the symbolic function of continuity that offers an anchor of security in preserving a sense of ethnic identity.

In short, the immigrant family is placed at a crossroads of conflicting demands and must really work at adjusting, negotiating, and recreating their relationships. Breakups, nostalgia, and regret for lost ties constitute a silent backdrop to the everyday life of those who find themselves in another country.

The immigrant family does not necessarily mean conflict and breakup. In some cases, the family is the primary place for overcoming suffering, for recomposing the disjuncture between territory and subjectivity that ultimately gives shape to a hopeful migration. Indeed, it is with the help, support, and resources of the family that the individual manages to climb the social ladder of the host country by taking over both leadership and entrepreneurial roles, as Santelli demonstrates with his research on the children of Algerian families emigrated to France.

Therefore, the process of integration should not exclusively be interpreted as a path of assimilation requiring a break between generations as well as with the community of origin, as represented by the self-asserting path of the *self-made man*. Integration can also be interpreted as a process of socialisation within an intergenerational 'harmony' of social pathways:

"Dans cette perspective, les trajectoires sociales apparaissent étroitement liées à l'histoire familiale. Autrement dit, la façon dont les individus se meuvent dans l'espace social est appréhendée d'une part en référence aux parcours de la génération précédente (y compris au sein de la société d'émigration) et d'autre part à partir de ce qui est vécu, a leur niveau, sous l'effet des expériences socialisatrices" (Santelli 2001: 279–280).

In this case, the social trajectories are the result of successive and superimposed socialisations manifested in terms that differ from one generation to the next, as well as from one individual to the next. Confrontation, negotiation, accumulation, and the transmission of experiences and aspirations all make the individual both a product and an actor of his own family story (Santelli 2001: 281).

Memory and desire therefore come to connote the new mythologies of migrant subjects in different time periods and spaces. Thus, the family can act as the take-off point for ultimately transforming the glacial forces of habit in the accelerated beat of improvisation (Appadurai 2001: 20).

The family as both indicator and instrument of integration

The term 'integration' expresses a complex concept, the significance of which varies in time and space according to migratory politics, cultural-historical circumstances and the phases of 'rootedness' and development of which immigration is a part. Therefore, numerous difficulties arise when trying to formulate one precise definition of the term, because what distinguishes integration is its dynamic character and the fact that it can be defined both as the process itself and the point of arrival in the process of insertion (AA.VV. 2000: 13).

Seen as a process, integration can be considered a multilevel path that, as reiterated before, involves both the host society and the immigrant as an individual exposed to a complex network of symbols and meanings that includes her/his own country of origin. A complex interrelationship exists between those who seek to gradually give visibility to their own presence, in an attempt to obtain enough legal and cultural recognition to construct a new identity, and those who promote, protect and guarantee that recognition. As Taylor writes:

"Diverse parts of contemporary politics have at their center the need, and sometimes the question, of recognition. One could demonstrate that need is one of the motivating factors of nationalistic politics; and in contemporary political life, the question emerges in various ways, in defence of minorities or 'the underground', in some forms of feminism and in what is today called 'multiculturalism.' In all of these cases, the question of recognition is put under pressure by the presumed tie between recognition and identity … Our thesis is that our identity is moulded, partly by the recognition, and partly the misrecognition by other people, for which an individual or group can suffer real damage, a real distortion, if the people or the society that surrounds him send him, as through a mirror, an image of himself that limits, reduces or humiliates him … Whether or not this element has been exaggerated is debatable, but it

is clear that the ideas of identity and authenticity have introduced a new dimension in the politics of equal recognition, which today makes use of its own notion of authenticity, at least regarding the denouncement of distortions produced abroad. In this way, the discourse on recognition has become familiar to us on two levels: in the first place, in the intimate sphere, for which we mean the formation of identity and of self as a dialogue and uninterrupted struggle with other meanings, and secondly, in the public sphere, where the politics of equal recognition have taken on an even more important role …" (Taylor 1998: 9).

Between the intimate sphere, where identity is deconstructed and reconstructed in a continuous polymorphic movement, and the public sphere, where politics attempt to recognise the immigrant as a legal subject, there is a third sphere in which actual integration is a multifaceted process of transcending the continuous precariousness and the separation experienced by the immigrant, as noted by de Rudder (de Rudder 1997: 31).

Beyond the difficulties regarding the integration of various cultural models, owing to the persistence of ethnocentric approaches derived from historically rooted power relationships, integration can be defined as both the inclusion of new groups in the social and cultural structures of immigrant countries, and of how these structures are used in accessing the larger systems of the host society. Therefore, the more material, social and cultural resources that immigrants have at their disposal within their ethnic and family networks, the more these will become useful instruments of insertion into the host society—or at least into some of its component parts.

Moreover, to perceive integration as a process articulated on distinct levels— structural, cultural, social and identificational (EFFNATIS 2001)[6]—does not only mean utilising the heuristic properties of a theoretical model but primarily taking into consideration the complexity, articulation, and internal dynamics connected to the creation of a multicultural society.

An emphasis on the role of immigrant entrepreneurship in urban economies, and particularly the importance of family participation in this activity, reflects the social mobility of immigrants and their contributions to local economies (Kloosterman & Rath 2001). This does not mean that integration is fully accomplis-

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[6]   By 'structural integration' we mean the acquisition of rights, access and feelings of belonging to such host institutions as the school, apprenticeship and workplace. By 'cultural integration' we mean those changes in cognitive, cultural, behavioural and attitudinal processes. The chance to develop stable friendships, marriages and other relationships characterise social integration. Finally, by 'identificational integration' we mean the sense of belonging in and identification with the host society.

hed but rather that a real prospect of insertion into a certain sector of society has been created, and that the practicability of new spaces can determine an internal restructuring of the system towards an analogous experience on other levels. In a similar way, mixed marriages can be interpreted as partial, improvised or incipient forms of integration (Collet 1998; Tognetti Bordogna 1996; Philippe et al. 1998) that accelerate—particularly in children—the creation of multiple and hybrid identities. These examples reflect the desire for identification with the social and educative systems of the host country, which is the first step towards the development of a sense of belonging in the host context.

Belonging to an ethnic minority indeed constitutes a condition that exposes immigrants to the risks of discrimination and social marginalisation. Often this occurs for reasons related to the way in which immigration took place, along with the reduced possibility of regulating spaces confining the majority of immigrants to the risks of discrimination and social marginalisation. However, it is also true that the desire to integrate takes shape, particularly with the younger generations, often producing conflict within the family by generating an inevitable rift deriving from an ambiguous sense of belonging. It is precisely in the backdrop to this conflict, one produced by the plurality of dimensions on the individual and/or familial level, that negotiation, confrontation, enrichment, and multiplication of social experiences are all constructed. The social mobility of immigrants will therefore be the product of the combination of individual and familial factors (Santelli 2001: 27).

Therefore, on one hand, the immigrant minor is representative of the culture of origin, endowed with a sense of commitment and historical relationship to the parents' country of origin. On the other hand, when the present takes precedence, the minor aims to achieve a sense of belonging in the host society.

It will indeed be the attitude of the minor—a combination of her/his will and ability to endure the pressure of dealing with a situation of social and cultural precariousness—that will reduce the possibility of conflict and make integration possible on many levels. This happens through the practicability of new spaces and the definition of a multiple identity.

Recent research conducted in Germany, France and Great Britain (EFFNATIS 2001) has revealed reassuring considerations on the positive potential of delocalisation. This contradicts what sociological literature has always maintained regarding delinquency among second-generation immigrants, defined as the generation of 'involuntary sacrifice' who suffers the consequences of their parents' difficulties. Indeed, the new research points to a high level of insertion and integration among young immigrants in the host context. These young people demonstrate high levels of overall satisfaction, satisfactory educational and occupational results, low levels of discrimination, the acquisition of good linguistic competencies, and the development of a sense of belonging and identification with the host society. As

such, the creative and innovative possibilities for delocalisation and cultural hybridisation are defined amongst the younger generations by moving towards a gradual acquisition of visibility and participation.

The family as an economic aggregate

The final aspect of migration that we will examine regards immigrants' economic contributions to the family network in the country of origin. The movement of money transfers assumes specific importance within the migratory phenomenon, with studies on the topic seeing it as an uninterrupted process of symbolic and material communication put into motion by the real or virtual contact of complementary individuals dispersed over several locations. The circulation of remittances underlines even more both the irreducible relationship between country of origin and country of arrival, and the role of the mediator—as embodied by the family and understood as the 'clan network' and/or economic aggregate.

As Boyd (1989) emphasises, the phenomenon of money transfers is important because of its positive or negative economic impact on the country of origin. Remittances indicate the existence and persistence of social networks connecting migrants and non-migrants. They place the choice of migration within a wider family strategy and send messages on the opportunities and quality of life in the host country, often stimulating emigration amongst compatriots. In particular, such monetary transfers can be considered as having a double value:

■ *an economic value*, underlining the role of a consistent transnational and 'globalised' influx of money;
■ *a relational value*, in terms of how much the phenomenon evokes symbolic and cultural ties with countries of origin, the 'family-community nature' of emigration, and the role of cultural belonging.

Elsewhere, it would be opportune to discuss the macro-economic dimensions of remittances, their capacity to positively influence economic development in the country of origin and the nature and typology of transfer channels: the informal individual channel, the informal organised channel, the formal ethnic channel and the autochthonous formal channel (Zucchetti 1995: 61–62). Here, we focus on the sociological aspect of the phenomenon and analyse the relationship between remittances and the maintenance of family and community ties.

If the broader definitions of emigration provide for a system of material and symbolic relations that link migrants and non-migrants, remittances will then represent a tangible manifestation of the persistence of structured multidimensional

networks of relationships in which migrants and non-migrants find themselves involved.

The family network represents the channel through which transfers travel, often accompanied by messages. It is in this context that the decision to emigrate is conceived of and supported: the departure of the individual can therefore be interpreted as a strategy used in accessing what is necessary for the survival of the group elsewhere. The emigrant, whether an adult or a minor—a high number of unaccompanied minors is present in various European countries—is the person in whom the family invests and in whom reciprocal obligations are sustained. The relationship becomes even more long-distance, created by a balanced and calculated equation of costs and benefits. These earnings are not always material, since they may also involve the symbolic-social sphere. Sometimes, emigration influences the social position of families within the country of origin. Friedl (Davis 1980: 45) cites the case of a Greek community in Vasilika, Beozia, where in the 1950s and 1960s a good parent was someone who had successfully settled his children in the city, offering them good prospects for integration and success. In this sense, emigration certainly has a greater impact on the social position of individuals than does the economic help that emigrants generally provide for their family members at home.

The familial network can therefore be considered as a unit of internal production (Lucas & Stark 1985), a solidarity network and a way to climb the social ladder. It can act as the springboard for emigration and facilitate insertion in the host context, not only by offering logistical support and legal protection. Again, we refer to the example of unaccompanied minors, particularly Albanians in Italy, who find themselves with many family connections in the territory. It also offers a chance to work—as exemplified by the intergenerational restaurant activity of the Chinese or Korean shopkeepers in New York, where families generally launch their own businesses.

The more the process of settling into the host context assumes stable and definitive forms, the greater the risk of transformation in the relationships and communication regarding the type and amount of remittances. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily true that the quantity and typology of remittances reflect the immigrant's level of integration in the host context or the dissolution of solidaristic relationships. As we have already affirmed, the varied nature of the migratory journey—besides being intended as a project of economic and social mobility—will determine modifications, re-elaborations or adjustments. Reciprocity, solidarity, and co-operation within clan or family networks will overlap and become juxtaposed in the creation of new ties and interpersonal relationships. The different decisions regarding investing one's savings in the host society or the idea of returning to the

country of origin entail more than integration or the lack thereof, in that the motivations behind economic behaviour can have multiple interpretations.

Nonetheless, it is undeniable that developing a stable existence in the new country involves the emergence of new needs and greater expenses—above all in cases where the immigrant has started a family or been reunited with her/his family. This implies the use of resources that until then had been earmarked for the family of origin.

Furthermore, insertion into a different economic and social model incites transformations in individuals' behaviour and ways of thinking, thereby risking negative effects on interpersonal relationships with those who continue living in more 'traditional' contexts. These messages risk not only weakening family or community solidarity but also create new needs and expectations in those who stayed behind in the country of origin.

Therefore, imagination becomes the backdrop for impulses to act, which at the same time are capable of recuperating the sense of solidarity that underwent modification through individual delocalisation and relocation. The family or clan network therefore becomes the trampoline from which it is possible to launch action in new spaces. Appadurai (2001: 22) notes that it is the imagination, in its collective forms, that creates ideas of the neighbourhood and the nation, of fair economies and unfair rules, of higher salaries and the perspective of working abroad. Imagination today is a gymnasium of action, and not only of escape.

By determining delocalisation and transnationality, immigration leads the way towards the manifestation of new expressions of solidarity, which can then depart from family and other traditional contexts in which solidarity is customarily manifested—thus expanding its confines into vaster contexts of belonging. If emigration, as Soysal (1994) indicates, indeed leads to the constitution of a post-national model, then it will be inevitable to acquire principles that legitimise and give voice to the idea of a common belonging, with subsequent repercussions on the ideology of those who seek visibility in a delocalised context. Furthermore, if immigration is perceived as a transnational process constantly interfaced by the presence of the country of origin and the host country, the following will then apply:

"Events at one end of the process will likely affect even more what happens at the other. Thus, in future studies of remittance behaviour, it will also be important to consider indicators of the economic conditions and of employment opportunities for family members in the country of origin" (Menjivar et al. 1998: 123).

Conclusions

Pandolfi (1996: 11) notes that, at the end of the century and the millennium, we find ourselves in a moment of transition where space and time, in crossing each other, produce complex figures of difference and identity, of past and present, of exclusion and inclusion. Nowadays, geographical movement seems to be an established part of social life rather than an exceptional event. Work impels people to emigrate, often more than once in the course of a lifetime; wars, political persecutions, ecological disasters, and tourism are all factors that contribute to establishing a mechanism of perpetual motion. The possibility of movement is also translated into an interior tension, especially when it is the hope of change that causes people to leave their own country. Indeed, emigration presents itself as a phenomenon generally characterised by a series of opposites—economic calculation versus feeling, the challenge of change versus ties to tradition, the individual as a member of a complex system or as a solitary hero and actor in a huge undertaking, and the individual as one motivated by need or as a dreamer and visionary.

We therefore have a phenomenon characterised by complexity in its premises as well as its effects. Immigrant families are the new permanent social actors in migratory processes. The hardships and sense of social exclusion experienced by second-generation immigrants generate intra-family and social conflicts that can explode in a violent way. The diffusion of technology is determining the transformation and extension of family, community and ethnic networks between individuals separated by distance. The role of the imagination allows perceiving—and in some cases, also experiencing—new possible lives. The extension—and in part, the sharing of this symbolic world of reference with the host community—permits the practicability of spaces that are increasingly hybrid and translocal, and it determines profound transformations in the social roles of immigrant families. The right to visibility and belonging conflict with the closed attitude from the host community, while new models of post-national belonging emerge.

As a network of social, symbolic, and material networks, the family is therefore an instrument of communication. It assures a continuous influx of information and determines a strict super-imposition between individual and collective stories, between stories of those who construct and reconstruct sentimental ties and solidarity and those who maintain old obligations at a distance, between those who depart and those who stay. In such a context, emigration must be considered a common project involving those who remain tied to their territory and traditional social roles, even if only in appearance. However, at the same time, it is also true that this opens up discussions about the symbolic practices of host countries and, as an extended relational network, becomes a specific place for transformation— as much between individual migrants as between those who have not explicitly

made this choice—involving relationships between the sexes, social roles, generational conflicts and identity change.

Within this complex network of meaning, the spatial mobility of the family becomes socio-cultural: its forms break down and recompose themselves, projecting its shadows on morphology as well. The migrant family can break down within the migratory project in a multiplicity of individual stories and delocalised superimpositions, and the change and mobility render its forms difficult to identify. Perhaps the very same concept of a stable migrant project should be reconsidered in light of the transformations of intra-familial relationships, of the multiple and parallel dislocations that call for research on work. It might also be worthwhile to reconsider it from the viewpoint of the transnationality of rights that renders superfluous the prospective of roots and instead, opens up spaces for successive mobility, with outcomes of return.

The symbolic link between individual and community of origin, which is also an ontological one, has become increasingly mobile and deterritorialised, having fallen into the structure of diversified trajectories and different spatial-temporal paths characteristic of emigration today (Bekkar et al. 1999: 280).

Indeed, the diffusion of a post-national ethic recognising equal rights amongst human beings—regardless of their country of origin—should not be ruled out. Such recognition could contribute to extending social networks, modifying interpersonal relationships and spreading this symbolic-ontological link from within that fundamental social organisation—i.e. the family—in a new and more complex space. Hence, alternative and intermediate forms of solidarity—such as friendships, extended family, ethnicity and a sense of nationalism from afar—could acquire more consistency. In addition, these transitions will be the future subject of analysis to gain understanding into how individual identities and the need to belong are being reformulated, beginning with the family as the basic structure of personal identification.

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Pablo Pumares

A key dimension of family migration research: intergenerational relations in migrant families—a study of Moroccan families in Madrid

Introduction: the immigrant family

Foreign immigration in Spain only began to become significant from the end of the 1980s onwards. In 1992, following the regularisation process of 1991, Spain only had 219,951 immigrants from outside the European Community (61,000 of them Moroccans) as legal residents, or about 0.55% of the whole population. The majority had arrived a few years earlier and had acquired legal status as a result of the regularisation process. As is usually the case in the early stages of immigration, they were mostly working people who either did not have a family yet or had left part of their family in their country of origin. The processes of family reunification and family formation in the host country happened progressively in the years after the arrival of the first family member, at a different pace but nonetheless strongly influenced by obtaining a residence permit and/or by acquiring access to a relatively stable job. Between 1997 and 1999, around 22,000 family-reunification permits were issued to Moroccans, a figure which will probably increase following the regularisation processes in 2000 and 2001. We neither know the composition of these permits nor to what extent they are granted to the spouse or to children, but data from the Ministry of the Interior from late 2000 point out that over 20% of the 200,000 Moroccans residing in Spain are under 16 years of age (a greater percentage than in any other significant nationality)—which is the best indicator available on the relevance that the Moroccan family has reached with regard to immigration. It is therefore only recently that families have begun to occupy an important position and to be taken into consideration, especially in terms of living arrangements and the education needed to incorporate immigrant children into the school system.

Perhaps it is for these reasons that the family has hardly been present in studies on immigration in Spain, and why there has been very little research done on immigrant families. Generally, there has been a tendency to approach the subject from other points of view (legal status, labour market); even when studying the integration of immigrants, the emphasis has been on individuals rather than on

families or, sometimes, on specific family members, i.e. wives or children (especially school children). However, we think the study of immigration from the family perspective is crucial for understanding integration processes. Human beings tend to live within a family, which plays a fundamental role as an instrument of socialisation and as a network for support and affection. This is even more evident in societies like the Moroccan one, where these parameters totally maintain their validity. The family has a decisive influence on the customs, behaviour and decisions of its members; but perhaps the most important thing is that any changes in any family member affect the other members and are modulated by them. It can be considered as the sphere where habits and values are contrasted in a more intense way. Finally, the presence of the family in the host country multiplies both the number and the diversity of the points of contact its members have with the host society. For all these reasons, the lack of studies from the perspective of the immigrant family constitutes a noticeable gap.

Characteristics of the families studied

The results to be shown here are based on a qualitative study of 32 family nuclei selected from an initial sample of 50, distributed throughout 43 domestic units. Of these, 22 were of rural origin and 10 of urban origin. The fieldwork in the Madrid community was carried out between 1991 and 1994. In a few (three) cases, however, contact has been maintained up to the present time, which allows us to incorporate the information into a broader period. The research was developed on two levels. The first was generic and more superficial, with the purpose of obtaining a certain characterisation of the Moroccan family in Madrid and of exploring a wide range of situations. The second was in depth, across nine intensive case studies, in which we spoke with various members of the family, maintained periodic contact and spent several hours—and in some cases even several days—with them.

It might have been desirable to select only families who had lived in Spain for a long time, which would have given them a greater opportunity to experience changes and develop better-defined adaptation strategies. However, due to the fact that the migration process has been so recent, it was very hard to find a sufficient number of such cases. Hence, next to families who immigrated over 20 years ago, we had others who underwent the reunification process very recently, with some members who had only lived in Spain for two or three years by the beginning of the field work. This was another remarkable aspect: most of the families studied were formed by family reunification. Only eight of them came together

through immigration, either by marriage among immigrants (4) or by mixed marriages between immigrants and Spaniards (4).

Nuclear families were predominant (26), although the migration process favours the presence of other relatives in the domestic unit. This leads us to think that, once reunification has taken place, the model followed is that of the nuclear family, occasionally accompanied by other members (usually one or two)—but this is of a marked temporary character (until they learn how to manage on their own or while they are going through a difficult period). From this viewpoint, the traditional family model with married children living in the father's house, already decreasing in Morocco itself, has a speedier demise with emigration. Of our three cases of compound domestic units, two were temporary until the newly-wed children managed to achieve the necessary economic stability for them to become independent. Single-parent families (6 cases) were indicative of two different processes: on the one hand, of a still-ongoing family-reunification process, represented by the three cases of single fathers, in which the wife had not yet been reunited with her family; whilst on the other hand, there are cases in which the woman, either widowed or divorced, must take care of her children and sees emigration as her only way out.

The number of members in the domestic unit was relatively high. Those couples married at least 17 years (22 cases) had an average of around five children (4.91), showing high fertility rates. However, this type of behaviour was not homogeneous and was affected by the parents' (especially the mothers') educational level, a key factor in this matter. Generally, great changes occurred when there was a minimum of education. On the whole, the highest birth rates were maintained by illiterate parents, whilst those who stayed at school longer showed the lowest levels. In any case, these low educational levels predominated, since 14 out of the 22 women were illiterate. It is to be expected that young couples will not reach such high birth rates.

With regard to their work, the great majority were manual workers, with low or average qualifications, mainly employed in construction but also in services and industry. Of the women, 55% were in paid employment: most of them in the domestic-service sector (home-help, cleaning). The only person working in administration was a young second-generation woman who received her education in Spain. In broad terms, the immigrants' wage level was low, which means that the highest possible number of family members must work in order to compensate for it. This fact has changed the attitude towards women's work and it often happens that the eldest daughters start working at a young age. 80% of the families studied had more than one of their members involved in gainful employment.

The integration of immigrant families: a typology

The integration process has a multidimensional character, and the most relevant factors are probably economic or even residential. However, this study focuses on the changes in mentality and customs that take place in immigrant families and on the attitudes towards them. It analyses how they affect the different members and which changes are most problematic. For this purpose, the following series of variables has been selected that are considered indicative of the intensity of these changes:

- *The role assigned to women:* Coming from a sexist society, there is a great deal of pressure on the Moroccan community to change its gender patterns; but at the same time, there is a lot of resistance to such change. Hence, changes in women's role, the new tasks they will be permitted to undertake, the new ways in which they are allowed to behave are considered major indicators of adaptation.
- *The way in which religion is conceived:* Religious beliefs can give spiritual stability and confidence and thus play an important role as an element of identity. If religion is conceived very rigidly, it can become a factor of resistance and even a barrier to interethnic relations. On the other hand, the loss of traditional values may lead to distress and deviation.
- *The attitude towards Spanish society and the relationships established with the Spanish people:* A positive attitude towards Spanish society will make the migrant more open to her/his new environment and will facilitate relationships with native-born Spaniards, which in turn will encourage mutual knowledge of each other and the exchange of cultural patterns. On the other end of the spectrum, an attitude charged with negative stereotypes will lead to avoidance of interethnic contacts by both migrants and natives.
- *Intergenerational relationships within the family* tell us how the different members of the family adapt and how they perceive and experience different types of adaptation.
- *Length of stay:* Families who arrived a long time ago have had more opportunities to know Spanish society and to choose among options for their own adaptation, while newer arrivals might still be in the process of doing so and are thus more likely to change their strategy.
- *Bonds maintained with the Moroccan world* can be a factor of emotional stability that minimise uprooting but, at same time, may become a factor of resistance to change.

Bearing in mind their position with regard to these variables, a series of basic adaptation types has been designed, and certain family types have been selected,

to illustrate the changes that have occurred and the mental process that support these changes. In order to complement the description of family types, some points of change will be analysed, in an attempt to show the existing variety within the types examined and to detect the frequency with which each particular change is adopted. Broadly speaking, the four types established can be characterised as follows:

Conservative

These were families who appeared to be firmly entrenched in their traditions, maintained close ties with their homeland and, above all, preserved the concept of women as permanently under-age individuals. The majority of these families hailed from rural areas in Northern Morocco (only three of those studied were urban) and had not been in Spain for very long (with the exception of five of them, all others were reunited after 1986). This was the type most represented (19 families); and perhaps because of this, it was reasonably heterogeneous. As a rule, the mothers did not work (except in the Uayaghli and the Hamraui families), spoke very little Spanish and lived a sheltered life at home. For the mothers, the first years were traumatic: they had many prejudices against the Western world and their lack of communication made it difficult for them to become less prejudiced. Their upbringing, focused solely on housework, often gave them a complex regarding their perceived ignorance and lack of capacity to learn, leaving them in an even more helpless situation when confronting a different environment. On the other hand, their isolation went beyond Spanish society, since they also lost their habitual relationship to Moroccan society. Their status as married women considerably restricted any chances of their building new relationships, usually being limited to finding other Moroccan families with whom they could relate. Their children, through television and school, were their windows to the world; but they did not really have anyone who could explain or interpret to them what they were seeing through these windows.

The daughters, on the other hand, were becoming part of the working world. This did not quite mean breaking away but was nonetheless a major step forward, even when they performed such traditional 'women's work' as domestic services and cleaning. Their working did not mean breaking away because it was a response to necessity, rather than being based on any particular wish or conviction on their part. It was not seen as something positive but rather as something temporary, until the economic situation of the family improved. The ideal way was for the husband to support the family by himself, so that the wife could look after the home. Thus, it was very likely that, when these girls got married, they would stop working immediately or after a few years. However, this experience, and their more direct

contact with the host society, planted a seed that would have consequences on the education of the next generation.

These working girls usually devoutly observed all their religious duties, which were highly meaningful to them. However, there were some cases (as with the Harrads and the Fetuhis) where the males had acquired certain habits forbidden by their faith (smoking or drinking) without moving forward in other ways. Their relationship with Spanish society was fairly limited; in some cases (Mussaui family), there was a certain avoidance. Nonetheless, they were usually in favour of their children striking up friendships at school—albeit with the customary limitations for girls, whose relationships were interrupted when they reached adolescence. Thus, the concept of women as minors who must always be under the jurisdiction of a male family member was maintained, as well as the tendency to arrange marriages. The older children absorbed their parents' principles fairly well, but there was potential conflict with the girls who arrived in Spain at a younger age.

In transition

These were families who had experienced a few changes with regard to the traditional model, which may increase as time goes on. Religious practice had been a bit relaxed, although the most common celebrations were still maintained and certainly their following Islam. The role of religion had become secondary and a certain relaxed attitude could be observed in its transmission to the children; but there were still severe constraints with regard to women. Representatives of this group showed a will to live within Spanish society, with a remarkable influence from it; but this was much stronger in the children, which created a generation gap—especially with regard to the freedom of women. This could result in conflict (as with the Hallal family), and girls sometimes counted on the mother's complicity (the Drijis and the Makhlufis). In some cases, the parents fully accepted the changes in their children (the Benziats). Among the nine families who fit into this type, one could observe considerable homogeneity of origins, both urban and rural. This type can be seen as a slow evolution of the previous type, achieved after many years in Spain—especially in rural families; whereas in urban families, the changes happen faster because they come from areas that have already undergone profound transformations. This leads us to expect that many families of the former type will eventually move closer to this type.

In favour of assimilation

This group showed a clear preference for the Spanish culture, which implies an assimilationist strategy. Their aim was to become as similar as possible to the

Spaniards in order to be accepted, if necessary doing away with everything that might identify them with Morocco—even to the point of adopting anti-immigration attitudes. They perceived culture as a rigid unit, and chose to adopt that of the host country. They avoided transmitting the Moroccan culture to their children and, although the parents might privately observe certain religious obligations, in practice they clearly renounced Morocco and their return (although they went there on holidays). Undoubtedly, the parents did retain some of the Moroccan mentality; but they tended not to impose it on their children. Some restricted their contacts with other Moroccan immigrants, in order to avoid social control. They could end up detaching themselves from Morocco and feeling inferior due to their origins, of which they were not proud. They ran a risk of losing their reference value system if the Moroccan one was not fully replaced by its Spanish counterpart. The children often looked down on a Moroccan culture they hardly knew. The Bugdainis were the prototypical family for this way of thinking, but the Guerraudis could also be included here, although they maintained stronger ties with Morocco and did not distance their children from Moroccan culture in such a radical way. Strangely enough, both families came from rural areas.

Integrationists

This type adopted a critical attitude towards both cultures and, at the same time, remained flexible enough to choose the most positive aspects of both. Representatives of this group did not renounce their origins, although they rejected some of the traditional customs. Regarding religion, they saw its fundamental aspect as its content and not its form, which facilitated the acquisition of some Christian practices that have become social occasions (first holy communions, Christmas celebrations). Returning to Morocco to settle down was not an option but frequent contact was maintained (generally among urban immigrants). Their children favoured the Spanish way of life without having severe conflicts with their parents. Only two families fitted this pattern (the Berezquis and the Zerualis, and possibly the Fassis, who could be a borderline case with the assimilationists). These were urban families: two of them mixed, with a certain educational level, who were in favour of modernisation—parents and children alike—from the very moment they left Morocco.

Table 1: Categories of adaptation of Moroccan migrant families

Category of adaptation	Women's role	Religious and cultural perception	Bonds with country of origin	Social relations with Spaniards	Attitudes towards Spanish society	Description of children	Number of domestic units
Conservative	Non-adult Dependant No freedom to move around unaccompanied	Very rigid Religious practice taken rather seriously	Very strong	Very few	Prejudice Caution	Older children keep traditional values Possible conflicts with younger children	19
In transition	Negotiating a certain autonomy	Slightly loose Religious practise taken rather seriously	Strong	Some	Certain permeability	Conflicts with parents	8
Assimilationist	Quite independent Freedom of movement	Loose Lack of interest	Weak	Quite a lot	Acceptance of assimilation	Conflicts with origin Lack of identification	2
Integrationist	Quite independent Freedom of movement	Critical view Meaning is most important not ritual	Quite a lot	Quite a lot	Permeability Criticism	Integration into Spanish society Concern about their origin	3

Source: Fieldwork. Categories elaborated by Pablo Pumares.

In short, the trends observed show that most of the families fall into the two first categories. Nevertheless, most of the families in the conservative category have not been in Spain for very long, and one might expect a significant part of them to evolve towards the second category—as has been seen in two of the cases followed until the present. Assimilation is not frequent, and the cases studied appear to be related to rural families who migrated earlier, when there where very few Moroccans in Spain. Finally, the option to integrate is chosen by families from urban areas with a certain educational level. It can be said that in these cases, part of the process (urban habits, contact with Western values) had already taken place when they arrived.

Immigrants' children and intergenerational relationships

It is too early to speak of a second generation of Moroccan immigrants in Spain, since the bulk of arrivals took place between 1989 and the present time, and was insignificant before that time. What we have at the moment are young people who have been educated in Spain but born in Morocco. Likewise, only a minority of the immigrants' children has received their entire education under the Spanish system, since most of them arrived in accordance with family reunification and entered the Spanish education system at that stage. The school system, guaranteed to all children under 16 residing in Spain, appears to be a fundamental element in the socialisation of immigrant children and the main instrument for transmitting the culture of the host society. Immigrants' attitude towards their children's schooling in an environment where education is universally provided, is usually very positive; and they place a high value on the fact that their children can get at least a basic education. Reunited families of rural origin are an example that shows how, whilst the older siblings left school after three or four years, the younger ones attended Spanish schools and completed their education (obtaining their baccalaureate). Those families who raise objections to their daughters going to school, who fear that they will reject their customs or their faith, are the exception to the rule (none of the families studied were in this category, although we know of some cases).

The majority of Spanish schools are not prepared for multiculturalism in the classroom, and many of them are overwhelmed at the present time by the rapid growth in the number of immigrant children over the past few years. Teachers complain about the fact that parents of immigrant children often do not come to the school, although the surveys carried out by the *Encarna Soriano* in Andalusia (2002) indicate that they do so as often or even more than Spanish parents. The achievement level of Moroccan children at school is low, however. Their parents, although they claim to appreciate education, do not know how to stimulate them to continue studying or are unable to help them (many of them have hardly been to school themselves). Sometimes, they cannot see the usefulness of education, if the children are going to have to work in the same jobs as their parents; and the family may place more value on an additional salary at certain times.

The children, on the other hand, have to overcome the language barrier and adapt to a different school system. Although some studies point out that Moroccan children mix easily with their Spanish peers socially, there are ghetto-like cases within schools where Moroccans only socialise with their own kind—especially when many of them arrived when the family was reunited. The change in school system means a new way of learning in an environment where authority

gives way to reasoning, and discipline is exercised in a different way. This process is not easy. Problems arise in the interpretation of these concepts, since in the home, the Moroccan system of discipline is maintained. The children take longer to learn and confusion is multiplied, reaching the parents as well: for example, when the school complains about a child's behaviour (sometimes because it is difficult for the child to understand that discipline should be maintained without punishment), the father may respond by beating the child or punishing her/him too severely in the teachers' view, which may bring about criticism of the father for not knowing how to deal with the matter. In time, the child adapts to the new system and, generally, the father changes as well—but if this is not the case, the relationship between the child and those in authority will suffer.

Looking at the near future, we can observe two factors that act in opposite ways. On the one hand, the proportions will be inverted, so that those who have attended Spanish schools from the start will be in the majority, which will improve their knowledge of Spanish society. On the other hand, due to the numbers and concentration of immigrant children in certain schools, there could be a greater separation, with Moroccans forming groups apart from the Spaniards, which would hinder their integration.

The child is at all times a mediator between the host society and the immigrants. Because it is easier for a child to learn the language, she/he becomes a translator from a very early age and a guide for other members of the family who cannot speak the language well enough or, indeed, cannot read or write. This means that the child acquires a more relevant role within the family, a role that would be unknown to her/him in Morocco. There is also more responsibility, which sometimes leads to embarrassing situations and makes children deal with topics that would normally be forbidden to them (for example, when they accompany their mother or father to the doctor's). This dependence does not necessarily mean that children will end up looking down on their parents, but it does strengthen the children's role. On occasions, it can undermine paternal authority; but it also generally means more involvement with the family who is in need of the children's help.

The child has a privileged point of contact with the host society at school, which allows her/him to get to know its values first-hand. The child stands permanently between both cultures, absorbing and comparing values from both sides; for this reason, she/he acts as an integrating agent for the family, bringing these values into the family home. This means permeability. Sometimes, without even realising that this is happening, certain fears disappear and subtle changes come about. One aspect often commented upon is that the relationship between fathers and their children becomes less distant and more affectionate, although one of their fears has to do with the loss of paternal authority. Moroccan parents do not want their

children to feel inferior to their Spanish peers, and this leads them to make allowances, to relax discipline and to give them more pocket money. During the pre-adolescence period, parents are more flexible in introducing those changes, which they believe will help their children to be accepted at school. For example, the great majority of boys and girls wear Western clothes to school. It is true that there are parents who insist on their daughters wearing headscarves or who prevent them from engaging in sports in front of boys, but they are certainly a minority at present. This is due in part to the children's incorporation into school. Families like the Harrads and the Jelloums (both classified as conservatives) treat their younger children who first started school after arriving in Spain differently as compared to their older children who arrived at age 12 and did not go to school in Morocco. Whilst the older girls would cover their heads with a scarf when going out, the younger ones did not, nor did they start doing it when they reached adolescence.

In any case, the onset of adolescence and young adulthood are a critical period, especially for women. Their time at school leaves a profound mark on immigrant children. It can be said that those who have been in Spanish schools from the beginning will understand the values of Spanish society well or very well by the time they leave school and will even share them to a certain extent, whilst this aspect varies greatly among those who entered the school system halfway through. However, for traditional families, the girls' adolescence opens the path to marriage, which in principle will be early and arranged. In order to achieve this successfully, the girl's reputation must be untarnished, which means having no contact with boys without being chaperoned by a male relative, not going out alone. Some of them will be forced to use the headscarf or to leave school. Despite the changes that have taken place, parents are much less predisposed to make allowances in this area, because they are aware of the fact that the girl's future is at stake. At this point, when crucial decisions are being made, it is easier for conflict to appear and for differences of opinion to be very obvious. Thus, families in favour of assimilation will have less risk of conflict.

For traditional families and for those whom we have classified as being 'in transition', there is a greater potential risk of conflict. On occasion, however, this does not happen due to the submissive attitude of the girls, who know what is expected of them, accept their role and are accommodating. Their lack of interest in education reaffirms this process, giving the parents a good excuse to take them out of school at age 14 or 15. The testimony of the only female university graduate whom we interviewed indicates her uniqueness in an environment in which her cousins and friends would interrupt their studies when reaching adolescence and get married in the traditional way as soon as they reached adulthood or shortly afterwards.

Conversely, showing a determination to continue studying and obtain good results has become a strategy to prolong this period, to avoid an early wedding and to attain greater independence through education. Thus, parents also have a good excuse to reject suitors without offending them. Once the girls reach university, it is very difficult to turn back; but as time goes by, parents also get used to the idea, so that open conflict will not necessarily take place. As girls are not always interested in studying, another option is getting a job, which can be complicated due to the few choices open to people with such a low educational level or because the parents are opposed to it. In any case, in our observations, there was only one reference to a case involving open conflict about a young woman who would not accept an arranged marriage, but who later on gave in to parental pressure and ended up the subject of scandal when it was discovered on her wedding night that she was not a virgin. Usually, an agreement is reached by means of negotiation, in which the social pressures of the Spanish environment, those of the Moroccan environment, the family's attitude and the girls' wishes are all influential factors. We must neither forget the importance of the family as a social network for Moroccans and as a source of affection and support, nor the fact that these matters are decided when the girls are very young and dependent. To reach a break-up, their postures must be totally opposed.

On the other hand, we can again observe different attitudes between the younger children and the older ones, with the latter being closer to the Moroccan value system and the former being closer to the Spanish one. In these cases, one can find traditional marriages among the older children, who caused no conflict because they themselves shared this mentality; whilst with the younger ones, it seems less likely that this could happen. In one of these cases, the youngest daughter had found a job as a security guard (a profession that her parents could probably not imagine for one of their daughters when they arrived in Spain) and had bought herself a car (when her older sisters were not allowed to learn how to drive). Nonetheless, she took on a series of family responsibilities that her brother, who is one year older, did not (e.g. doing domestic chores or being driver for the whole family although she worked 12-hour shifts). Likewise, although she had no problems at work in relating to her colleagues, she was not allowed to go out alone at night despite the fact that she was 21 years old.

Among young males, there is also a remarkable diversity. Within conservative families, we can find young men who drink or smoke, but who have very traditional ideas about women and become very watchful of their sisters' behaviour. This increases if they live in a fundamentalist Moroccan environment and feel pressure from remarks made about women. However, even the most Westernised among them are not immune to this type of rumour and may behave in practice in a way different from what they might prefer in theory. On other occasions,

however, brothers and sisters join forces, so as to be better able to convince their parents.

Finally, for immigrant children, we need to point out the subjective value of work. Their aspirations have more to do with those of their peers at school than with those of their parents—something that both their parents and the host society sometimes find it hard to accept. This is also the case if they have completed their education according to the Spanish system and feel entitled to the same consideration as their Spanish peers—especially if their families are pro-assimilation. However, various problems usually arise in their access to the world of work.

Although the children's aspirations differ from those of their parents, there is a series of factors that nevertheless directs them towards the same jobs. The social network is still important when trying to find employment in Spain (not so much in large cities but still the case in smaller towns), where small firms prefer to hire those of their 'acquaintance'. The social network of immigrant children tends to lead them to their parent's jobs, because that is where they have contacts. This is also favoured by legislation. The children of immigrants have the right to work in Spain when they become of age, regardless of the national employment situation. However, in order to be able to work legally, they need a work permit; and for this, they need to present a formal offer of employment and wait until the permit comes through. This can take between three and five months; but the majority of firms do not issue a contract only to be able to hire a worker several months later. Hence, this often leads young immigrants to firms that habitually hire immigrants and that think they are doing them a 'favour' by giving them a contract that will enable them to obtain a work permit. This 'favour' will, of course, have to be paid back in one way or another (loyalty, more hours, lower wages, making them pay part of their taxes, etc.). This fact makes young immigrants aware of the difference between them and their Spanish peers, in that it limits their access to the labour market and leads them to the same jobs as their parents'—jobs they are not always willing to accept and that could cause identity problems later on.

Factors influencing a family's adaptation process

The main impetus for Moroccan immigration to Spain is economic, in search of better opportunities. Nonetheless, there is a positive (often idealised) image of a more democratic political system, with greater freedom. In some cases, this freedom can be a main factor in the decision some young people make to emigrate; though for the majority, these aspects are secondary and even arouse some suspicion. When immigrants arrive in Spain, they are open about their intention to adapt to the civic norms of the host country; but they are not equally predisposed

to change their customs or beliefs, which they consider to be good. However, our observations indicate that, in a different context, change is inevitable, albeit at a different pace and not always in the same direction.

It is precisely the fear of this new context transforming their mentality and customs that generates prejudice against external influences, which can translate into attitudes of separatism and withdrawal. This happens mainly among the most traditionalist immigrants, who usually hail from rural areas; but there are also Islamists from urban areas, whose numbers increase as more and more Westernised customs spread amongst young people from the middle and upper urban classes. Origin, educational level and perception of religion (as a rigid, unmoveable bloc or as something open to flexible interpretation) all play a crucial role in how they perceive the integration process. Some of these immigrants will delay family reunification indefinitely precisely in order to prevent the family members from being exposed to Western values. There is a fear of their children challenging their authority, losing their faith and acquiring vices forbidden by their faith; a fear of women demanding independence and equal treatment and having boyfriends or adopting sexual behaviours that will put their honour—and consequently, that of the family—into question.

Reuniting the family in this context is usually related to a long-term migratory project and to a somewhat less negative attitude towards Western values. These two elements should, in principle, be considered as positive factors regarding family reunification with a view to integration. A long-term migratory project generates a greater stake in the host society and increased investments in their place of destination (above all, in housing). It also means a more open attitude, though this does not impede the existence of a certain amount of prejudice. The way in which these prejudices are overcome is through daily contact, which in time will enable immigrants to see as normal certain aspects that initially alarmed them.

However, contact with the host society is not simple. Some studies (Aparicio & Tornos 2001) indicate the infrequency of relationships between immigrants and Spaniards, which hinders both exchange and learning. The tendency to use the ethnic network to resolve problems, the high number of Moroccan immigrants and residential segregation are all factors favouring contact solely among immigrants. In the case of Moroccans, this is highlighted by the negative stereotypes that Spaniards have of them, as well as the language barrier and the prejudice of some Moroccans. This often restricts relationships in the workplace—the first point of contact with the host society, *which is ideal* since they occupy the lowest jobs, often without colleagues at all (domestic service) or with colleagues who are also immigrants (agriculture). This makes it difficult for them to develop relationships with Spaniards, and it also makes it easier for their employers. Language courses and administrative formalities make charitable organisations and social ser-

vices the main points of contact between the host society and immigrants, and perhaps the most privileged because here they find a sensitive and accepting environment. The presence of the family opens new windows and multiplies points of contact of various types, through the different family members. The school, where children have the opportunity to strike up friendships with their peers, is central, but the neighbourhood also becomes more important. Likewise, the presence of the family diminishes the locals' negative stereotypes, which tend to get worse when they are confronted with single Moroccan males.

The Moroccan case has another peculiarity that affects the integration process by slowing it down: the immigrants' close contact with their place of origin, which is maintained as the immigrants' main reference point and which exerts a prolonged influence. The geographical proximity of home facilitates direct and continued contact in most of the cases studied, with frequent trips (at least once a year). Reuniting the family does not reduce the number of trips but instead makes them regular, subjecting the migrants to more stable and constant rhythms. Through these trips, bonds are kept alive with relatives and neighbours in Morocco and with those who emigrated to other places and who return home during the same period. This helps the migrant network to function, by bringing about information exchange: discussions on various possible destinations for those who have not left yet and on new marriages to be arranged, which sometimes result in new passports for immigration.[1]

The marriages of immigrant children with non-immigrants back home implies the need for adjustment, which usually results in some regression if the person reunited is a man. On the contrary, marriages between Moroccan women and Spanish men are frowned upon because it is believed that the women and above all the children will lose their Muslim faith, thus constituting another obstacle regarding their relationships with Spaniards. During their stay in Morocco, immigrants successfully boast about their economic improvement; but on the other hand, they are criticised for having acquired more 'liberal' habits that affect the traditional roles of family members. Parents, in their position of maximum responsibility, are under great pressure and are often criticised of having lost their authority over their children, who do not respect them, about their daughters' way of dressing and whether they speak with boys. This factor reduces predisposition to adopt the norms of the host society and aids the ambivalent situation of managing two

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[1]   Of the 50 families studied, eight had been formed by children of immigrants, with five of them marrying people from their village or town back home with whom they were reunited later on (four through the traditional procedure of marriage arranged by parents). Another two arrived at a very young age and married Spaniards. The last one married another immigrant, who was also a neighbour from the village back in Morocco.

sometimes contradictory points of reference—an ambivalence transmitted to the next generation.

Aparicio's and Tornos' (2001) observation can also be explained by the fact that, even with the same income, Moroccans invest less in housing than do other immigrant groups. This conformist attitude towards housing—together with their low income, lack of stability at work and discrimination—often results in situations of overcrowding and poor living conditions, factors which negatively affect the perception of Moroccans in Spain. Reuniting the family brings about a remarkable change in this sense, however. This is partly due to the requirements that must be fulfilled to reunite a family legally, but also to the concern about offering their families a decent home. Thus, any improvement in living conditions in the host country becomes a priority. Despite all this, however, there is always a part of their income that is destined for their place of origin, to refurbish their old house or to build a new one.

Conclusions

The dominant perception in the host society is that Moroccan immigrants do not change their attitudes or behaviour and do not integrate into Spanish society. In a study about African immigrants in Andalusia (Pumares et al. 2002), in which a multidimensional concept of integration was applied, very different attitudes and behaviours were observed varying according to the aspect under observation. These oscillated between an assimilationist stance vis-à-vis material matters, and a separatist stance vis-à-vis beliefs and values. The immigrants considered the latter to be part of their identity and something to be preserved entirely; but to them, this did not mean that they did not want to integrate. However, the reality seems to indicate that—albeit much more slowly and sometimes inadvertently—there are also changes in these areas as a result of continuous exposure to the new environment, even if the immigrants do not always perceive them.

The origin and educational level of the families both play an important role in this process. Urban families, who were already more Westernised to begin with, experience a gentler and more balanced transition, without provoking a radical departure from their original values. Families from rural areas tend to be very conservative. Customs and religion are strongly related; indeed, in many cases, one is identified with the other. This poses a barrier to change, since customs are often contrary to their religious beliefs. For an uneducated population, however, this simple recipe provides them with strong armour that helps them get through everyday life by assigning a specific role to everybody, which (if fulfilled) will minimise conflict. As immigrants, they try to maintain this *status quo*; but contrary to

what happens in their village, they are exposed to constant invitations to introduce changes into their life—especially the younger ones, whose strategies for dealing with these 'temptations' can vary, though they do appear more vulnerable in this regard. The parents' low educational level and the fact that they are unaccustomed to reasoned discussion affecting their understanding of the society around them can cause problems when trying to convince their children, who are better educated and demand reasons why. A building propped up by faith can tumble down in an unfavourable environment. Usually, changes are introduced little by little, which allows for balance to be maintained. However, the lack of a solid basis can lead to extremes, from adopting strategies which clearly favour assimilation or even marginalisation, to the more common one of maintaining conservative ideas with regard to women—whilst at the same time, traditional values are lost without being replaced by new ones.

The initial prejudice sustained by fears and negative stereotypes is dispelled as time and contacts become normal and differences are demystified. 'Slowing-down' factors are the intense relationships amongst Moroccans, which aid and abet social control, and the omnipresence of their place of origin, which remains their main point of reference for a long time. However, the progressive multiplication of points of contact with Spanish society and, above all, the children's role as inter-mediaries and actual vectors of change, end up producing progressive transformations within the families. The second generation will be decisive. However, besides the cultural aspects, one will have to bear in mind the discrimination to which they may be subjected and their chances on the labour market.

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Bernhard Nauck

Intergenerational relations in Turkish families in Germany

Intergenerational relationships are of special importance in understanding immigrant families, for two reasons:

1) Most immigrant families stem from societies that do not have any extensive system of state social security. Thus, people protect themselves against life's risks in the immediate context of intergenerational relationships, organizing them accordingly. These 'insurance functions' of intergenerational relationships have far-reaching consequences in terms of cultural and institutional arrangements, as well as for what parents and children 'mean' to and expect from each other and how they 'value' each other. The case of Turkish immigrant families provides an especially good example for studying this utilitarian dimension of intergenerational relationships, as they stem from a society where insurance against life's hardships is predominantly a matter of family and kinship. In addition, Turkish families in Germany frequently have an insecure immigrant status in the receiving society. Any possible desired or enforced return to the society of origin thus also means reliance on its social-security system, which is not based on insurance benefits but rather on stable intergenerational relationships.

2) The immigrant situation itself has immediate consequences for intergenerational relationships, because many goals related to migration can only be legitimised and met in intergenerational relationships. This implies not only chain migration into the receiving society on the basis of already existing (extended or nuclear) family contacts and initial placement in housing and labour markets. It also means an ongoing exchange of marriage partners and migration for the sake of the education, economic wellbeing and social status of one's offspring. Additionally, intergenerational relationships are of crucial importance in transmitting the culture of the society of origin. This is especially the case in receiving countries such as Germany, where practically no institutions from minority cultures exist nor do any of the institutions of the receiving society take on their functions.

This presentation discusses intergenerational relationships in Turkish families in Germany from two perspectives. First, it investigates the culture-specific characteristics of their intergenerational relationships, especially with regard to the 'value of

children' and parental expectations. These are then discussed in the context of observed changes in the migrants' situation. Second, it describes the actual relationships between Turkish immigrant parents and their children, especially with regard to the intergenerational transmission of values, identity, attitudes and integration behaviour. Finally, it contrasts these findings with those from studies on other immigrant minorities in Germany, using a comparative study of about 1,600 parent-child dyads from four national groups.

Value of children for their parents

A central dimension for intercultural differences in the performance of intergenerational relationships is whether economic-utilitarian or psychological-emotional expectations are prevalent:

Economic-utilitarian expectations towards children contain, for example, helping out in the family household early on, working (comparatively cheaply and flexibly) in the family enterprise, and later on helping, caring for, and financially supporting older relatives and others in case of illness, unemployment or financial strain.

Psychological-emotional expectations towards children contain, for example, enriching one's own life through parenthood, self-awareness in the parental role and development of a close and unique emotional relationship that encompasses the entire life span.

Although both dimensions are present in the parent-child-relationship in all societies, there are marked differences in the value placed on them. It is only possible in affluent societies with high social welfare provisions that solely psychological-emotional expectations are relevant in the decision to become a parent and take on responsibility for a child. Economic-utilitarian aspects only become relevant because of the costs that children entail for their parents. In developing countries with no social-welfare regulations, however, utilitarian expectations are *always* prevalent in the decision to have a child. A systematic explanation has been developed that makes the value of children (VOC) a central factor when explaining cross-cultural differences in fertility behaviour and performance in parent-child-relationships (Hoffman & Hoffman 1973; Friedman et al.1994; Nauck & Kohlmann 1999; Nauck 2001). Such differences especially reflect whether children are important 'intermediate goods' for achieving material security and social recognition in the respective culture and to which extent institutionalised alternatives exist outside of intergenerational relationships. In some societies, there is a need to invest into children in order to survive in a subsistence economy, to be respected as an adult in the village community or to have some security in old age or when

needing care. In other societies, the same may be achieved by investments into technology, academic titles, and private or state-based insurance schemes.

Such differences in expectations on children and the value one places on them can also be found in other families of foreign origin who live in Germany. In the following interpretations of empirical results, however, it has to be considered that these are based on answers given by *parents*. Additionally, there are already significant cultural differences in the readiness to take on responsibility for children that result in differences in the proportion of childless people among the adult population of the respective society. While childlessness (as part of a conscious life-planning) is extremely seldom in societies like those in Vietnam and Turkey, German society is more and more polarised into family and non-family sectors (Strohmeier & Schulze 1995). Accordingly, it has to be assumed that this will result in more pronounced differences in attitudes between parents and non-parents in this society.

This model of the value of children for their parents is first applied to describe changes in the values in Turkish families. Afterwards, it is used to describe differences between the respective immigrant nationalities in Germany.

Value continuity and change among Turkish families

Table 1 shows an essential aspect of change in Turkish migrant families, namely the impact of economic and utilitarian expectations on the formation of intergenerational relationships. The percentages reveal the proportion of the respective subgroup expecting help from the parent-child dyad. Such economic and utilitarian expectations have an important influence on behaviour, gender preferences, educational attitudes and child-care and socialisation practices (Nauck 1989; Nauck 1997). Because the information on mothers' and fathers' expectations for help and support from sons and daughters was taken directly from the cross-cultural comparative studies on the values of children (Anold 1975; Bulatao 1979; Hoffman 1987; Hoffman & Manis 1982; Kagitcibasi 1982; Nauck 1988; Nauck 1989), some additional direct comparisons can be made:

The gap in modernisation between Turkey and the receiving society, Germany, can be estimated, at least indirectly, by a comparison with the answers of Anglo-American parents. Data from the USA were used because comparative data from German parents are not available; however, results for the same construct with other indicators show that the distribution of the values of children in Germany and the USA resemble each other to a high degree. In the dominant culture of both societies, psychological and emotional values are unrestrictedly accepted, while economic and utilitarian values are almost completely ignored (Nauck 1993; Nauck 1997).

The extent of a social change in Turkey can be estimated by comparing answers in a 1995 value-of-children study conducted in Istanbul with one from 1975, provided the modernisation gap between Istanbul and Turkey is taken into account.

Changes in Turkish migrant families can be estimated by comparing them with families in the society of origin (at both survey times), though the effects of selective migration of certain population groups may be skewed by the effects of the socialisation and acculturation in the receiving society. The extent of inter-generational change can be estimated by comparing the answers of parents and their descendants in the society of origin with those in the receiving society (Nauck 1997a).

Table 1: Parents' expectations of help from sons and daughters

Expectations of …		parents in Turkey, 1975[1]		parents in Istanbul, 1992		Turkish parents in Germany	
Expect children to…	*RS[3]*	*daughters*	*sons*	*daughters*	*sons*	*daughters*	*sons*
contribute part of their income when starting work	F	55%	72%	54%	66%	20%	44%
	M	25%	59%	32%	52%	25%	14%
help younger siblings with their education	F	73%	85%	62%	76%	29%	55%
	M	65%	83%	61%	76%	51%	39%
provide financial help in family emergencies	F	85%	94%	90%	95%	66%	78%
	M	62%	86%	77%	93%	71%	52%
help with domestic chores	W	*[4]	*	92%	27%	85%	36%
	M	*	*	96%	80%	63%	90%
provide financial help to parents in old age	W	78%	91%	60%	77%	70%	81%
	M	64%	84%	78%	88%	78%	58%

Expectations of …		adolescents in Istanbul, 1992		Turkish adolescents in Germany, 1992		Anglo-American parents, 1975[2]	
Expect children to …	*RS[3]*	*daughters*	*sons*	*daughters*	*sons*	*daughters*	*sons*
contribute part of the income when starting work	F	51%	61%	30%	50%	28%	28%
	M	35%	49%	37%	47%	18%	18%
help younger siblings with their education	F	68%	64%	26%	43%	11%	11%
	M	63%	71%	36%	47%	12%	12%
provide financial help in family emergencies	F	99%	98%	79%	86%	72%	72%
	M	79%	93%	76%	85%	63%	65%
help with domestic chores	F	95%	28%	80%	30%	*[4]	*
	M	93%	55%	86%	73%	*	*
provide financial help to parents in old age	F	83%	88%	81%	87%	10%	11%
	M	74%	90%	77%	87%	9%	58%

1) *Kagitcibasi 1982.*   3) *Respondent's sex.*
2) *Hofman & Manis 1982.*   4) *Data not available.*

Regarding the gap in the extent of modernisation, the results compiled in Tables 1 and 2 make it clear that parents' economic and utilitarian expectations towards their children in the USA are drastically lower than those in Turkey. In the USA, such expectations are limited to providing help in emergencies. In Turkey, utilitarian expectations in 1975 were consistently higher for mothers than for fathers; this position-specific differentiation is largely absent for Anglo-Americans, though still visible. In the same year in Turkey, expectations were consistently stronger for sons than for daughters; however, in the USA, this gender-specific difference in economic and utilitarian expectations has practically disappeared.

In 1992, the expectations of Turkish parents for economic support from their sons and daughters were still extraordinarily high. If one takes into account the considerable regional variability of these expectations, and also the fact that in urban areas they were somewhat below the national average (Kagitcibasi 1982a), then one can hardly conclude that there has been any change in parental expectations between 1975 and 1992.

The trend implies, instead, that daughters are now somewhat more included in their parents' expectations. In any case, this adjustment towards greater equality in expectations placed on daughters and sons, being on such a high level, cannot be interpreted as assimilation into the cultural-normative standards of intergenerational relationships in Western industrial societies, with their widespread shift towards psychological and emotional values. Rather, it seems to be the reverse: a 'mobilisation' of female offspring, along with their male counterparts, as an object of utilitarian expectations.

Some modifications in economic-utilitarian expectations on children can be observed in Turkish parents living in Germany. The expectation that offspring will contribute financially to the family income is strongly reduced, probably because of the lapse of time between surveys. Also reduced are expectations to assist younger siblings, probably because tuition fees are not necessary in German—though more indirect support may be needed. As is the case with Anglo-American parents, expectations for mutual assistance in financial emergencies remain comparatively high. Furthermore, parallel to expectations of parents in Turkey, helping out at home is quite frequently taken for granted, particularly in the same-sex dyads. As for all other Turkish groups, parental expectations for financial help in old age remain stable. Taken together, these modifications allow the conclusion that only a situational reinterpretation of intergenerational relationships takes place in migrant families, but that its deep, culturally determined structure remains stable because the utilitarian expectations do remain. While the long-term hope of help in emergencies—and particularly in old age—remain stable, migrants' short-term economic expectations have lessened. Because both parents and their offspring enjoy a comparatively high level of opportunities for gainful employment, there is intense pressure on adolescents to take over household duties.

The data on Turkish adolescents in both Turkey and Germany reveal the remarkable extent to which they anticipate (and surely, too, internalise) parental expectations. In Turkey, 49% of the sons believe that they have to contribute part of their salary to the parental household when they enter the labour force; 55% think that they have to help with household chores; 71% anticipate having to support younger brothers and sisters; 90% take it for granted that they will support their parents financially in old age; and 93% are prepared to help out in financial emergencies. In principle, this also holds true for the girls: 51% of them believe they have to hand over part of their salary to their parents; 68% believe they have to help support their brothers and sisters; 83% believe they should assist their aged parents with money or care; 95% believe they have to help with housework; and 99% believe they will be expected to help the family out in financial emergencies.

The influence of two different normative patterns of intergenerational relationships among migrants and in the receiving society seems to have little effect on these expectations. For example, like those who remain in their country of origin, Turkish adolescents in Germany also accept the high economic and utilitarian expectations placed on them by their parents. Especially high and stable, overall in parent-child dyads, is the expectation of financial assistance in old age and in family emergencies. If one takes into consideration that the adolescents anticipate having to provide in some areas even more help than is expected by their parents, these results do not point to any radical changes taking place in the relationship between parents and children, either in migrant or non-migrant Turkish families.

Value of children for their parents in immigrant families

In Table 2, a comparison of the results from parents of German, Greek, Italian, Turkish and Vietnamese origin and from German repatriate families reveals that the strongest differences occur in economic-utilitarian expectations on children (Nauck 2000: 360).

The empirical analysis is based on a data set from a 5 x 2 x 2 design of parent-child-dyads from migrant families, i.e. one that surveyed five different groups of migrant generation-dyads of the same gender (mothers and daughters; fathers and sons).

The study comprises five different groups of migrant families—namely Greek, Italian, Turkish, and Vietnamese labour migrants and German repatriates from Russia. Each migrant group has its own characteristics that have to be considered in the analysis. The groups indicate not only different nationalities and cultures of origin, but also different institutional regulations with regard to residence permits, membership to different migration cohorts and waves, and different distributions of socio-demographic characteristics:

Italians are the migrant nationality in Germany with the smallest cultural distance. They are also the oldest migrant cohort. With Italy being a member of the European Union, Italians have never been affected by limits on residence or work permits. One result of this is that, among Italians, are numerous migrants with long periods of residence as well as those who frequently go back and forth between their society of origin and Germany.

Greeks show the second smallest cultural distance and are the second-oldest migrant cohort. However, since the late 1980s, Greece has had the same membership status in the European Union as Italy. Limitations on residential status made travelling back and forth between Greece and Germany impossible for a long time, resulting in comparably long residential periods in Germany. Recently, an increasing proportion of Greek migrant workers has adopted the Italian pattern of commuting.

Turks are generally perceived to be the migrant-worker nationality with the greatest cultural distance from Germans, and they are the last significant wave of migrant workers in Germany. They are by far the largest migrant minority group in the country; and because of their numbers in many urban areas, they definitely meet the structural preconditions for ethnic segregation and a minority sub-culture. At the same time, Turks differ from Italians and Greeks with respect to their residential status. Limitations on their residential status prevent commuting back and forth between the society of origin and Germany, but (together with the gap in the two societies' welfare situation) it does provide them with ongoing incentives for chain migration. This includes marriage migration to second-generation Turks and family reunification. The ongoing incorporation of families who migrated earlier on is thus masked by their coinciding with the influx of new waves of migrants.

Vietnamese are a rather small, 'visible' minority group in Germany, with a pronounced cultural distance from Germans. Vietnamese contract workers were hired by the former German Democratic Republic and thus live primarily in East Germany. Compared to migrant-worker nationalities in West Germany, they are the last wave of immigrants and thus have a relatively young and uneven age and gender structure (which had to be reflected in the research design, insofar as parents of younger children and adolescents in this national group are not included in the design).

German repatriates from Russia are the newest group of immigrants to Germany, with the first significant wave in the 1980s and an enormous increase after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. They differ from the 'classic' migrant-worker nationalities in their entitlements. They are immediately given German citizenship, are eligible for special and extensive integration programmes and are entitled to full benefits from the German social-welfare system. Their legal status is

based on the concept of being of German ancestry and maintaining German cultural heritage. This produces a consensual fiction of 'no cultural distance'. In any case, their migration to Germany is usually final, as re-migration is normally not considered to be a realistic option. Administrative regulations have produced residential segregation among German repatriates that is at least high at the beginning of their stay in Germany. Although it is still too early for a definitive judgement, it seems that the repatriates have a tendency for social closure and 'ethnic' segregation.

The study design thus contrasts two significantly different groups of immigrant families: on the one hand, the classic migrant-worker nationalities; and on the other, German repatriates from Russia. Within the migrant-worker nationalities, only the Turks are numerous enough to really create an institutionalised minority, thus offering incentives for segregation. In contrast, like the Vietnamese, the number of Greeks and Italians has remained quite small, despite their longer stay; thus, there are more incentives for them to assimilate. These variations among migrant groups allows for testing assumptions about the level and direction of change in ethnic identification and how it is transmitted between the generations.

The parent-child-dyads in each migrant family consist of mother-daughter or father-son pairs (from different families). In contrast to the conventional cohort analyses in migration research where aggregate findings of separate immigrant generations are confronted with one another, this analysis is based explicitly on transmission processes within parent-child-dyads in migrant families. The child generation contains children attending grades seven through nine of different school tracks; they are thus at the stage of preparing for the transition into the occupational system or going to university. The parents in these families are almost exclusively first-generation migrants, while some adolescent groups are already from the second generation: 92.6% of the Greek parents, 95.6% of the Italians, 96.7% of the German repatriates and 100% of the Turkish and the Russian Israeli parents were born in the society of origin, while 70.9% of the Italian juveniles, 71.5% of the Greek and 79.8% of the Turkish adolescents were born in Germany, as opposed to only 1.1% of the German repatriate adolescents.

The *opportunity structures* vary according to the socio-ecological context within the respective society. Approximately one half of the respondents live in highly urbanised contexts, with a comparably high population density of people sharing the same national origin and, accordingly, a good likelihood for an institutionalised ethnic colony. The other half consists of respondents from a small-town context; this generally means a higher living standard for these immigrant families, a lower density of the migrant population and thus less opportunity for ethnic colonies.

Every cell in this design contains at least 100 persons, i.e. the study consists of 397 interviews with parent-child-dyads from Greek immigrant families, 406 from

Italian families, and 405 from Turkish families, and 427 from German repatriate families, along with 200 interviews with Vietnamese fathers and mothers. Data collection took place between 1990 and 1992 for the Turkish families; between 1996 and 1997 for the Greeks, Italians, and Vietnamese; and between 1998 and 1999 for the German repatriates and Russian Israelis. The oral interviews were carried out using standardised questionnaires available in the language of the society of origin (Greek, Italian, Turkish, Vietnamese and Russian) as well as in German. They could be used alternatively according to the respondent's preference. Parents and children were interviewed separately. For the construction of the generation-, gender- and group-specific questionnaires, the utmost attention was paid to customising indicators to match the intended constructs.

Table 2: Value of children in German, Greek, Italian, Turkish, Vietnamese and repatriate families

Psychological-emotional value (complete agreement)

	German		Greek		Italian		Turkish		Vietnamese		Repatriate	
Children …	*Fathers*	*Mothers*	*Fathers*	*Mothers*	*Fathers*	*Mothers*	*Fathers*	*Mothers*	*Fathers*	*Mothers*	*Fathers*	*Mothers*
…enrich life	73.6%	79.2%	51.5%	58.4%	57.3%	61.5%	92.2%	84.0%	66.5%	75.6%	61.9%	72.6%
…give the feeling of being needed	55.1%	62.8%	53.5%	54.3%	51.9%	59.5%	77.1%	85.5%	57.6%	61.4%	63.7%	69.3%
…are fun to have around	82.8%	86.9%	60.0%	53.8%	51.9%	60.0%	99.5%	96.0%	74.4%	84.3%	60.5%	73.9%

Economic-utilitarian value (complete agreement)

	German		Greek		Italian		Turkish		Vietnamese		Repatriate	
Children …	*Fathers*	*Mothers*	*Fathers*	*Mothers*	*Fathers*	*Mothers*	*Fathers*	*Mothers*	*Fathers*	*Mothers*	*Fathers*	*Mothers*
…help their aged parents	9.4%	10.6%	29.5%	28.9%	21.4%	35.0%	73.7%	68.5%	45.8%	59.4%	32.9%	36.9%
…help in emergencies	15.2%	20.1%	36.5%	34.0%	30.1%	34.5%	69.8%	79.5%	55.2%	61.4%	40.5%	40.6%
…bring spouses closer together	31.9%	30.4%	40.0%	35.5%	33.5%	32.5%	92.7%	81.0%	66.0%	69.5%	49.3%	47.6%

Sources: Survey on intergenerational relationships in migrant families; DJI-family survey 1988.

Strongest agreement with the *psychological-emotional value of children* is expressed by Turkish immigrant families: 99% of the fathers and 96% of the mothers fully agree with the statement that children are fun to have around; 92% and 84%, respectively, see them as enriching their life; 77% and 85%, respectively, indicate that children make them feel needed. Turkish parents are followed by their counterparts among Germans, Vietnamese immigrants and German repatriates. Less pronounced is agreement among Greek and Italian migrant parents, although the proportions of complete agreement are higher than 50% for all items.

Responses tend to show *stronger differences based on the nationality rather than the gender of the respective parent*, although smaller differences may also be observed between fathers and mothers. It is true for all nationalities that mothers feel to be 'needed' more frequently than do fathers; these differences are, however, about 8% stronger for the German, Italian, and Turkish parents than for the Vietnamese, Greek and repatriate parents. If these responses are to be taken as an indication of their involvement in parent-child relationships, than it can be concluded that emotional relationships among the German, Italian, Vietnamese and repatriate families are predominantly maintained by the mothers. Fathers are more involved in Greek and especially in Turkish migrant families.

Parents from the respective nationalities differ strongest with respect to whether children are perceived as a *help in old age*. German fathers have the lowest expectations (9% in agreement), followed by German mothers (11% in agreement), while expectations are highest among Vietnamese parents (46% and 59% in agreement) and especially among Turkish parents (74% and 69%). Greek, Italian and repatriate families fall somewhere in between. These differences in responses are related, without a doubt, to the cultural differences in the institutionalisation of parent-child relationships and their relevance for old-age security in the respective society. While societies like Germany perceive as 'reliable' a corporate state-level old-age security system based on transfer payments between members of different *age cohorts*, societies like the Vietnamese and Turkish perceive direct transfer payments between generations as much more important than corporate old-age security systems. The stability of intergenerational expectations and their relatively slow acculturation to the institutional regulations of the receiving society are caused by two factors: (1) Intergenerational relationships encompass rights and duties over the entire life span and are thus only subject to change when faced with the risk eroding solidarity potential. (2) The migration situation itself contributes to intensifying intergenerational relationships (Nauck & Kohlmann 1999b). The lower the possibility of inclusion in the receiving society—be it because of perceived or factually insecure residence status, or because of a factually planned return to the society of origin or the maintenance of a diffuse return option (Dietzel-Papakyriakou 1993)—the more the solidarity of close family will predominate over a corporate social-security system.

Marked differences are also obtained with regard to the question of whether *children bring parents closer together:* While for Turkish and Vietnamese parents this expectation is quite strong, this is not the case for the German, Greek and Italian parents. These results are also related to differences in the respective cultures of origin: in this case with regard to 'everyday theories' about the 'developmental logic' of family-formation processes (Nauck 1997; Nauck 2001a; Nauck 2002).

It is highly consensual in Germany for *family human capital* to first be established by obtaining the necessary educational degrees and vocational training. Then the material preconditions for a family household have to be established, and *only then* can family formation take place—whereas any already-existing romantic relationship will remain in a status of moratorium until then. The developmental logic of family formation is thus (1) romantic *love*, (2) *economic security*, (3) *marriage* and (4) *children*.

In societies with a prevalent *regime of descent* (as opposed to an affinal regime), like the Vietnamese and Turkish, there prevails a totally different 'everyday theory' on the developmental logic of the family-formation process, one strongly related to economic-utilitarian expectations in intergenerational relationships. With the same subjective certainty, the following 'logic' of the family formation process is taken for granted: (1) (consensual or arranged) *marriage*, followed by (2) *children*, whereupon (3) *love* between spouses will emerge through their having children together; followed by (4) economic security.

Of course, the relevance of children for the development of spousal relationships is totally different in both developmental logics: while in the first model children are the *consequence* of a sustained couple relationship, they are the *cause* of it in the second.

Regarding the *economic-utilitarian value of children*, gender-specific response patterns are to be found similar to those pertaining to psychological-emotional value. German, Italian and Vietnamese mothers show slightly stronger utilitarian expectations than do fathers of the same nationality, while the reverse holds true for Turkish and Greek families.

Summing up the intercultural differences, it can be said that the psychological-emotional value of children prevails over their economic-utilitarian value for parents of all immigrant nationalities. At the same time, certain characteristic differences can be found:

In *German families*, intergenerational relationships are exclusively organised as emotional relationships. Although some intergenerational transfer of services, money and goods does take place, this does not 'define' the relationship. At the same time, empirical results show once again that intergenerational relationships are matrilineal, being maintained by women and stronger in the female line of descent.

The highest similarity to German families with regard to these values exists among *Italian and Greek families*. They differ from German families in that the cultural specialisation of intergenerational relationships as based on emotional aspects is less pronounced. Internally, they differ from each other in that Italian families have a tendency to be matrilineal, while Greek families tend to be patrilineal.

Vietnamese and Turkish families are those with the highest economic-utilitarian expectations in intergenerational relationships, which are less important among German, Italian and Greek families. However, this is not combined with any decrease in the perceived importance of psychological-emotional expectations. Moreover, intergenerational relationships have a multi-functional character and are not (as in German families) specialised on emotions.

With regard to parents' expectations on their children, *German repatriate families* are not at all similar to 'native' German families. With their comparatively strong emphasis on utilitarian expectations, they fall between the Greek and Italian families on the one hand, and the Vietnamese and Turkish families on the other.

Significant differences may also to be found in the perception of the costs of children among the different nationalities of origin (Table 3) (Nauck 2000: 363):

It is true for all nationalities that mothers perceive (and actually bear) more *opportunity costs of having children* than do fathers. More mothers than fathers indicate that having children does not leave them enough time to pursue their own interests; this especially seems to be the case among migrants, as agreement with this specific item is higher for all immigrant parents when compared to German parents—and especially high for Turkish and Vietnamese mothers. Also, more mothers indicate that children make a reduced occupational commitment a necessity; German mothers especially agree with this item, while Turkish parents are least concerned with these opportunity costs.

Regarding the *direct costs of children*, it primarily needs to be noted that the *social costs* (children creating problems in the public sphere; children as a burden on a marriage) are perceived as rather low. Turkish mothers are the most likely to perceive problems in public (25%), while the perception of a burden on their marriage is highest among repatriate mothers and Greek fathers (9%). German parents appear to be the least concerned by the psychological and social costs of children. This also holds true for financial costs, which are mentioned least by German parents (17%) and most frequent by Turkish immigrant parents (fathers 28%, mothers 36%).

There are good reasons to assume that families of foreign origin suffer a higher burden with regard to child care when compared to non-migrant German families. This is caused by the migration situation itself with its special demands, as well as by immigrants' placement in the lower strata of the German occupational structure. It is all the more noticeable that the perceived costs of children are not significantly higher for migrant parents as compared to native German parents. Moreover, the perceived costs lag far behind the positive expectations associated with children. This underlines the fundamental importance of intergenerational relationships in the migrant situation.

Table 3: Costs of children

Children …	German		Greek		Italian		Turkish		Vietnamese		Repatriate	
	Fathers	Mothers	Fathers	Mothers	Fathers	Mothers	Fathers	Mothers	Fathers	Mothers	Fathers	Mothers
… leave no time for parents to pursue their own interests	6.9%	9.3%	19.5%	20.3%	18.0%	21.0%	20.0%	31.0%	19.7%	24.4%	16.3%	19.3%
… create problems in the public sphere	3.3%	6.3%	7.0%	6.1%	9.2%	10.5%	11.7%	25.0%	8.9%	4.1%	7.0%	6.1%
… are a burden on a marriage	1.2%	2.0%	8.5%	6.6%	5.8%	8.5%	2.9%	4.5%	4.4%	2.5%	4.2%	9.4%
… are a financial burden	17.6%	16.8%	28.0%	18.3%	22.3%	22.0%	28.3%	36.0%	19.7%	20.8%	19.5%	19.3%
… are a source of worry	26.0%	26.6%	32.5%	25.4%	23.8%	28.5%	23.4%	36.5%	19.2%	27.4%	26.5%	28.3%
…limit occupational options	14.6%	46.3%	16.0%	30.5%	18.4%	35.5%	7.3%	24.0%	29.1%	29.4%	11.6%	25.0%

Sources: Survey on intergenerational relationships in migrant families; DJI-family survey 1988.

Because utility expectations have turned out to be a dimension subject to much differentiation in immigrant families' intergenerational relationships, Table 4 provides some additional empirical results on expectations regarding parental help. The first part (Table 4a) shows results on what parents expect from their children, which are then complemented in the second part (Table 4b) by results for teenage children (Nauck 2000: 368). This part indicates the extent to which these utility expectations are perceived and anticipated. This part of the analysis thus deals with 'what to expect from expectations', which represent mutual role obligations in intergenerational relationships in a very specific way.

The empirical results show a very consistent pattern of gender-specific intergenerational expectations:

In all migrant nationalities, it is more frequent for parents to expect their daughters to remain permanently close to home and thus make themselves available for *personal help* (though communication can be maintained without residential proximity). The same expectation is not extended as frequently to sons. Mothers express this expectation more often, which underlines more than just the closeness of mother-daughter-relationships. It is also a cultural symbol of the fact that, given the age difference between spouses and consequently the longer life expectancy of wives, females are more likely to become dependent on intergenerational help than are males.

Table 4a: Help expectations in migrant families

Parental expectations of …	RS	Repatriates		Greeks		Italians		Turks		Vietnamese	
expect children to.	RS	Daughters	Sons	Daughters	Sons	Daughters	Sons	Daughters	Sons	Daughters	Sons
always live in the vicinity	F	60.8%	46.2%	50.8%	42.1%	53.0%	44.9%	-	-	75.8%	71.7%
	M	55.8%	48.4%	46.9%	42.5%	41.0%	37.9%	-	-	67.4%	56.5%
deliver part of their income when starting work	F	20.8%	24.4%	29.4%	32.0%	24.5%	27.9%	20.0%	44.0%	30.4%	40.4%
	M	30.5%	29.8%	20.4%	29.5%	22.9%	25.2%	24.9%	14.2%	20.9%	33.2%
help younger siblings get an education	F	39.3%	47.8%	40.8%	51.3%	35.2%	38.9%	29.0%	54.5%	57.8%	75.8%
	M	45.8%	45.6%	35.2%	44.5%	34.6%	38.8%	50.2%	39.0%	57.2%	71.9%
provide financial help in family emergencies	F	68.4%	75.3%	66.0%	74.1%	69.5%	71.7%	65.0%	77.5%	78.9%	85.8%
	M	73.2%	74.0%	58.7%	71.0%	59.5%	68.9%	70.2%	52.2%	76.6%	84.5%
help out with household chores	F	79.2%	44.6%	73.1%	26.9%	69.8%	34.3%	84.0%	36.0%	88.5%	53.5%
	M	80.0%	37.7%	73.0%	28.0%	72.5%	29.1%	62.4%	90.2%	88.9%	50.3%
provide financial assistance in old age	F	76.9%	78.5%	56.9%	69.5%	59.0%	68.7%	69.0%	80.5%	84.0%	93.4%
	M	69.5%	76.7%	48.5%	62.0%	48.5%	60.7%	78.0%	58.0%	78.1%	82.3%

Table 4b: Parental expectations anticipated by sons and daughters in migrant families

Expectations of…	RS	Repatriates		Greeks		Italians		Turks	
expect children to …	RS	Daughters	Sons	Daughters	Sons	Daughters	Sons	Daughters	Sons
always live in the vicinity	F	55.2%	43.7%	43.7%	35.9%	41.2%	37.2%	-	-
	M	48.7%	41.4%	36.2%	31.5%	35.0%	27.3%	-	-
deliver part of their income when starting work	F	18.9%	26.3%	20.3%	23.6%	18.6%	20.1%	30.0%	49.5%
	M	23.3%	26.0%	20.4%	23.6%	15.0%	18.0%	35.6%	46.8%
help younger siblings get an education	F	39.0%	50.8%	28.9%	33.8%	22.1%	28.6%	26.0%	42.0%
	M	44.0%	47.4%	28.1%	32.5%	27.7%	33.7%	35.6%	46.3%
provide financial help in family emergencies	F	73.6%	74.7%	55.3%	59.5%	49.7%	54.3%	79.0%	85.0%
	M	73.6%	76.3%	48.0%	53.5%	51.0%	58.5%	74.6%	84.9%
help out with household chores	F	77.8%	55.3%	64.0%	28.2%	57.8%	25.6%	79.0%	29.5%
	F	77.2%	37.2%	62.8%	22.5%	57.8%	23.9%	84.4%	72.2%
provide financial assistance in old age	F	76.4%	76.8%	47.2%	61.5%	51.8%	57.3%	80.0%	86.5%
	M	73.6%	78.6%	42.3%	55.0%	48.1%	58.0%	74.1%	85.9%

Sources: Survey on intergenerational relationships in migrant families.

RS = respondent's sex

In all migrant nationalities, daughters are more frequently expected to help out with household chores than are sons. This gender-specific differentiation in expectations is markedly more pronounced in Italian, Greek and German repatriate families than in Turkish and Vietnamese families. Turkish sons are especially expect-

ed to help out at home—Turkish fathers have even higher expectations on their sons than on their daughters. Cultural differences regarding the importance of the economic-utilitarian value of children as opposed to their psychological-emotional value thus result in a *decreased* differentiation of parental utility expectations.

Finally, in all migrant nationalities, expectations related to transfer payments from the younger to the older generations are more frequently expressed by mothers and are more frequently directed towards sons. Mothers expect from their sons especially that they deliver part of their income when they start working, that they help their younger brothers and sisters get an education, that they help out in family emergencies and that they provide financial assistance to parents in their old age. These expectations are more salient in cultures with an emphasis on the economic-utilitarian value of children, and these cultures are also more likely to include daughters in these expectations than are cultures that (only) place a psychological-emotional value on children. Again, German repatriate families show an expectancy pattern that is not much different from the high utility expectations of Turkish and Vietnamese families.

A comparison of parents' responses with those of their teenage children shows that the children anticipate and internalize parental expectations to a very great extent. The children's response patterns follow those of their parents, which results in the same gender-specific differentiation of expectations.

Daughters most frequently anticipate that their mothers expect them to live permanently close by, while the same expectation is of no importance in the father-son-dyad.

In all immigrant nationalities, children of both sexes agree that it is the prime task of girls to help out with household chores. Differences are only related to the expectation on how much boys should be involved: while this expectation is relatively low for Italian, Greek, and repatriate boys, Turkish boys are able to anticipate quite precisely their fathers' high expectations.

Finally, it is also true for children of all nationalities that expectations related to transfer payments from younger to older generation are of special importance to the relationship between mothers and sons. Again, these expectations are especially salient for children in Turkish families *and in German repatriate families*; and in both groups, daughters include themselves much more in these expectations than in Greek or Italian families.

In general, gender-specific differences between the respective migrant nationalities are not very intense. It may be concluded from the obvious similarities in response patterns that a deep-rooted division of labour is prevalent between generations and genders and is by and large wholeheartedly accepted by both parents and children. The acceptance varies, however, with the importance of psychological-emotional or economic-utilitarian expectations in intergenerational rela-

tionships: in Italian and Greek families, parental expectations are always higher than those anticipated by their children; in Turkish and German repatriate families, the children's anticipations sometimes exceed those of their parents.

Intergenerational transmission in migrant families

The transmission of culture between generations is a necessary precondition for the continuity of a cultural community, but it never occurs completely. Moreover, culture is created in the ongoing interaction between individuals and groups; and it changes permanently. Accordingly, the process of cultural transmission never results in a perfect reproduction of the culture in the respective next generation. Cultural transmission is always placed in a strained relationship, which ranges between perfect transmission (thus resulting in imperceptible differences between generations) and the complete absence of any transmission (thus resulting in no visible resemblance between generations). Both extremes are problematic in the same way: perfect transmission would not allow for any social change and does not provide any capacity for adaptation to new situations and circumstances, while lack of transmission would not allow for any coordinated action between generations and would destroy any potential for intergenerational solidarity (Phalet & Schönpflug 2001).

If only a few members enter into a social group, cultural transmission can be slow and diffuse. If, however, the culture is to be maintained and many new members enter into that social group, then cultural transmission has to be fast and intensive. If migration is common, migration situations are typically characterised by social change in the receiving society; in any case, however, they are characterised by rapid cultural change on the part of the migrants themselves. Migration situations thus lead to a stronger accent on the respective culture—both within the receiving society and the migrant minority group. In these situations, intergenerational transmission is sometimes the only way for a migrant minority to maintain their cultural heritage. Thus, the paradox of the migrant situation is that the parents' generation is simultaneously faced with an increased difficulty with and an increased need for intergenerational transmission of culture. On the one hand, the shining parental examples have lost their adaptive value in the context of the receiving country; and on the other hand, parents are forced to make even stronger efforts to transmit their culture of origin to their offspring. This is especially the case if (as in countries like Germany) there is no support from culture-transmitting institutions—for example, if elements of the minority culture are not part of the official curriculum in kindergartens and schools. It is not astonishing at all if, under

these conditions, migrant families become highly motivated to maintain and strengthen intergenerational relationships, and that these relationships become co-ordinated to a much higher extent than in non-migrant families—be it in the receiving society or the society of origin.

Intergenerational transmission in Turkish families in Germany and Turkey

A comparison between Turkish migrant and non-migrant families provides some insight into whether intergenerational transmission—i.e. correspondence in the perception of social situations, attitudes and preferred ways of behaving between generations—is more or less intensive under migrant conditions.

Table 5 lists findings regarding agreement in perceptions, attitudes and behaviour patterns in the dyads formed by parents and children of the same sex (Nauck 1995). The comparison of means allows for conclusions about gradual differences between generations and genders. T-tests indicate statistically significant intra- and intergenerational differences in migrant and non-migrant families, as well as among the latter. The correlations of the father-son and mother-daughter dyads, respectively, refer to the degree of concordance between parents and adolescents at the individual level and allow for conclusions regarding the degree of values transmitted to the next generation within families.

Table 5: Transmission of attitudes in Turkish families in Germany (G) and Turkey (T)

		Means				Correlations	
						Father-	Mother-
		Fathers[1]	Mothers[2]	Sons[3]	Daughters[4]	son	daughter
Educational	G	14.6+	13.6**	12.3**	11.5	52**	62**
aspiration	T5)	18.6∞∞∞	15.7∞∞∞	17.5∞∞∞	17.6∞∞∞	.12	.24
Utility expectations	G	2.85	2.93	3.36**	2.93++	.26**	.28**
on sons	T	3.88∞∞∞	3.41∞∞∞	3.55	3.35∞∞∞	.17	.11
Utility expectations	G	2.54	2.67*	3.04**	2.94	.20*	.29**
on daughters	T	3.44∞∞∞	3.58∞∞∞	3.32	3.94∞∞∞	-.02	.12
Normative							
gender-role-	G	1.94	1.85	2.24**	1.95++	.16	.34**
orientation	T	2.08	1.73	1.99∞∞∞	1.64∞∞∞	.23	.18
Internal locus	G	3.47	3.54**	3.18**	3.25	.13	.17*
of control	T	3.48	3.49	3.05∞∞	2.97∞∞∞	.12	.04

1) ++   *Intragenerational differences between migrant fathers and mothers*
        p < .01   (+ = p < .05)

2) **   *Intragenerational differences between migrant mothers and daughters*
        p < .01   (= p < .05)*

3) **   *Intragenerational differences between migrant fathers and sons*
        p < .01   (= p < .05)*

4) ++   *Intragenerational differences between migrant sons and daughters*
        p < .01   (+ = p < .05)

5) ∞∞∞   *Differences between migrants and non-migrants*
        p < .01   (∞ = p < .05)

Dramatic differences between migrant and non-migrant Turkish families can be found in the individual attitudes of parents and their sons and daughters. In migrant families, the highest amount of concordance is seen in areas specific to relationships between generations. Educational aspiration exemplifies this finding. This variable was measured by how sure the respondent was that the child would actually achieve the desired educational status: r = 0.62 for the mother-daughter dyad, and r = 0.52 for the father-son dyad. The parents' educational aspirations are clearly higher than those of the adolescents themselves, who are far less sure that they will achieve an educational level as high as that desired by their families. For this variable, gender-specific differences (in favour of a somewhat higher aspiration

level for male youngsters) are less important. Overall, the results of this study reveal that Turkish migrant parents still have extraordinarily high educational aspirations for their children.

The mean comparisons between migrant and non-migrant Turkish families show that the latter by far surpass the former in the degree of educational aspiration with respect to both gender and generation. However, the rather low correlation coefficients show that, in Istanbul, the high level of education sought cannot be attributed to intergenerational transmission. A homogeneous milieu may contribute to the stabilisation of such aspirations to a great degree, even if they are not expressed in the parent-child dyad.

In migrant families, the transmission of traditional values concerning expectations of filial utility is expressed through educational aspirations, which are stronger in female dyads than in male ones. The mean comparisons reveal that gradual differences are given only for male adolescents, whose anticipated utility expectations for daughters as well as for sons are extraordinarily high and clearly surpass those of all other groups. Turkish migrant sons thus anticipate higher economic-utilitarian expectations than are actually expressed by their parents. Interestingly enough, these male adolescents have by far the strongest normative gender-role orientations, not only surpassing any other group in Germany but in Turkey as well. Migrant sons tend to express convictions of external control, believing they have few opportunities for situational control. This accentuation of attitudes among male Turkish adolescents directs them straight into a normative conflict, not only with their own family but also with the receiving society. Because the host society has neither a positive view of utilitarian expectations on children nor value-laden gender-role norms or overriding convictions of external control, male adolescents' attitudes may be interpreted as further evidence of their being under 'structural strain' as a result of the migrant situation (Nauck 1989b: 296).

If unfulfilled expectations are taken as the main source of conflicts, it can reasonably be assumed that expectations on sons will be unfulfilled much more frequently and profoundly than those of daughters. Economic and utilitarian expectations on sons are greater and longer-lasting than those on daughters. Additionally, in the receiving society investments in education are much higher compared to the society of origin; thus, they become associated with extremely high expectations of social mobility. The potential for conflict, especially for sons, not only results from the fact that these mobility aspirations are usually unmet (adolescents already being subject to reduced educational aspirations) but also arises from assumptions between the individual parents and their children concerning lifelong loyalty and assistance. Conflict arises when this 'understanding' is unilaterally cancelled by the children, producing unforeseen consequences on the parents' decision to migrate. The parents suddenly become a 'lost generation' who, on the

one hand, fulfil their traditional commitments of loyalty towards their family—often incurring severe financial burdens in the process—but who, on the other hand, have to give up any expectations that their children will reciprocate because of new developments in the receiving society. Thus, for the parents' generation, their relationship with the next generation is costly and reciprocal benefits are both scant and rare.

The conflicts between parents and daughters are less intense than those with sons and are usually caused by situational norm violations. Failure to fulfil parental expectations is less likely. For example, as long as there is any continuation of the present uneven distribution of sexes in the migrant population, with more males of marriageable age than females, and as long as migration by marrying a Turkish woman in Germany is an attractive option for Turkish men, Turkish migrant daughters are favourably placed in an extended marriage market. Thus, the upward mobility of daughters through a successful marriage is a realistic target with a comparatively higher probability of success than the upward mobility of sons. The risk of daughters not fulfilling their parents' expectations is more likely to occur short term in matters such as helping out with housework and younger siblings. Nevertheless, if these expectations compete with educational aspirations and peer-group relationships according to the standards of the receiving society, they may lead to goal conflicts. In addition, the stronger transmission of traditional attitudes in female dyads supports this interpretation, such that one can assume that migrant daughters are better integrated into their families than are sons.

The comparison with non-migrant Turkish families shows that parents' utilitarian expectations on their children continue to be more pronounced in the society of origin than in the newly adopted society. The attitudes of female adolescents in Istanbul are particularly interesting. They express by far the highest utilitarian expectations on girls, but at the same time they indicate the lowest normative gender-role orientations and the lowest convictions of internal control. As Tables 1 and 2 show, this seems to be connected to a change in gender-role orientations between the generations, one differing considerably from trends in Western industrial societies. Egalitarian views about the female gender role are not associated with individualism and independence and thus are associated with low utilitarian aspirations and high internal convictions of control. Conversely, egalitarianism is interpreted as the daughters' equality in the existing utilitarian 'understanding' between the generations within a culture based on kinship (Kagitcibasi 1987).

Despite the intergenerational differences in attitudes and behaviour, results reveal that intergenerational transmission is an essential and integral part of the socialisation of second-generation immigrants. Despite all the differences between the generations in assimilation behaviour and reactions to the receiving society, the dense interactive structure of migrant families undoubtedly results, to a great

degree, from concordance between generations in basic value orientation and behavioural preferences.

The structure of migrant families clearly provides a mechanism for the delivery of numerous social services often provided by institutions in Western society. The marked intergenerational transmission of norms leads not only to a much higher concordance in attitudes in migrant than in non-migrant families, but also to a high level of co-orientation among family members in attitudes and values. Family members know more about each other, are more sensitive to intra-familial interactions and are better at synchronising their interactions.

These results contradict numerous assertions expressed in migration research, particularly in research analysing aggregate differences between migrant generations based on cohort comparisons. This study's findings contradict the assertion that intergenerational differences will result in increasingly endangered relationships between generations at the individual level. According to migration sociology, 'inevitable' intergenerational conflicts are the current fate of migrant families. However, by making a direct comparison of dyadic intergenerational relationships both in the society of origin and in the receiving society, this empirical study shows that intergenerational transmission becomes stronger after migration. The conclusions of previous researchers that migration intensifies conflict between generations are thus contradicted by these results.

Intergenerational transmission in Greek, Italian and Turkish migrant families

The question is now whether the empirical finding about the high level of intergenerational transmission is primarily related to characteristics of the Turkish culture of origin, or whether it is related to the migrant situation *per se*. The latter would be the case if intergenerational transmission in other migrant nationalities with different cultural traits is as high as in Turkish migrant families.

In a first step, differences in educational level between immigrant nationalities, generations and gender are investigated, together with bivariate measures for intergenerational transmission (Nauck 2001a). The percentages from the results in Table 6 are reduced to one significant category; the correlations, however, are based on the full range of the variables. In the case of language acquisition and retention, and in the case of discrimination, additive indices of several single indicators are used.

Table 6: Intergenerational transmission of cultural capital and ethnic identification between parents and young adults in Italian (I), Greek (G) and Turkish (T) migrant families, and in German repatriate families (R)

		Percentages (in %)				Correlations	
		Father	Mother	Son	Daughter	Father-son	Mother-daughter
Educational level (for parents, secondary school degree or higher; for children, in the highest school track)	I	20.4	23.4	21.4	17.0	.35	.32
	G	20.5	15.7	20.5	13.7	.40	.07
	T	33.2	20.0	20.3	18.0	.05	.28
	R	44.2	52.4	14.0	17.5	.16	.30
Family language retention in the communication between parents and children (parents' columns) and between brothers and sisters (children's columns)	I	50.0	59.0	26.7	28.0	.56	.50
	G	56.5	56.9	34.0	27.9	.58	.55
	T	48.8	51.5	9.3	9.0	.22	.35
	R	40.5	37.7	37.7	28.8	.76	.69
Language acquisition (percentage fluent in the language of the receiving society)	I	19.9	19.5	76.2	81.0	.24	.15
	G	25.0	16.2	75.0	74.6	.38	.35
	T	4.4	2.0	53.7	60.0	.12	.28
	R	19.1	17.5	50.2	53.3	.59	.49
Children's language retention (percentage fluent in the language of the society of origin)	I			33.5	33.9		
	G			38.0	41.6		
	T			48.8	28.5		
	R			44.2	52.4		
Feelings of discrimination (percentage feeling 'strongly' discriminated against in two or more areas)	I	10.7	11.0	.5	2.0	.53	.55
	G	10.5	11.7	1.5	1.5	.58	.57
	T	15.1	5.5	4.9	5.5	.19	.11
	R	6.0	5.2	3.7	4.2	.63	.54
Marriage homogamy (percentage 'never' accepting a native-born son-/daughter-in-law or a native-born spouse, respectively)	I	2.4	5.5	4.4	3.5	.34	.48
	G	4.0	9.1	9.0	6.1	.40	.46
	T	25.4	46.5	30.7	46.0	.30	.28
	R	4.2	3.3	5.6	6.2	.37	.29
Return plans (percentage planning to return)	I	13.1	12.5	6.3	8.0	.20	.17
	G	22.0	27.9	13.0	10.2	.41	.28
	T	31.2	28.0	16.1	22.5	.16	.28
	R	10.8	11.0	.9	.0	*	*

The *educational level* (and thus the cultural capital that may be invested into the migration process) varies considerably between the immigrant groups included in our research. While about half of the German repatriate parents have at least a secondary-school degree, this is the case for less than a quarter of the migrant-worker parents, with the highest levels of schooling occurring among Turkish fathers and the lowest among Greek mothers. While there is no difference in educational level between the first and second generations of Italian, Greek and Turkish migrant families, the newly arrived repatriates in Germany show a significant gap in this area, with the educational level being at least as low as for the classical migrant-worker nationality in Germany.

A major mechanism for *retaining an ethnic language* is whether this language is used within the family for everyday communication between parents and children and among siblings. Table 6 shows the percentage of families in which both parents and children consistently report using the language of the society of origin. Slightly more than half of the immigrant parents in Germany exclusively use Italian, Greek, Turkish or Russian when speaking with their children. Language retention is slightly higher in the mother-daughter-dyads in Italian, Greek and Turkish families, and slightly higher in the father-son-dyads in repatriate families. In all immigrant groups, language retention occurs less in communication between brothers and sisters, as compared to the communication between parents and children. The contrast is highest in Turkish migrant families and lowest in German repatriate families. Accordingly, the intergenerational transmission of the family's language is quite high in the German repatriate families (and in Italian and Greek immigrant families as well), and low in Turkish families. The level of family language retention is not directly related to the level of the children's *mastering the language of the society of origin* (their parents'). The highest language losses are reported by Turkish girls: less than one third claim to speak Turkish "very well" (as opposed to about 50% of Turkish boys!). Both, intergenerational differences in retaining the family language and children's mastery of it show the difficulty in sustaining the culture of origin in the majority of immigrant families. Accordingly, neither 'segregation' nor 'integration' seems to be the major pathway of acculturation, giving way to 'assimilation' and perhaps even to 'marginalisation'. Which one of these two outcomes will be more likely is related to acquiring the language of the receiving society. Not surprisingly, in all immigrant groups, the children's generation masters it to a much greater extent than do their parents. However, Turkish parents show a relatively low level of *language acquisition.* However, in the next generation, these differences appear to have nearly disappeared; and the order of the language mastery in the second generation merely mirrors historical immigrant waves—with the Italians in first place, Greeks in second, Turks in third and repatriates last—but with an extremely visible effect on intergenerational transmission. The acculturation pattern only

becomes visible when there is a link between access to the culture of origin and to that of the receiving society. For this purpose, the acquisition of both languages has been dichotomised in Table 6, first according to the average of all immigrant groups and then according to boys and girls of all nationalities, who have been grouped according to bilingual performance both above or below the cut-off point.

The results clearly show that, for Italian and Greek second-generation youth, 'integration' is the predominant pathway for acculturation, e.g. more then 50% perform above average in both languages, while assimilative or segregation tendencies are less profound and only about 10% recognise losses in both languages. In the other groups, the highest proportions are to be found in the 'segregation' column. This is least significant for Turkish youth in Germany who remain in the receiving society as long as their Italian and Greek counterparts; but it may indicate some segregationist tendencies among the German repatriate youth as well. Language acquisition is systematically gender related: girls perform better in languages. Accordingly, they have the least risks among all four groups of becoming linguistically marginalised and are much more likely to adhere to the 'integration' mode of culture contact than are boys.

Table 7: Language acculturation of second-generation Italian, Greek, Turkish and German repatriate youth in Germany (%)

Language of origin / of receiving society		- / - 'Marginalization'	- / + 'Assimilation'	+ / - 'Segregation'	+ / + 'Integration'
Italian	Boys	12.1	22.8	15.5	49.5
	Girls	7.5	12.5	18.5	61.5
Greek	Boys	12.5	20.5	17.0	50.0
	Girls	7.6	19.3	21.3	51.8
Turkish	Boys	16.6	15.1	43.9	24.4
	Girls	16.0	18.5	35.0	30.5
German repatriate	Boys	16.4	21.0	38.8	23.8
	Girls	13.2	22.2	35.4	29.2

Strong intergenerational differences exist in *feelings of discrimination*: first-generation immigrant parents report feeling discriminated against to a significantly higher degree than do their children. The highest rate of such feelings occurred among Turkish fathers (15% reported feeling 'strongly' discriminated against in at least two of areas from the categories of 'work', 'housing', 'shops' and 'offices'). Immigrant groups differ considerably according to how these feelings get passed down: the transmission effect is consistently high for both genders in Italian, Greek and German repatriate families, and low in Turkish families. This may indicate a sharper separation of the generational living spheres among these families.

More active indicators for segregation (or more precisely, non-assimilation) are those referring to *marriage homogamy* and *return plans*. Marriage homogamy may be related to the creation of a more or less stable minority subculture, while return plans indicate the idea of not investing too much into a permanent stay in the receiving society. The tendency towards marriage homogamy is highest among Turkish families, especially in the female dyad; whereas this tendency is quite low among Italian and Greek families and also among German repatriates. In all four migrant groups, the intergenerational transmission of attitudes towards marriage homogamy is relatively high in both gender dyads. Once again, return plans differ according to migrant generation, being considerably higher in the first and lower in the second—but on different group-specific levels. Among the German repatriate families, return plans are practically absent; and in the second generation, literally zero. At about 13%, the percentages for Italian parents are only slightly higher than for German repatriate parents. Return plans are more pronounced among first-generation Greeks immigrants, and especially among Turkish immigrants, where about 30% of the parents and 20% of the children express plans to return.

In general, the results show a clear intergenerational trend towards more cultural contact and less segregation among second-generation immigrants. However, these differences in levels are linked, as is shown by the comparatively high correlations between the attitudes and behaviour of both generations among the family dyads (Nauck 1997). This transmission effect is higher among migrant families as opposed to non-migrant families, indicating a highly synchronized inter-generational pattern of coping with the migrant situation. This effect appears to be unrelated to the cultural capital available within the family: the transmission of educational success is the lowest among all the indicators investigated (Nauck et al.1998).

However, the empirical question remains open of whether the mechanisms of the acculturation process are the same across all immigrant groups. The analysis of the differences in levels already revealed two extreme groups (Nauck 2001a; Steinbach & Nauck 2000): the Turkish immigrant families in Germany on the one hand, and the Jewish Russian families in Israel on the other. Both groups show comparatively high segregationist tendencies: the parents have a relatively poor command of the language of the respective receiving society, and thus a high ten-dency to use the language of origin for communication within the family, and both groups show the highest tendency towards marriage homogamy. However, while this does relate to feelings of discrimination and to definite plans to return 'home' in the case of Turkish families, among Russian Jews it is more an issue of extremely high levels of education, few feelings of discrimination and the absence of any return plans. *While the Turkish family members in Germany consistently have the highest level of social capital, the Russian Jews in Israel have the lowest*, despite both

groups differing significantly from the 'average' of remaining Italians, Greeks and German repatriates. These differences in social capital thus seem to stem from fundamentally different acculturation strategies: while Turkish families in Germany tend to make use of a collectivistic strategy to utilise the social capital at their disposal, Russian Jewish families rely more on an individualistic strategy and have the smallest network size of all groups. Accordingly, intergenerational transmission is comparably high in the 'collectivistic' case of Turkish migrant families, and relatively low in the 'individualistic' case of Russian Jews.

However, why do both strategies end up in producing highly segregationist tendencies? A necessary precondition is, of course, the sheer number of people whose needs are to be met, which makes segregation much easier for Russian Jews and Turks as compared to Italians, Greeks and German repatriates. One hypothesis, nonetheless, calls for a second precondition: the group's respective relationship to the majority and the resulting opportunity structure. Segregationist tendencies increase with the receiving society's level of relative closure in relation to the immigrant population. This is obviously the case for the Turkish population in Germany: they are most likely to display feelings of discrimination. Moreover, successful 'collectivist' patterns have evolved within their cultural heritage, which not only support their defensive tendencies but in turn can cause them to rely more on social than on cultural capital—thus enforcing the social closure between majority and minority.

The situation for the Russian Jews in Israel is quite different. Their cultural capital is equivalent or superior to that of the receiving society and—as is indicated by their lack of feelings of discrimination— a social closure is absent. However, any gains from investing their highly available cultural capital into assimilation may not be as salient as, for example, with the Italians, Greeks and German repatriates; rather, investments into 'weak ties' within their own group, one also having highly specialised skills and abilities, may be just as profitable without any further need to assimilate. Segregation increases if the opportunity structure of the receiving society either *does not or cannot* make offers to immigrants.

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Section 3:
Socio-economic situation of migrants

Philip Muus

Migration, immigrants and labour markets in EU Member States

1 Introduction

This paper is meant to offer insight into the incorporation of immigrants into the labour market of EU Member States. It also attempts to study variations in (national) degrees of their integration and variables that have an impact on (country-specific) policy development. A study on immigrant labour-market incorporation cannot completely be detached from national labour-market developments, labour-migration needs and the ways in which EU Member States have developed and are developing (labour-) migration policies. Since a major part of the immigrants who entered the EU during the past two decades have arrived under headings other than that of legal economic immigrants—e.g. as family members, asylum-seekers or irregularly—the migration spectrum needs to be broadened to include these categories in order to better understand both national variations in immigrant incorporation into the labour market and the corresponding policy responses. The final part of this paper will present two schemes of analysis for future investigation into immigrant labour-market integration into EU Member States.

1.1 Immigration and the labour market

Although there is no general theory on international migration, efforts have been made to reconcile different theoretical approaches. Boyle et al. (1998) distinguish micro- versus macro-analytical, as well as determinist versus humanist conceptual approaches, coming forward with integrated accounts of human migration. Massey et al. (1998) write about the insufficiency of traditional approaches, i.e. the 'push-pull framework' and neoclassic theoretical explanations, in an effort to integrate such theoretical perspectives as the new economics of labour migration, segmented labour-market theory, social-capital theory, world-systems theory, and the theory of cumulative causation. Both groups of authors make important distinctions between theories that might, on the one hand, explain the start of migration, and those that may account for its continuation or perpetuation. However, they do not fully take into account the importance of a large part of the 'new' types of migration, i.e. the arrival of asylum-seekers, refugees and irregular migrants. As

theoretically based studies on Europe are lacking, Massey et al. (1998) are unfortunately unable to convincingly demonstrate that migration to Europe can be sufficiently explained by the above-mentioned theoretical perspectives.

One of the elements not specifically taken into account is the welfare-state aspect of the countries of settlement. The study of international migration in relation to the labour markets of the European host countries has become more diffuse since the formal halt to the recruitment of foreign labour around 1973. Since then, international migration has changed in both form and momentum. Great numbers of family members have joined those who primarily arrived as low- and unskilled labour migrants, during times when labour-market needs for these groups were dwindling. Since the mid-1980s, the welfare states of Northern and Western Europe have shown a significant influx of asylum-seekers and refugees, while the countries of Southern Europe with a less extensive welfare system have attracted more irregular and undocumented migrants. So far, comparative research has not focused on the relationship between the relative attractiveness of different parts of Europe for different types of immigrants, along with the corresponding policy implications. In this paper, we are concerned with the labour-market integration of immigrants in an international comparative perspective.

Most Northern and Western European states face major difficulties in their attempt to incorporate a large share of the resident immigrant population, along with their descendants, into the labour market (Wrench et al. 1999). Nevertheless, new openings for labour migration do pop up in most of the same states. On the one hand, new arrivals are allowed for highly skilled personnel (though often limited in numbers); on the other hand, the admission doors may be widened for temporary (often seasonal) foreign labour at the bottom of the job scale.

Southern European states (King et al. 2000) have only recently emerged as (de facto) immigration countries. Although the shares of the legal foreign workforce are still of minor importance compared to those in Northern and Western Europe, labour markets may be qualified by a significant and frequent presence of irregular immigrant labour in the informal economy. Measures underway to regularise their status usually only offer the chance for temporary settlement. To complicate matters, these developments in migration and in the integration of immigrants are taking place in an era when the demographic composition of European states is changing due to low birth rates and increased population ageing (United Nations 2000). These demographic processes automatically impact on the (future) composition of the labour force and have triggered a major discussion on the sustainability of extensive welfare-state measures, e.g. how to finance existing social-security and pension systems, how to finance and staff existing health-care systems, etc.

In a sense, immigration may roughly be divided into old and new migration patterns. Old migration patterns are characterised by recruiting labour, mainly low- or unskilled males, and by post-colonial and follow-up migration primarily for purposes of family reunification. Most migration to Europe has taken place within a limited number of countries in the framework of formal bilateral labour-recruitment contracts or as a heritage of the colonial past. New migration patterns differ from the old ones in two ways. First, concerning the migrants themselves, the number of countries of origin and their heterogeneity has increased enormously, following less along the well-trodden paths of the (recent) past. Second, migration specifically due to the arrival of forced migrants and partly by that of irregular migrants is to be explained by push factors within the country of origin with no direct labour-market links in the country of destination. This last characteristic also applies to the great majority of migrants who arrived as family members of labour migrants. The increasingly restrictive European immigration policies specifically address these developments.

These kinds of generalisations tend to obscure other developments. First, the current intra-European Economic Area (EEA) migration of EEA nationals is left out of the picture. Second, the large-scale immigration of ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) needs to be treated as a specific case, though as a category they share a non-direct labour-market link with the other categories mentioned. Third, European countries have always welcomed highly skilled immigrants from outside the current EU and continue to do so. New labour-market needs, not only in the ICT sector but also in health care, have recently eased the labour-migration policies for highly skilled immigrants from non-European countries in a number of EU Member States (OECD 2002). Consequently, many European countries are simultaneously faced with high unemployment, specifically among resident immigrants and their descendants, and with the frequent need to attract new, highly skilled immigrant labour to work (temporarily) in specific sectors and professions.

1.2 Immigration, integration and the welfare state

In the European context, the relationship between immigration and integration cannot be fully understood without taking into account the specific (national) welfare-state component. As stated above, migration has already been linked to the welfare state in two aspects: firstly, migration is not always directly related to the labour market, which makes newly arrived legal immigrants who are unemployed dependent on welfare-state benefits and thus adds to the costs of immigration (turning immigrants of working age into clients of the welfare state instead of workers). Second, future demographic developments that are now becoming partly visible may cause specific labour-market shortages in such service professions as

health care. A more general debate revolves around this issue, namely whether and to which extent replacement migration will be needed to sustain current welfare states.

Faist (1996) states that, in welfare states, the integration of immigrants partly depends on the *type* of welfare state. While differentiating between policy-based and market-based welfare states, Faist elaborates four arguments specifying the impact of welfare-state structures on policies regulating the selection, admission and integration of immigrants—and vice versa, regardless of whether immigration and integration policies have changed politics in these welfare states. The four arguments are formulated as follows (Faist 1996: 228–229):

1) Welfare states granting extensive social rights within highly-regulated (policy-based) labour markets on the one hand; and on the other, welfare states granting fewer social rights with lower degrees of (market-based) labour-market regulation: the two types differ in how they regulate immigration and integrate immigrants.

2) Partial convergence of immigration and integration policies can be seen in different host countries.

3) Immigration and integration policies result in (semi)permanent politicisation of welfare-state politics.

4) Receiving welfare states, such as Germany, have responded to immigration and integration in two ways. They have tried to speed up the socio-economic integration of those already present; and they have also opened their doors to short-term labour migrants, thus enforcing rotation.

Faist confronts the three worlds of welfare capitalism (the *liberal* Anglo-Saxon countries; *conservative* Continental Europe, and the *social-democratic* Scandinavian countries) with the four immigration-policy regimes as distinguished by Baldwin-Edwards (1991) (semi-peripheral or Mediterranean regimes; *Schengen* or the mainland Continental model; the Scandinavian model; and the outlier, namely the UK). Faist notes a correspondence between the two sets of typologies. The idea of a distinctive fourth Southern European welfare state overlaps here with Baldwin-Edwards' semi-peripheral model. Although the borderlines between the distinctive typologies are not always consistent, partly due to convergence in both welfare and immigration-policy regimes, Faist's first argument is of interest to this study. The main dividing line is the policy-oriented versus the market-based welfare state. Policy-oriented welfare states may be characterised by high degrees of labour-market regulation and are more likely to have implemented more fluctuating immigration policies (for example, Germany). Market-based welfare states generally have low degrees of labour-market regulation and are more likely to have had continuous immigration policies (for example, the USA). Faist develops

his argument in comparing Germany and the USA. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on the differentiation between both types of regimes within Europe.

If we accept Faist's argument regarding a distinction between overlapping immigration and integration regimes and welfare-state regimes in Europe, we may take their degree of labour-market regulation as a central element for this differentiation. In this respect, the impact of an informal economy/labour market and its relative size also need to be taken into account. Among other things, the existence of relatively important informal economies in Southern European countries has contributed to major flows of irregular migration; and this has only partly been redressed by often-repeated regularisation schemes. Since 1986, four major regularisation programmes have been launched in Italy. The last one in 1998–1999 introduced a quota of 300,000 persons; the first major regularisation programme in Greece (1997–1998) led to 375,000 applications; and regularisation programmes in Spain involved 108,000 persons in 1991 and 21,000 in 1996 (OECD 1998; OECD 1999).

With some exceptions, the differentiation in European welfare-state regimes also overlaps with labour-market characteristics for the total working-age population: e.g. the net participation rate (both for the total and for specific categories) and the unemployment rate (again, both for the total and for specific categories), as was shown in a study by the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP 2000). The Scandinavian countries (with the exception of Finland) have the highest net participation and lowest unemployment rates (specifically in low levels of long-term unemployment). The Southern countries have the lowest net participation rates (with the exception of Portugal) and the highest unemployment rates. The Western European countries fall between the two extremes, while the UK comes closest to the Scandinavian countries. The SCP study also mentioned that a specific Southern European category is highly visible. We shall deal with this issue in more detail later on.

Regarding the impact of the welfare states on the incorporation of immigrants, one argument is partly rooted in the background of the newly arrived immigrants and in the extensiveness of the welfare state and the highly regulated labour markets. A large share of the newly arrived immigrants consists of family members and asylum-seekers/refugees. Most of them tend to have arrived without any direct linkage to the labour market; hence, the only answer of a highly organised welfare state must be to incorporate them, if not as workers than as clients of the system. As long as the labour market is able to absorb these newcomers, the system works well. However, as soon as it is no longer offering job opportunities, the only option that remains for them is to become dependent on the welfare-state system in its role as caregiver. Something like this seems to have taken place in The Netherlands in the 1980s and early 1990s, showing ever-in-

creasing unemployment rates among immigrants. Nevertheless, due to increased economic growth in the second part of the 1990s, the process apparently has somewhat reversed (Muus 2001). In Sweden, a similar process seems to have taken place at a later date but became highly visible in the mid-1990s with some improvement at the end of the decade (Westin 2000). At the same time, any restructuring of the economy, with all its consequences, definitely had a negative employment effect on the (immigrant) labour force and will make it harder for those who just arrived to enter the labour market.

We may conclude that it is relevant to include specific welfare-state aspects into a European comparative study on migration and the subsequent integration of immigrants into the labour market. Important aspects are its extensiveness in covering policy realms, the degree of labour-market regulation and the way it includes or excludes immigrants from social and other rights.

1.3 Demography and the labour market

In European countries, the issue of immigration has recently also been connected to (future) developments and changes in demographic composition, with possible consequences on the labour market and the organisation of the welfare state. In this section, we shall deal with the possible effect of demographic changes on the labour market in European countries. Two developments are important: declining fertility and reduced mortality rates among the elderly, which together lead to population ageing. There are important variations in these developments among European countries, though all have been touched by these two phenomena. Ultimately, they make the non-working population (0–14 and >65 years) increasingly dependent on the working segment (the working-age population/WAP aged 15–65).

The OECD study published in 1991 came to the following conclusions with regard to the possible effect of increased net migration on mitigating population ageing:

1) It is not easy to fine-tune immigration policy to precise demographic objectives, due to difficulties in controlling the volume and composition of net migration.

2) Simulations of the impact of immigration show that extremely high volumes of migration—much greater than those now occurring—would be required to completely offset ageing processes, such as growth in old-age dependency ratios.

3) Immigration policy is only one of a number of ways in which the economic burden of the elderly can be reduced, and it is unlikely to rank first among possible means of tackling the problem.

The discussion was refuelled in 2000 by a publication called *Replacement migration* (United Nations 2000). The scenarios presented for the European Union are, in a sense, dramatic:

1) If the total population of the European Union is to be kept constant until 2050, it would be necessary to have 47.4 million immigrants between 2000 and 2050, or 949,000 immigrants per year.
2) If the size of the population aged 15–64 is to be kept constant until 2050, it would be necessary to have 79.6 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or 1.4 million immigrants per year.
3) If the support ratio of persons aged 15–64 to each person 65 or older is to be kept constant until 2050, it would be necessary to have 701 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or 12.7 million immigrants per year.

The consequences of these scenarios become highly unrealistic if we read in the same report that, in the case of the last-mentioned scenario, the population of Europe would grow threefold by 2050 and three quarters of the population in 2050 would consist of post-1995 migrants from outside the European Union. This would equal unprecedented mass immigration surpassing even such traditional immigration countries as the USA, Canada or Australia.

The Council of Europe (Punch & Pearce 2000) addressed the same issue in a study called *Europe's population and labour market beyond 2000*. The contribution by Fina-Sanglas (2000) basically follows the reasoning found in OECD reports (1991, 1998). The main challenge for immigration policies will be to decide which immigrants are allowed to enter the country. Whether these flows can compensate for demographic gaps must be answered negatively.

The studies cited point to a serious demographic change in European countries in the decades to come. How this will impact labour markets remains inconclusive; it is easier to forecast demographic developments than labour-market developments. Immigration might play a role in partially filling the demographic gap, but other factors might also be important. Positive short-term changes in fertility rates are not very likely in most European countries but cannot be ruled out. For example, in 2000 and 2001 France experienced an important and unprecedented increase in fertility (see *Le Monde*, 7 Feb. 2002). The participation rates of the working-age population might also increase, and the productivity of the relatively smaller labour force might rise. High unemployment levels among nationals and immigrants might decline, and the pension age might slightly increase. These are still general options; the picture could well be quite different if we take into account basic national differences in Europe. For example, countries with high participation rates and/or low unemployment figures will undoubtedly have less room to manoeuvre when compared to countries with low participation rates and/or high unemployment.

2 Labour-migration needs and policies

The first aim of this study is to identify major causes behind the need for labour migration at the national level, as well as background variables that have an impact on the (country-specific) development of labour-migration policies.

In the future, one of the main foreseeable needs will be some sort of organised labour-market-related replacement migration to fill in demographic gaps. As outlined above, demographic changes will have a significant impact on the dependency ratios of the working versus the non-working population, which should begin to become obvious between 2010 and 2020. At the end of the 1990s, such countries as Germany and Italy showed a slight population growth, which, however, was entirely due to their levels of net migration. None of the EU Member States currently has an explicit migration policy based on demographic needs. One may wonder whether this is implicitly the case for the arrival of *Aussiedler* in Germany or for regularisation programmes in Italy, though, thus far, nothing points in this direction. France's immigration policy after the Second World War has been the only one in Europe with both a demographic and an economic component. Immigrants could compensate for low population growth aggravated by the loss of life during the War, and they could contribute to necessary post-war reconstruction. However, within two decades, the economic goal became predominant, culminating in 1972 in the *circulaire Fontanet*, where work and residence permits were only granted according to the availability of work and suitable housing (Muus & van Dam 1998).

Direct labour-market needs are not easily discerned in relation to migration. As we shall see below, only very few countries pursue direct labour-market-oriented policies; and in such cases, they only do so for limited numbers of immigrants. Nor does indirectly assessing the need for foreign labour by measuring changes in the labour-market presence of immigrants provide any clear indication of new migration. These changes may also be attributed to those immigrants who were already settled in these countries, as well as to naturalisations and changes in the immigrants' demographic composition.

Since the introduction of the free movement of workers within the European Community in 1968 (nowadays extended to countries belonging to the European Economic Area), national labour-migration policies relate only to non-EC/EEA labour (third-country nationals). Most of the EU Member States have developed a kind of work-permit system for new non-EEA entrees in their labour markets. Although national policies vary, they are all highly restrictive, in the sense that they give priority to the resident workforce and even the EU workforce at large before granting work permits to new non-EEA foreign labour migrants (priority ruling). The system may vary, however: in Germany, temporary workers are granted a

general residence permit and a specific type of work permit. The duration of the work permits varies depending on the country and the occupation concerned. In France, residence permits authorise people to work; while in The Netherlands, employers must obtain a recruitment authorisation but may only hire workers with a valid residence permit (OECD 1998: 186).

Recent OECD reports on international migration (OECD 1998; OECD 1999) indicate a variety of national solutions besides work-permit systems—mostly in connection with the priority ruling—that restrict access or stem the flow of new non-EEA foreign labour. Austria additionally maintains a quota policy governing foreign workers' access to the labour market: their share is not allowed to rise above a certain percentage of the total workforce (8%). In 1996, France exempted restrictions on specific highly skilled personnel working in new subsidiary firms run by foreign companies. Similar commitments were made for researchers, teachers working in higher education, assembly and technical workers, and performing artists. France carried out a major regularisation programme from 1997–1998 accepting most of the 143,000 immigrants who applied for regularisation. Germany allows the temporary entrance of contract labour and guest workers from a number of Central and Eastern European countries as an exception to the priority rule; but it sets annual quotas for each nationality and occupation. In 2000, Germany allowed a maximum of 10,000 residence permits for temporary foreign ICT specialists under specific conditions. Greece annually puts a lid on the number of work permits for foreign migrants based on country of citizenship. The first regularisation programme in 1997–1998 resulted in 375,000 applications. Italy additionally introduced the entry of foreigners for work-related reasons into the 1998 Immigration Act, using a system of preferential quotas for nationals of countries with which Italy has concluded agreements on admission to Italy and readmission back to the country of origin. Italy has thus far experienced four regularisation programmes (1986, 1990, 1997 and 1998), with each of the latter three leading to over 200,000 applications. In 2000, The Netherlands allowed temporary work in hospitals for a limited number of nurses from both the Republic of South Africa and Indonesia, while simultaneously demanding that employers increase their training facilities for both nationals and resident immigrants with a view to future recruitment. In its new Employment of Foreigners Act of 1998, Portugal eased access to work for foreigners by lifting numerical restrictions on foreign workers in firms with five or more employees. Portugal had two regularisation programmes in 1992–1993 and 1996, respectively, involving 39,200 and 21,800 irregular immigrants. Since 1993, Spain has set annual quotas of between 15,000 to 20,000 persons for non-EEA workers. Research on the two major regularisation programmes that took place in Spain in 1991 and 1996 (with 108,400 and 21,300 permits granted, respectively) showed that part of the quota was filled

with resident but irregular immigrants rather than new arrivals. The UK demands an adequate command of English from persons who need a work permit. For temporary work, the UK has additional entries for trainees and working holiday makers (the latter for Commonwealth nationals).

Incomplete though it may be, this indicative summary of recent labour-market related migration policy initiatives shows a few interesting points. First, a number of countries do not seem to have taken any specific policy measures besides existing restrictive labour-migration policies: the Nordic EU Member States (Denmark, Finland and Sweden), Belgium and Luxembourg. Second, all Southern European EU Member States (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) have introduced immigration policies and have (repeatedly) carried out major regularisation programmes for irregular immigrants. France recently joined with a major regularisation initiative. Third, Austria has introduced a ceiling in the share of foreign workers in total employment, while Greece has begun to put an annual limit on the number of work permits for foreigners. Fourth, a number of countries have developed alternatives for regulating foreign employment: Germany, Italy and Spain introduced (small) annual quotas, albeit for different categories; a number of countries broadened possibilities for specific categories of highly skilled workers (France, Germany, The Netherlands, the UK). This division partly reflects the composition of migration flows: more non-direct labour migration (asylum and family reunification) of non-EEA nationals to the North, and more irregular migration of non-EEA nationals to the South.

For the present study, the focus is on the incorporation of immigrants into the labour markets of EU Member States, as well as on variations in (national) degrees of their incorporation and variables that have an impact on the (country-specific) development of related policies.

Most immigration into EU Member States takes place under headings other than labour migration. Labour-migration policies are both scarce and specific, and new direct labour migration mainly takes place either within a variety of 'priority-ruled' work-permit systems or indirectly by all kinds of 'regularisation' efforts. (Temporary) Non-EEA labour migration is of growing importance in steadily growing economies, like those of The Netherlands and the UK; and the process of population ageing will undoubtedly add to future (specific) migration needs. In order to understand the migration component of immigrant incorporation into EU labour markets, one must conclude that most non-EEA immigration after the mid-1970s took place without any direct link to (formal) labour markets, occurring for reasons of family reunification/formation, asylum-seeking and the entry of irregular migrants into the informal economy. This fact has had a great impact on the incorporation of immigrants into the labour market. Whether or not immigrants have been successful may depend on a great number of variables and on their

characteristics (e.g. age, skills, gender), as well as on those of the receiving society (e.g. business cycle, skills needed, general and specific labour-market policies, discrimination, anti-discrimination policies, etc.).

3 Incorporation of immigrants into the labour market: variations and policies

The degree of current immigrant incorporation into the labour markets of EU Member States varies greatly if measured by the unemployment and participation rates of the immigrant population versus the national population. Both rates may also show important changes over time. The second aim of this study is to try to identify the major causes or factors behind these variations and to establish the main factors underlying the development of (country-specific) policies with regard to the incorporation of the immigrant population into the labour market.

3.1 Defining immigrants

One main issue is how to define 'immigrants'. In EU Member States, there is no common understanding or definition on what the term stands for. Interestingly, the word 'immigrant' cannot be translated into the different European languages without semantic and even definitional problems. Who is to be included: the foreign resident, the person born on foreign soil? Are those who once arrived by migration but who became naturalised still to be counted as immigrants? What about the children of those who arrived by migration? Wrench et al. (1999) point to these problems of comparison in the opening chapter of their book on migrants, ethnic minorities and the labour market. In the UK, the term (im)migrant is rarely used; people rather prefer to speak of 'ethnic minorities'. In The Netherlands, the expression 'ethnic minorities' is used to label specific target groups for integration policy, and outside official governmental language the term *allochtonen* has been introduced to describe the non-indigenous population. The Scandinavian countries prefer to use the word 'immigrant' (in Swedish *invandrare*), while the term 'minorities' is strictly reserved to national minorities in Sweden. Germany employs the word *Ausländer*, which equals foreigners in English. Southern European countries and France use the word immigrant (in French, *immigrés*); and in Italy, it is common to label third-country nationals as *extracommunautari*. It is quite obvious that these different words describe somewhat different categories and different notions of immigrant incorporation or integration. The term 'ethnic minorities' may include nationals as well, while this does not hold true for *Aussiedler*.

For practical reasons, when comparing data internationally in this paper, we shall limit the term 'immigrants' to the resident foreign population. Most of our comparative data are on foreign nationals; and for a number of countries, we also have data on the foreign-born individuals. Country-specific studies rarely deviate from the country-specific definitions we use for such cases. The reader must bear in mind that, for countries with relatively easy naturalisation procedures (e.g. Sweden, The Netherlands and France), a large part of the once-immigrated population and their descendants is thereby excluded, in contrast to countries like Germany where naturalisation is more difficult and a large part of even third-generation immigrants are still considered foreigners (e.g. Turkish nationals in Germany).

3.2 Unemployment rates

One of the ways to compare the labour-market integration of the immigrant population is by looking at the unemployment rate of the resident foreign population. For ten of the EU Member States, EUROSTAT published statistics in 1996–1998 on the unemployment rates of nationals, other EU citizens and non-EU working people. Table 1 shows the unemployment rates for these groups, irrespective of gender.

Table 1: Unemployment rates by main groups of citizenship 1996–1998 (in %)

EU Member State	Total	Nationals	Other EU	Non-EU
Denmark '97	6.8	6.3	11.3	25.0
Germany '98	9.7	9.0	10.4	20.1
Spain	20.8	20.8	15.4	23.9
France '97	12.3	11.6	10.1	31.3
Ireland '97	10.3	10.2	16.2	5.4*
Netherlands '97	5.5	5.1	8.4	24.7
Austria '97	5.1	4.4	5.6	11.4
Portugal '97	6.7	6.6	9.0	11.5
Finland '97	19.3	18.9	24.7	53.4
UK '98	6.1	6.0	7.0	11.9

EU Member State   Source: European Communities (2000a), Table D–1.2

Note:

- *Unemployment rate equals unemployed persons as a percentage of the total working population for each group.*

- *Spain: Based on the working population living in households.*

- *Ireland and UK: Based on Labour Force Survey.*

* This figure is probably inaccurate. The figure for men is 13.1%; and 14.9% for women.

Other sources complement data on Belgium and Sweden. In Belgium, the 1997 unemployment rates are 12.6% for the total population, 11.4% for nationals and 25.0% for foreigners (EU and non-EU together) (Lannoy 2000). The unemployment rates for some of the non-EU nationals are even higher: 41.2% for Turkish and 43.4% for Moroccan nationals. In Sweden, the 1998 unemployment rates are 5.5% for the Swedish population excluding naturalised Swedes, 11.8% for naturalised Swedes, 20.2% for foreign citizens, 8% for EU citizens and 33.6% for non-EU citizens (Thoursie 1999).

The picture based on this measurement shows rather high unemployment rates for nationals in some of the countries but overall dramatic unemployment rates for non-EU citizens in most of the states on which data are presented. In most countries, unemployment rates among non-EU citizens are far above those of nationals. Ireland, the UK, Portugal, Spain, Austria and Germany show the least disparities (less than about twice the rate for nationals, with the unemployment rate for non-EU citizens in Ireland probably inaccurate); while in such other countries as Denmark, Sweden, Finland, The Netherlands and France, the unemployment rates among non-EU citizens are from two to five times higher than among nationals.

Table 2: Unemployment rates of non-EU citizens by gender 1996/1998 (in %)

EU Member State	Men	Women
Denmark '97	23.8	26.5
Germany '98	20.8	18.7
Spain	22.9	25.7
France '97	28.4	37.0
Ireland '97	13.1	14.9
Netherlands '97	26.0	23.9
Austria '97	12.7	9.4
Portugal '97	1.0	31.3
Finland '97	49.2	58.5
UK '98	12.3	11.3

Source: European Communities (2000a), Table D–1.2

Notes: See Table 1.

Unemployment rates in Belgium (1997) are higher among foreign women (31.9%) than among foreign men (21.2%) (Lannoy 2000). The data quoted earlier on Sweden provide no information on gender. For 1998, Westin (2000) shows a slightly higher unemployment rate for men (22.6%) than for women (17.1%) among non-Swedes.

In a number of cases, the unemployment rate among foreign women from non-EU Member States (1997–1998) is slightly below or close to that of foreign men. The main exceptions are France, Portugal, Finland and Belgium (insofar as the countries are presented above). In these countries, the unemployment rate among foreign women from non-EU countries is at least 8% higher than among foreign men. This remarkable difference cannot be explained here.

A slightly different picture arises from another published EUROSTAT source containing the results from the 1999 Labour Force Surveys (European Communities 2000b). The survey definitions are based on ILO recommendations. On the basis of the data on the employed and unemployed, unemployment rates were calculated as the share of the unemployed in the labour force (= employed and unemployed). Since the Labour Force Surveys are sample surveys, data may be unreliable due to a large margin of errors. In such cases, EUROSTAT indicated the unreliability of the data and did not calculate any unemployment rates.

The unemployment rates for non-EU citizens by gender can only be compared between Tables 2 and 3 for five countries (1997–1998 and 1999): Germany, Spain, France, Austria and the UK. Differences are slight except for Spain, which shows a major reduction in non-EU female unemployment. The unemployment rate among non-EU women in Spain should have been even below the high unemployment rate for Spanish-born women. In The Netherlands, the 1999 unemployment rate for non-EU men also showed a major reduction when compared to the 1997 figure, though the figure is still high (18.1%).

Table 3: **Unemployment rates of nationals, other EU citizens and non-EU citizens in EU Member States, age 15–64, by gender, 1999 (in %)**

EU Member State	Nationals		Other EU		Non-EU	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
EU-15	7.9	10.9	8.3	9.4	19.1	20.0
Belgium	6.3	9.3	10.9	18.1	34.6	39.4
Denmark	4.3	5.8	x	x	x	x
Germany	7.8	8.9	8.8	8.8	19.5	17.8
Greece*	7.1	16.8	x	x	9.3	19.4
Spain	11.0	23.2	x	18.5	13.2	15.9
France	9.7	13.4	10.1	11.1	27.3	36.3
Ireland	6.0	5.4	x	x	x	x
Italy	9.0	16.4	x	x	x	12.1
Luxembourg	x	x	x	x	x	x
Netherlands	2.4	4.7	x	x	18.1	x
Austria	4.3	4.4	x	x	8.7	10.1
Portugal	4.3	5.3	x	x	x	x
Finland	10.9	12.3	x	x	x	x
Sweden	8.0	6.4	x	x	30.2	27.7
UK	6.9	5.1	7.5	7.1	12.4	10.6

Source: European Communities (2000b) Active population between 15–64 years of age. Table 8: Unemployed 15–64 years of age. Table 56: Unemployment rate calculated by share of unemployed in active population (employed and unemployed) (in %).

 * Data from Greece for 1998.

The available data on 1999 unemployment rates for nationals, other EU citizens and non-EU citizens in Table 3 show the least discrepancies between nationals and other EU citizens. The only major exception is the high unemployment rate among other EU women in Belgium, which is nearly twice as high as among the Belgium women. Again, Table 3 shows that the largest discrepancies are to be found between nationals and non-EU citizens. For the entire EU, non-EU men are unemployed nearly three times as often as male nationals, while non-EU women are unemployed nearly twice as often as female nationals from the countries in question.

Spain and Greece show the least discrepancies in the (relatively high) unemployment rates of their nationals and non-EU citizens. In Austria and the UK, the non-EU unemployment rate is about twice the national rate. In Germany, the difference between the two rates is slightly higher; while in France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Sweden, the unemployment rate among non-EU citizens is three times or more that of the respective national population of working age.

3.3 Employment rates

Unemployment rates indicate one aspect of the relative position of immigrants on the national EU labour markets. In comparing different population categories, we also need to know which part of the potential labour force (the working-age population between 15 and 64) is actively employed. Based on labour-force survey data, EUROSTAT published the 1999 employment rates for nationals, other EU citizens and non-EU citizens in the 15 EU Member States. The employment rate equals persons in employment as a percentage of the working age population. The comparison of the employment rates by these three categories and by gender for the EU-15 as a whole shows that employment rates are highest for men in all three categories (nationals, other EU, non EU); employment rates for other EU citizens are slightly above those of nationals, while employment rates of the non-EU citizens are 11% below those of nationals for men and as much as 14% below those of nationals for women. In other words, a smaller part of the working-age population of non-EU citizens is working, while they are also faced with (much) higher unemployment rates. As Table 4 shows, there employment rates of non-EU citizens in the EU Member States vary considerably.

Table 4: Employment rates of 15–64 year olds by citizenship categories and gender, 1999 (persons in employment as a percentage of the working-age population, living in households)

EU Member	Nationals		Other EU		Non-EU	
State	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
EU-15	71.9	53.1	73.9	55.3	60.7	36.8
Belgium	68.6	52.3	69.8	40.7	39.6	15.4
Denmark	81.8	72.5	76.3	82.4	55.6	36.3
Germany	73.2	58.5	76.4	55.7	60.9	37.8
Greece*	71.3	40.0	75.7	(38.8)	82.4	50.1
Spain	67.8	37.2	65.6	37.6	79.0	52.0
France	68.1	54.7	71.6	55.7	53.9	26.2
Ireland	73.7	51.5	75.0	52.3	53.9	(35.6)
Italy	67.0	38.0	79.3	51.4	86.2	45.3
Luxembourg	73.3	45.2	77.4	55.7	67.2	36.7
Netherlands	81.5	62.4	81.3	59.8	43.1	24.4
Austria	76.5	60.0	82.0	68.6	78.5	54.5
Portugal	75.7	59.6	69.7	48.2	69.5	59.2
Finland	70.3	65.0	(69.6)	-	56.2	39.1
Sweden	73.1	70.2	72.1	71.3	42.9	34.5
UK	77.4	64.5	71.1	59.5	63.5	43.2

Source: European Communities (2000b), Table 13.

The data on employment rates show some interesting phenomena. The relatively high employment rates of women in Denmark and Sweden are also found among women from other EU Member States, but definitively not among non-EU women. The Southern EU Member States show comparatively high employment rates for non-EU men and women. Austria has a very high employment rate for non-EU men and a relatively high rate for non-EU women. Belgium, The Netherlands and France show very low employment rates for non-EU women and also low employment rates for non-EU men. Germany, Luxembourg and the UK have lower employment rates for non-EU citizens as compared to their nationals, but their employment rates for non-EU citizens are still above the rate for the EU as a whole irrespective of gender.

3.4 Immigrant's qualifications, occupational structure and sector of employment

EUROSTAT has not systematically published or made available comparative data on immigrants' qualifications, occupational structure and sector of employment. In summer 1999, *SYSDEM Trends* (European Commission 1999) focusing on ethnic minorities and immigrant groups on the labour market offered some information in these aspects. However, the data were given by country and unsystematically, such that they did not provide a basis for general EU-wide tables. In its annual publication *Trends in international migration (SOPEMI)*, the OECD provides general information on immigrants and the labour market. The 1998 and 1999 issues report about changes in total and foreign employment in six selected European OECD countries as well as about foreigners' vulnerability to unemployment in these states (OECD 1998; OECD 1999). In the study by Wrench et al. (1999), which is mostly devoted to issues of discrimination and diversity, data on immigrants' occupational structure and sector of employment are provided for a selected number of countries only.

The 1998 OECD report studies changes in total employment and the employment of foreigners between 1973 and 1997 in six European countries where foreign labour accounts for a relatively high share of the total labour force (Belgium, the UK, France, Germany, Luxembourg and The Netherlands). Except for Germany, employment grew in all of these countries during this period. The reductions in total employment in industry were more than offset by increases in the tertiary sector. For foreigners in Belgium, France and Germany, the creation of employment in the service sector did not sufficiently compensate losses in the industrial sector. As this OECD study shows, the fragility of foreigners' employment was particularly high in the construction sector in Belgium, and to a lesser degree in France and in the UK, as well as in mining and/or manufacturing in Germany,

Luxembourg, France and The Netherlands. In the service sector, the situation is quite different. In the hotel and restaurant lines, foreigners have benefited more from job creation than have nationals (except in France and The Netherlands). Except for The Netherlands, this also holds true for business and real estate. The employment of foreigners in the transportation sector increased at a faster rate than for nationals in the UK, Luxembourg and France. The same study shows that, in general, foreigners are more vulnerable to unemployment than are nationals. The following are mentioned as causal factors for the different unemployment rates of foreigners and nationals:

> "Changes in economic performance and the nature of the jobs occupied by the different ethnic groups, the demographic structure and the order of the various waves of migration into the host country. The profile of the immigrants has an important bearing on their degree of employability: variables such as age, gender, nationality, level of education, training and experience, mastery of the host country's language and the length of stay in the host country play a non-negligible role among the factors which explain the degree of vulnerability to unemployment" (OECD 1998: 40).

The 1998 OECD report elaborates on several factors. One is the low likelihood of low-skilled foreign workers in manufacturing to find a new job after having lost their work due to major restructuring. Another is the preponderance of the role of family immigration in total immigration, which explains the increases in employment and unemployment among female foreigners and immigrants. Yet another arises from differences in educational attainment, which makes foreign youth more vulnerable to unemployment than young nationals. Last but not least is racial and cultural discrimination.

In its introduction, the *SYSDEM Trends* report (European Commission 1999) mentions only some general, rather well-known facts on immigrants' qualifications, occupational structure and participation by economic sector. Immigrant/minority groups often have a lower level of formal education, and show higher drop-out rates from additional training than do comparable groups among the native labour force. Immigrants are still over-represented among the low-skilled and unskilled occupations, often in blue-collar jobs with unpleasant working conditions. In many EU Member States, immigrant employment is concentrated in but a few sectors, e.g. certain branches of manufacturing, the building and construction industry, trade and 'other services', predominantly cleaning, personal care, and hotel and catering. Although the country reports in the SYSDEM study are highly informative, they lack a common structure. This makes an overall comparison difficult, if not impossible. It cannot do away with existing national differences, albeit idiosyncratic, merely by using specific terms and definitions (for instance, 'foreigners', 'immigrants', 'minorities', etc.).

Part of what explains the unfavourable position of immigrants and ethnic minorities on the labour market can undoubtedly be attributed to a number of factors on both the demand and supply sides of the labour market and its developments over the past few decades. The restructuring of the European economies made many of the labour migrants recruited in the past redundant. To some measure, this can be explained by the fact that those who arrived after the initial recruitment waves—e.g. family members and later on asylum-seekers and refugees as well—did so without any direct link with the labour market and, unfortunately in many countries, at a time when unemployment was rising and job opportunities were less favourable. In The Netherlands, a downturn in the economic business cycle caused a rise in unemployment among immigrants in the early 1980s, which continued to increase into the early 1990s. Only in the wake of a strong economic recovery in the second half of the 1990s did an important decrease in unemployment rates become visible; but they still are unacceptably high and lagging far behind the decreased unemployment rates among the native Dutch (Muus 2001). At a later point in time, Sweden showed a similar development, due to the fact that the economic down-turn occurred later in time; only recently has it shown signs of strong recovery (Westin 2000). In both cases, the unemployment rates among different immigrant categories show important variations. In comparing immigrant labour-market incorporation in different EU Member States, it may be important to devote attention to this phenomenon. How did a rather stable order develop in unemployment and participation rates among immigrant categories with a different national background or country of birth?

3.5 Discrimination and exclusion of immigrants and ethnic minorities on the labour market

Wrench et al. (1999) showed that, in all the European countries covered by the study, discrimination and exclusion of immigrants (young people, women, refugees, asylum-seekers, etc.) does indeed occur. There is some variance from the legal standpoint, such as discrimination with regard to formal access to the labour market or parts thereof (e.g. the public sector), institutional forms of ethnic and racial discrimination, as well as different forms of discrimination in everyday practice. In a number of countries, data show that non-EU nationals experience more discrimination on the labour market than do other EU nationals. Evidence of discriminatory practices and their effects on the labour market are found in several countries in both direct and indirect ways. Some EU Member States have (recently) introduced anti-discrimination legislation (e.g. the UK, Ireland, The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden). The UK presents the example of a country with a long-established legal tradition in fighting various forms of racial discrimination. The anti-

discrimination legislation in France is part and parcel of an egalitarian approach guided by a universalistic ideology. Not all EU Member States have developed anti-discrimination legislation, and not all migrant categories are protected by it, either. Certain categories, like those who work in an irregular or undocumented way, are often not in the position to claim the protection provided by anti-discrimination legislation, nor can non-EU nationals claim protection from existing EU anti-discrimination laws, which deal only with discrimination of (other) EU nationals.

3.6 Policies directed at incorporating immigrants into the labour market

Most of the recent policies directed at incorporating immigrants into the labour markets of EU Member States are briefly described in the *SYSDEM Trends* report (European Commission 1999). The most salient aspects are summarised below.

- **Belgium**: General policies are directed at weak groups on the labour market, such as low-skilled workers and long-term unemployed. The impact of these measures on minority groups is difficult to assess. Specific measures have been taken since 1998 at both the federal and regional levels. At the federal level, this involves training and employment measures based on an agreement by the social partners to consider immigrants as a specific risk group. Public-service jobs have recently been opened to all EU nationals and, in some cases, to non-EU nationals as well. At the regional Flemish level, the government and social partners agreed in 1998 on proportional and full employment of migrants in public and private labour markets. An action plan with measurable targets will be formulated each year. It will be applied in three domains: affirmative action, anti-discrimination training, and improvement of migrants' employability. In Wallonia, regional integration centres have been established, mainly to improve the social integration of migrants and to guide young unemployed people to public employment services.

- **Denmark**: Migrants and ethnic minorities have access to all general labour-market measures and instruments. Specific measures were developed within the action plan against (ethnic) barriers on the labour market (1992–1996), which since then have been in partial operation. They include guidance, language courses, training, job-searching and information activities. A specific wage-subsidy scheme was developed to increase employment opportunities for people who speak Danish as a second language as well as for academics (ice-breaker scheme). The improvement of language skills has been especially emphasized. Since 1 January 1999, a new mandatory scheme has been operational for refugees, who will be evenly distributed across Denmark under the responsibility of the local authorities and under the obligation to follow through with a

three-year integration program. They will receive a monthly allowance, which will be cut if the person does not take active part in the programme. A permanent residence permit will only be given after these three years and after the person has successfully completed the programme.

- **Germany**: The Federal Ministry of Labour funds policy measures to support immigrants in three areas, with a special focus on the social and occupational integration of foreigners. About 40% of the available budget (1998) is spent on social care by charity institutions, about one third on language training, and 16% are used for vocational training and preparation for the labour-market entry of specific target groups (e.g. young foreigners and young women with specific training deficits). Besides this policy, foreigners are also supported by the Labour Promotion Act. Special attention is given to the integration of ethnic Germans.

- **Greece**: Ethnic immigrants can take part in existing labour-market programmes for disadvantaged groups. The Pontians are regarded as returning Greeks and given preferential status; they are eligible for certain benefits from policies aiming at their social and economic integration. Albanians are not treated as a favoured category. They are also eligible for benefits from certain labour market programmes, though they are officially encouraged to return home. The situation of illegal foreign employment in the informal sector is, in fact, a current controversy of major proportions. The Greek government tries to intervene in this situation through regularisation programmes and by issuing temporary residence and work permits.

- **Spain**: Benefits from employment-promotion programmes as part of active labour-market policies are not available to all foreigners but depend on work permits. Foreigners are not allowed to work in the public sector. Specific vocational training courses offered to immigrants are scarce when compared to those offered to other categories. In terms of passive policies, insurance-based unemployment benefits are only available to EU foreigners who have contributed to the scheme for at least one year; and non-EU foreigners have no right to the unemployment-assistance benefits. In 1994, a plan for the social integration of immigrants was launched. A number of labour-market-related proposals were included but their effects in terms of actual results are still unknown.

- **France**: On the one hand, France has a long tradition of measures to incorporate immigrants and their families with the help of the Social Action Fund (*FAS*). On the other hand, French policy is very much devoted to the prospect that foreigners take on French citizenship, as well as to the principle of equality in all areas. Foreign immigrants have access to all active labour-market measures for disadvantaged groups, e.g. long-term unemployed, women, people

with disabilities and youth. Immigrants may take advantage of such general measures as adult vocational education and subsidised employment in the non-commercial sector. In certain cases of under-representation of immigrants in this type of programmes (e.g. immigrant youngsters in on-the-job training programmes), specific measures are developed. In recent years, *FAS* activities have been more aimed at (language) training and job-search support. In summary, specific measures have been developed with a view to refugees and recognised asylum-seekers, though the number of participants in these programmes remains low (1,300 in 1997).

- **Ireland**: No specific information is provided on the situation with regard to labour-market-policy measures for immigrants. This is probably due to the fact that Ireland has only recently experienced immigration in a way similar to other European countries. Up to 1999, asylum-seekers were denied access to the labour market.

- **Italy**: Labour-policy issues are generally a competence of the local (regional and sub-regional) level and of non-governmental organisations and trade unions, with major differences in approaches and services provided. In the Northern regions, policies mainly concern housing and welfare; in the central regions, they are more directed towards training and the labour market; while in the Southern regions, there is a lack of adequate policies, with associations and trade unions partially compensating. The March 1998 Immigration Act includes some labour-market measures and speaks of the need to develop equal opportunities and anti-discrimination policies. As in some other Southern EU Member States, illegal migration and undocumented work in the informal sector are quite dominant and have an impact on the public debate, leading to setting priorities for relevant policy measures.

- **Luxembourg**: Policy and social measures to integrate foreigners are based on the law of July 1993. There is a large array of policy measures, among them training, schooling and information on labour-market issues. Compared to other EU countries, Luxembourg is in a very special situation. On the one hand, it has the largest foreign labour force in the EU, though 90% of these workers are EU nationals.

- **The Netherlands**: A Dutch policy on 'ethnic minorities' was officially established in the early 1980s, with the aim of creating equal access and equal opportunities between native Dutch and targeted immigrant categories ('ethnic minorities'). In 1996, it was reinforced by a 'settling-down policy' (*inburgeringsbeleid*) for new immigrants. This highly decentralised measure consists of a compulsory language-learning programme and guidance towards the labour market. Mainstream labour-market measures open to immigrants include a number of instruments introduced by the 1998 law on the integration of jobseekers (*Wet*

Inschakeling Werkzoekenden, WIW). This law focuses on unemployed young people looking for work as well as long-term unemployed. Evaluations show that these measures tend to 'cream off' the labour supply, and specific measures seem to be more successful in reaching ethnic minorities. Another general measure concerns subsidised additional employment (*melkert jobs*); in 1997, 34% of those entering the programme came from ethnic minorities. Specific labour-market policies are carried out or supported by the public employment service, the government and the social partners. The public employment service aims at proportionally placing ethnic minorities in programmes and jobs. The government introduced the *SAMEN* law (1998) as a successor of the 1994 law (*WBEAA*) on the enhancement of equal labour participation of *allochtonous* (non-natives). Firms with more than 35 employees have to report annually on the number of immigrants in their workforce and on how they try to reach the desired equal labour participation. Reporting, though improving, is still poor; and enforcement of the law is lacking. At long last, the social partners have reached agreement on a number of initiatives in the field of promoting immigrant employment. Most recently, specific labour-market measures for ethnic minorities have been taken within the framework of 'large cities policies', which are co-ordinated by the Minister responsible for policies on the integration of minorities.

■ **Austria**: Austria's labour-market policy does not envisage any specific measures for immigrants. Participation in labour-market measures is open for all foreigners with a valid employment permit under the same conditions as for Austrians. Data show that, in practice, only 1% of all participants in such measures are foreign immigrants. Recent immigrants without an employment permit are excluded from participating in the labour market and have no access to pertinent measures. Bosnian refugees with a fixed-term residence permit are exempted from this rule: they have limited and fixed-term access to jobs in certain sectors. Special advisory and support centres for foreign workers have been set up to help them obtain a work permit and cope with unemployment. Young foreigners have only conditional access to employment under the law governing the employment of foreigners, which limits foreign employment to 8% of total employment and allows only 1% additional foreign employment by 'integrated young foreigners' and some other categories. Part of this phenomenon may be explained by the fact that unemployment benefits are granted irrespective of nationality, but since 1998 foreign-born persons have had great difficulties in meeting the criteria (e.g. having been in socially insured employment for 8 out of the last 10 years). If they fail to meet these conditions, they do not receive a maintenance benefit and cannot be sure of retaining their right to stay in the country. Given the work-permit system, unemployed

foreigners are forced to find a new job as quickly as possible. In the Austrian context, the term 'ethnic minorities' only designates specific groups with Austrian citizenship, such as Roma and Sinti, and minorities from Austria's Eastern and South-Eastern border who have lived in Austria for generations.

■ **Portugal**: A 1993 government resolution is aimed at facilitating the integration of immigrants, ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups into the existing employment policy structure. Until 1996, immigrants were not the subject of specific measures but were covered by instruments set up for disadvantaged groups (young people threatened by exclusion, homeless people, drug addicts, etc.). In February 1996, the High Commission for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities was established; and in the same year, the Strategic Concertation Agreement was signed by the government and the social partners. The first employment-policy measure was taken in January 1999 in the field of vocational education. It involved the creation of special units for integration into working life and support for local employment initiatives.

■ **Finland**: Foreigners permanently residing in Finland are entitled to partake in all labour-market services. Active measures have mainly taken the form of labour-market training (vocational and preparatory), a measure whose output is regularly monitored.

■ **Sweden**: In 1975, Parliament approved equality, freedom of choice and cooperation as the guiding principles for immigration and minority policy. In 1997, a new proposal was approved, according to which immigrants are not to be seen as a special group just because they are immigrants. First and foremost, all people are given equal rights and opportunities, independent of their ethnic and cultural background. A new Integration Board was established in 1998. One of its tasks is to ensure that measures of the new integration policy target immigrants in the first two to three years of their residence in the country, after which general welfare measures should be activated. There are practically no specific labour-market programmes for immigrants. The most common thing for non-Nordic citizens is to participate in some type of employment training. The municipalities, besides giving immigrants general access to extensive active labour-market measures, also offer them Swedish language courses (*SFI*) (averaging 525 hours) and basic knowledge of Swedish society. The organisations of the social partners have only recently (in 1997) become involved in taking action in such issues as ethnic discrimination.

■ **United Kingdom**: Active labour-market schemes are not especially targeted at ethnic minorities, but there is more regular monitoring of their participation in the major schemes and their achievements as compared to those of white trainees. The main active measures are work-based training for young people and work-based training for adults. Recently (1998), two New Deals were

introduced. The first is the *New Deal for Young People*, with compulsory partici-
pation for all 18–24-year-olds who have been unemployed for at least six
months. The government's goal is to attain a high level of participation by eth-
nic minorities with the help of ethnic minority organisations. The second is the
New Deal for Long-term Unemployed ages 25 and over, for those who have
been unemployed for at least two years. This measure is less extensive than
the one for young people. Policies on racial equality are greatly institutionalised
into companies, mainly due to the efforts of the Commission for Racial
Equality (*CRE*) established in 1984: in 1993–1994, 9 out of 10 companies with
over 7,000 employees had their own policy for this issue.

In six of the 15 Member States—Denmark, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands,
Sweden and the United Kingdom—anti-discrimination laws are in force. In
Germany, a ban on discrimination is embedded into the Constitution and explicitly
mentioned in important labour-market laws (European Commission 1999).

This brief overview is based on the corresponding national SYSDEM reports
on recent labour-market-policy measures. They show a number of interesting
points. Policies targeting immigrants and/or ethnic minorities with an immigrant
background are formulated within the national political and ideological context
with a view to their integration into the respective nation-state. This automatically
has an impact on the phrasing or terminology used for the people concerned, be
they immigrants, foreigners or ethnic minorities. It also partly explains the relative
ease or uneasiness in developing specific policies and/or designating immigrant tar-
get groups, contingent upon overriding national values like equality (for example, in
Sweden) or the ultimate goal of immigrants taking on citizenship in the country of
settlement (for example, in France). This may explain why an approach called 'poli-
cies for ethnic minorities' could develop in the formerly politically 'pillarized' Dutch
society, while in France the ultimate goal has remained obtaining French citizenship
with all its rights, privileges and duties. Another point of interest is that countries
with a longer tradition of immigration tend to have developed a more extensive
policy framework for incorporating immigrants into working life as well as in the
field of anti-discrimination. This has not always led to the development of specific
measures for immigrants or ethnic minorities, but monitoring systems might be in
place all the same. Countries that have only recently experienced immigration—
e.g. the Southern European countries, Ireland and Finland—are starting to develop
labour-market-oriented policies and to provide equal access to existing measures
to natives and immigrants alike. The overview also shows how unemployment
levels among foreign residents might be influenced by specific aspects of the regu-
lations governing residence and work permits (e.g. in Austria). For further research
in understanding relative employment and unemployment rates, this means that

we must obtain deeper insight into how these systems work in the respective countries. The welfare state's impact on immigrant employment or unemployment rates cannot be determined on the basis of this brief non-historical overview. Finally, in a number of countries (Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Sweden) specific policy programmes have been developed to guide newcomers or refugees during the first few years of their stay, both in working life and in society as a whole.

3.7 Cross-national comparative studies on the integration of immigrants into the labour market

The ILO has published a number of cross-national comparative studies on how immigrants are integrated into the labour market (Werner 1994; Böhning & Zegers de Beijl 1995; Doomernik 1998). Werner's study may be taken as the first general overview comparing the integration of foreign workers into the labour markets of France, Germany, The Netherlands and Sweden. Werner systematically describes the labour-market integration of foreign workers in these four countries, not without first trying to establish a concept on how foreign workers are integrated into the labour market and mentioning the difficulties in national terminology and definitions. The term 'integration', as Werner uses it, can be understood as a process and, at the same time, as a state of being. The integration process develops in the direction of desired state of being, i.e. the achievement of successful integration. It can be said to have proceeded successfully if differences between comparable groups of nationals and foreigners/ethnic minorities no longer exist regarding participation in the social arenas of the receiving country. Important areas are housing, education and work. The main pre-requisites for a migrant's successful integration are legal security and equality before the law (Werner 1994: 3). In fact, however, this is an open concept, in that it depends on whether the national and foreign populations move closer to each other or the foreign population is assimilated into the receiving society. Successful integration into the labour market refers to the same employment structures for comparable national and foreign groups (regarding unemployment, earnings, activity rate, etc.). The prerequisite is equal access to occupational activity/work and to education and educational schemes, housing and social security. Werner states that integration measures should facilitate reaching the objective of integration. Such policies must be based on the factors that influence integration. He presents a short-list of factors that promote integration and factors that make integration difficult, both in the case of the migrant and in the case of the receiving country.

Factors promoting integration (receiving country):
- Availability of jobs in trades, occupational areas, economic sectors; regions with good job prospects.
- Access to the labour market regulated only to a minor extent.
- Active minority policies.
- Policy of equal opportunity.
- Willingness on the part of the national population to accept the newcomers.

Factors making integration difficult (receiving country):
- Statutory discrimination.
- *De facto* discrimination by such gate-keepers as personnel managers, job placement officers, etc.
- Resistance on the part of the receiving society to integrate foreigners.
- Regulated admission to the labour market, including self-employment.

Factors promoting integration (migrant):
- Qualifications: aptitude, training and vocational knowledge and skills.
- Prime working age of approximately 25–45 years.
- Personal motivation.
- Family income sufficient for sustaining a socially acceptable standard of living.
- Fairly long duration of stay.
- Lasting employment.
- Similar cultural origins/ties.

Factors making integration difficult (migrant):
- Frequent or lasting unemployment.
- Precarious employment conditions (limited service contract, involuntary part-time work, employment with sub-contractors.
- Deficiencies in qualifications and training.
- Employment in occupations, economic sectors and regions affected by market restructuring.
- Age.
- Sex: female (access to the regular labour market is more difficult for women).
- Large number of children.
- Cultural distance.

Similar to the present study, Werner tries to measure integration into the labour market with the help of indicators such as the unemployment rate, income, female activity rate, degree of employment of nationals and foreigners in atypical forms of employment and degree of self-employment. Finally, much attention is paid to the integration policy in the four countries.

The findings and conclusions of this comparative study show the following:

1) In all four countries, the unemployment rate among foreigners is considerably higher than among nationals. Unemployment rates among young foreigners have fallen only in Germany, probably due to demographic developments favouring the entry of young foreigners into the dual vocational-education system and into the labour market. Differing unemployment rates can be observed among different national/ethnic groups. The explanation is partly to be found in the restructuring of the manufacturing industry. Job losses are only partly compensated by employment in the service sector. Discrimination is another explanation, especially if unemployment rates differ; while essential labour-market characteristics between nationals and foreigners are the same. During a recession, employers can recruit from a larger pool of candidates, which allows for a preference for national workers.

2) Earnings differ between the national and foreign groups, but foreigners do not form a homogeneous group. Similar qualifications reduce the differences in earnings, but foreigners generally tend to earn less than nationals.

3) The activity rates among foreign women are considerably lower than those of native women, while their unemployment rates are higher. Only for EU women, figures are comparable to those for national women.

4) Integration policies partly depend on successful migration policies. Werner perceives Sweden as the country with the most conceptually sophisticated and consistent immigration and integration policies, with immigration regulated to a high degree. Equal treatment is a necessary prerequisite for integration but may have adverse effects, as is the case in France, where allocation of public housing has led to an exodus of nationals from certain neighbourhoods and increased segregation in housing. Similarly, in The Netherlands, a generous social-security system has long been leading to social security being perceived as an acceptable alternative to gainful employment. In general, any long-term absence from the labour market is seen as detrimental to human capital and will cause difficulties for re-employment. Integration policies in the four countries show signs of convergence; and, with regard to the labour market, special measures are less favoured than general ones. Paradoxically, the foreigners who are disproportionately more likely to benefit from labour-market measures actually only participate in them to a disproportionately low extent. Immigrants tend to be found in schemes with a 'parking' function.

Our reason for quoting Werner's study (1994) so extensively is that its set-up is similar to ours, while paying great attention to both the regulative role of migration (admission) policy and the role of integration policy. However, recent developments in, for example, the unemployment rates of a country like Sweden are diffi-

cult to explain on the basis of the more elaborate integration policies of that country. Doomernik (1998) could not establish how effective policy efforts have been in integrating immigrants and their descendants into the labour market and educational systems of France, Germany and The Netherlands. The low unemployment rate of Turkish nationals in Germany cannot be explained by differing policy efforts. Instead, Doomernik points to the fact that the legal position of foreigners is more insecure in Germany and that Germany has continued to have a return migration policy next to an integration policy. In an unpublished study by Muus (2001) comparing the labour-market participation of Turkish migrants and their descendants in five European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands and Sweden), the possible impact of integration policies on participation in the labour market could not be established either. The differing migration policies (admission and return) have clearly had an impact on the relative demographic growth of the Turkish immigrant population, from a rather high growth in The Netherlands to a relatively low one in Germany. Naturalisation policies have also had a clear impact on the share of the naturalised Turkish population in the countries concerned. Naturalisation was highest in those countries allowing dual nationality (The Netherlands). Migration and naturalisation policies seem to have had a much greater impact than integration policies, which may be characterised as 'softer'.

Finally, the study by Böhning & Zegers de Beijl (1995) is of particular interest for this section. Böhning begins by elaborating on labour-market disintegration, subsequently showing its detrimental effects that affect foreigners more than natives. According to Böhning, the macro-economic parameters changed in the 1970s due to three factors: rises in oil prices (1973–1974 and 1978–1979), the 'skill-biased' nature of recent technological changes, and, finally, a deeper involvement of Asian economies in the global economy (globalisation). The resulting intensified structural adjustment processes in European economies has caused some measure of general labour-market disintegration and considerable disintegration for non-nationals. This is partly visible in unemployment, in the growth of irregular economic activities and in migrants' return to their home country. When quoting Seifert's (1994) study on the socio-economic mobility of migrants, Böhning shows that foreigners lost ground relative to Germans. German nationals left semi-skilled and skilled manual positions between 1984 and 1989, while foreign workers (first and second generation) experienced mobility almost exclusively within blue-collar jobs—and a great deal even downwards. Böhning's conclusion is that the labour-market disintegration for migrants starting in Western and Northern Europe in the 1970s could not be the result of the vast array of special measures introduced with the intention to counter this development. The measures are not questioned per se: without them, the disintegration of the migrants would even be worse. A

larger effective participation by immigrants in active labour-market and employment measures is needed, and strengthening of these measures is deemed necessary.

In his second contribution in the above-mentioned study, Böhning takes a critical stand with regard to the sustainability of imported labour in Europe, in comparison with the labour import in the United States. On both sides of the ocean, the admission of foreigners favours those either with high qualifications or in unskilled jobs. In Böhning's analysis, there is no room for upward mobility for migrants in European societies, if compared to what is possible in the United States; and he refers to both the underlying policy concepts and the impact these concepts have on the willingness of society to accept foreigners' upward mobility as desirable and worthy of public support. If the current situation in Europe continues as it is now, the cleavage between rich and poor in European societies will take on an increasingly ethnic dimension, with tensions between national and ethnic poor. Current policy is thus seen as unsustainable; and according to Böhning, this potentially explosive situation can only be defused by either a change towards US-like settlement orientation, or by satisfying bottom-end labour requirements with a policy on importing labour that is truly temporary.

4 Conclusion

The study by Böhning & Zegers de Beijl (1995) is important here, since it brings us partly back to the role of the welfare state in integration issues—at least if we assume that socio-economic mobility in the United States is seen not only as a driving force in society but is also related to a less extensive and more market-based welfare state as compared to the majority of the European welfare states. Second, it brings us back to the relationship between migration and the labour market. It may help shed some light on the relative rigidity of European societies, the difficulties they encounter in incorporating immigrants into their society and labour market, and in the country-specific ways in which this may have been reinforced by different ideological philosophies in nation-state building. The latter may, in the end, turn out to have a differential but generally negative effect on the labour-market integration of immigrants.

This study has shown that is difficult *to discern direct labour-market needs in relation to migration*, at least in the current situation and most probably since the end of the labour-recruitment era in the early 1970s. Most of the migration in the last quarter of the 20th century does not show any direct link to the formal labour markets of the various European countries: it predominantly concerns family re-unification and family formation, forced migration (asylum-seekers and refugees),

the arrival of former nationals (*Aussiedler*) and irregular and/or undocumented migrants. A small part of the total migration is directly linked to formal labour-market needs. It may increase in the future if the demographic composition of European countries undergoes further changes, which may bring about a need for some kind of 'replacement migration'. In most countries, some kind of work-permit or employment-permit system is in place to regulate the labour migration of non-EEA nationals. EU Member States differ in how they have taken additional measures to regulate new entries of non-EEA labour into the labour market. Although labour migration may become more important in the near future, the priority for feasible research becomes a secondary aim of this project. In a later phase, but not yet, the primary aim (i.e. integration) may become increasingly important.

We have seen that, by the end of the 1990s, EU Member States show important *variations in the degree of immigrant incorporation into their labour markets,* if measured by such indicators as unemployment and employment rate, if possible by gender and in comparison with the national working-age population. On the basis of what has been outlined thus far, two schemes of analysis are presented in the next few pages in a preliminary attempt to relate independent to dependent variables on immigrant incorporation into the labour market and the development of the corresponding policies.

A) Factors at the macro-level that may explain variations in the degree of migrants' incorporation/participation into the labour market of the respective countries:

B) Factors at the macro-level that may explain the (country-specific) development of policies aimed at immigrants' labour market incorporation/participation:

Economy/labour market
• (Un)employment
• Business cycle
• Economic restructuring

Policy on foreigners
• Admission
• Stay
• Work
• Return

National ideology of civic integration of nationals and foreigners
• Ius sanguinis/soli (options for naturalisation)
• Assimilation/integration/multi-culturalism/segregation
• Citizenship rights (inclusion/exclusion of non-nationals)

Immigrant labour-market incorporation/ participation
• (Un)employment
• Sectoral employment
• Socio-economic mobility

Policies furthering immigrant labour-market incorporation
• General/specific measures
• Target groups/all immigrants
• Obligatory/voluntary

Equality/anti-discrimination policies

Welfare-state policies
• Labour market
• Social security
• (Vocational) education
• Housing

Immigrant characteristics
• Nationality/country of birth
• Migration histories
• Skills/age/gender
• Language skills

Attitudes towards immigrants
• Favouring integration
• Discrimination

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Katleen Peleman

Social life of Moroccan immigrant-women in urban and non-urban settings

1 Introduction

Within the integration debate, the social aspects of integration in society have always received special attention. Issues such as immigrants' social networks and intermarriage rates have been under discussion since the early days of the Chicago school (for an overview, see Peach 1975). In this context, geographers and urban sociologists have always had an interest in the spatial dimension of integration. They have looked for the influence of people's living environment on their integration into society. Especially urban segregation and a high concentration of immigrants have elicited many questions. In this respect, the literature generally agrees on the existence of a negative correlation between segregation and the social integration of ethnic minorities. For The Netherlands, Dagevos (2001) and Bolt (2001) recently confirmed that living in an ethnic neighbourhood decreases the number of social contacts that ethnics have with non-ethnics. Alpheis (1993), however, could not demonstrate a negative correlation with the social contacts of immigrants in Germany. Participation in associations as a part of becoming integrated into society has been investigated even less. Literature on associations generally focuses on participation in political activities as an indicator of political integration (for an example, see Junn 1999). Whether participation in ethnic and ethno-religious associations impedes or facilitates integration into the host society is still a controversial issue (Bankston & Zhou 1995; Kemp et al. 2000; Peleman 2002a).

In this article, the focus is on the role of associations in the social life of immigrants. From this point of view, we shall compare the social life of Moroccan women living in cities with that of their non-urban counterparts. We have concentrated our research on women because they tend to be less mobile than men and spend more time in the neighbourhood. The article provides a short overview of the social life of Moroccan women in an ethnic neighbourhood, which is followed by a more elaborate discussion of the social life of those living outside towns. Since ethnic individuals living apart from their ethnic community in non-urban areas are largely underrepresented in research, we shall pay particular attention to the latter group.

2 Moroccan women in Antwerp

This paper is based on research on Moroccan women in Antwerp, the largest city of Belgium (with 450,000 inhabitants) after Brussels. Moroccans are the second largest ethnic minority in Belgium (Italians being the largest).

During the so-called 'Golden Sixties', Belgium—like other Western European countries—experienced serious labour shortages. After targeting labour from Italy, Greece and Spain, the country began to look for workers in Morocco and Turkey. In particular, the Moroccan government hoped to relieve internal tensions by promoting emigration from the turbulent and underdeveloped Rif region. According to the 1999 figures for Belgium, more than 40% of the 125,000 people of Moroccan nationality grew up in one of the two mountainous Rif provinces, Nador and Al Hoceima. Almost all immigrants from this region speak a variant of the Berber language, and more than two thirds of them grew up in rural areas or small towns (Reniers 1999). The majority of Moroccans in Antwerp are from the Rif area. Therefore, in this article, 'Moroccan' usually implies Berber origin. Given this origin, the Moroccan women in Antwerp stand out due to their high level of religious and traditional conformity and their low recognition of the role of women in society, when compared with other Moroccans living in Belgium (Lesthaeghe & Surkyn 1996). They support the influence of religion on society and the preservation of such traditions as obedience to the husband and the confinement of women to the private sphere. Moreover, in this article, the term 'Moroccan' does not refer to legal nationality but rather to Moroccan origin. Naturalisation legislation in Belgium has become much more flexible in the last decade, and many people of foreign origin now have taken on Belgian citizenship. Due to a lack of data on ethnic origin, people are always counted according to their nationality, which means ethnic groups tend to be underestimated (Kesteloot et al. 1999).

In this article, we compare the social life of Moroccan women in an inner-city ethnic neighbourhood of Antwerp on the one hand, and in the suburbs around town on the other (see Figure 1). The neighbourhood characteristics can be found in Table 1.

Figure 1: Antwerp urban region: localisation of interview areas

The ethnic neighbourhood Old-Borgerhout is situated within the 19th century extension of Antwerp. During the late 19th century, Antwerp's population boomed and the city expanded up to the new walls still visible in the current ring road. Like other 19th century 'belt' neighbourhoods in Belgium, Old-Borgerhout is densely built, with almost no open space. The buildings are old and usually not adapted to current housing standards. During the 'Golden Sixties', the local middle class left the neighbourhood and settled in the more attractive suburbs. At the same time, immigrants—mainly Moroccans—filled the vacant houses. Due to chain migration, family ties are strong and strengthen social contacts, such that now 24% of the 25,000 inhabitants of Old-Borgerhout are of Moroccan nationality.

The suburbs have varied socio-economic histories but in general are residential; and both the quality of the dwellings and the median income are relatively high (see Table 1). Most municipalities also offer some type of employment, and the village centres contain a variety of shops. Suburbs are a very popular living environment, and

housing prices have risen continuously over the past 20 years. In the suburbs, the presence of Moroccan inhabitants is exceptional, with the percentage of Moroccans below 1%. The women interviewed usually did not live in a spacious newly-built dwelling with a garden, typical of the suburbs. Rather, Moroccan families occupy lower-quality houses in the old part of the village proper. A few municipalities house a small ethnic concentration attracted by specific local employment or cheap housing. Moroccan shops or other types of infrastructure are non-existent in the suburbs (apart from one mosque).

Table 1: Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the two neighbourhood contexts

	Old-Borgerhout	*11 suburban municipalities*
Total population *	24,676	176,717
% Moroccans*	24%	0.4%
% foreigners*	31%	3%
% houses: (re)built before 1919**	23%	8%
% houses with full facilities**	21%	52%
% social housing***	5%	7%
Median per capita income (in Euro, 1998)****	7,017	12,049

Sources:

* National Institute for Statistics (NIS), Population Register 1999

** NIS, Population Census 1991

*** Flemish Housing Department 1999

**** NIS, Financial statistics

3 Field work

We have used a qualitative approach to descend to the level of daily life and analyse the impact of the daily living environment. In both neighbourhood contexts, we interviewed Moroccan women between 20 and 45 years of age: 17 in Old-Borgerhout and 15 in the suburbs. The interviews consisted only of open questions and lasted mostly between two and four hours. Almost all women are married and have young children. Of these women, 19 of the 32 belong to the second generation, which means they attended primary school in Belgium. Some are employed, and a minority have completed higher education. The other women arrived as teenagers (the generation 'in-between', which implies that they never had regular schooling in Belgium) or as married women. The latter are the new first generation. These women, having arrived already married, often find themselves in a dependent situation since they do not speak the

local language. Women with little knowledge of Dutch were interviewed in French or by means of an interpreter. The aim of the sampling was to gather as much information as possible by obtaining completeness and saturation (Rubin & Rubin 1995). To achieve this, we interviewed women with diverse characteristics (e.g. social, cultural, demographic) in both neighbourhoods. This was not intended to be a statistically representative sample.

In addition to the interviews, conversations were held with key persons from about 20 organisations in Antwerp. Also, we attended a number of activities, such as Arabic courses, Dutch courses or afternoon teas.

4 Interlocking dominance structures

The position of minority women in society has been worked out theoretically by black feminist writers in the US, e.g. Hooks (1984) and Collins (1991), who argue that gender experiences are specific to race and class. Collins presented the matrix of domination, in which race, class and gender are seen as interlocking systems of oppression. The matrix does not represent women as defenceless victims of the dominance structures but rather stands for both dominance and resistance. In our study of Muslim minority women, we have taken gender and ethnicity as central and interlocking dominance structures, adding Islam as a more complex additional structure (Peleman 2002b).

Gender has been retained, since patriarchal structures are strong in the Moroccan immigrant community:

■   The way patriarchy is exerted and reproduced within the community can be explained by means of Bourdieu's (1998) theory of the market of symbolic goods. In his theory, Bourdieu stresses both the central position of women *vis-à-vis* the family honour and the social restrictions placed upon them—two central concepts in the literature on gender in Muslim communities (see, for example Buijs 1993; Cooper 1997).

■   The second dominance structure results from the ethnic minority situation. Because the concept of race is seldom used in the context of European ethnic minorities, it is replaced by that of ethnic dominance. Ethnic consciousness increases when an ethnic group is in a precarious position (Eriksen 1993; Roosens 1989). In our case study, the oppression exerted by Belgian society on the Moroccan ethnic group reinforces feelings of ethnic identity.

■   Third, the added field of Islam takes on an ambiguous position: it is not a dominance structure in itself but rather provides the resources to legitimate dominance and resistance in the two other fields. Islamic structures are strongly interwoven with patriarchal structures. Yet both have to be identified apart from Islam, given

the significance of patriarchy in Western society, and also given the significance of Islamic resources for women's resistance and emancipation (Afshar & Maynard 2000). Since Western societies find arguments to legitimise their perceived superiority and domination in the Islam (Franks 2000), the articulation of Islamic identity by women counts as an act of resistance not only against Muslim men but against Western dominance as well.

Lastly, due to complex immigration experiences, class proves to be a variable too fragmented to be considered as a univocal dominance structure for Moroccan immigrant women. First-generation immigrant men may have been predominantly unskilled workers, but this provides little insight into the class position of the younger women. This confirms the findings of other authors that class is a term inadequate for describing the socio-economic situation of women (Ferree & Hall 1996; Morris 1990) or ethnic minority groups (Van Amersfoort 1982: 63–66).

The above shows that the basic principles of the black feminist matrix of domination are applicable to Moroccan women in Antwerp. The three dominance structures are indeed mutually reinforcing, and dominance and resistance are simultaneously expressed.

5 Social life in cities and outside of town

5.1 In cities

The greatest asset of any ethnic neighbourhood is its abundance of social and ethnic capital. Living in Old-Borgerhout facilitates immigrant access into Moroccan social networks and ethnic infrastructure (Moroccan shops, mosques and associations). Moroccan organisations offer activities for women, particularly concerning their religion and traditions. Hence, it is thus perhaps no surprise that almost all the Moroccan women living in Old-Borgerhout experience social life in the neighbourhood as something positive. During the interviews, women repeatedly conveyed this by underlining that they know people. A typical statement was: *"Yes, I do like living here. I know a lot of people here, so I can always run into somebody"*.

Moreover, not only ethnic Moroccan associations exist in the neighbourhood. Because Old-Borgerhout has a significant Moroccan population, the government subsidises neighbourhood activities specifically aimed at foreign women. Some of these have a primarily social function, such as afternoon teas or cooking lessons; but others inform women about choosing schools, getting an education, staying healthy, etc. The offers also comprise Dutch language courses. Since Dutch is the only language spoken in Antwerp, linguistic proficiency is indispensable for integration. For many women,

taking classes in Dutch is still a necessary step towards full participation in society. Developing a social life with non-Moroccans without knowing Dutch is almost impossible. In Old-Borgerhout, Dutch language courses have been increasingly successful among Moroccan women. Women explain this through the fact that language classes tailored to women are now being legitimised by the benefit resulting for the family, which makes them more acceptable within the community. The idea that the entire family profits when the mother can communicate in Dutch has become prevalent, since the situation where the man has to take care of virtually all household contacts with the outside is simply not feasible. Thus, Dutch classes for women are not perceived as a threat to male dominance. Unfortunately, the growing demand for lessons cannot be met by the existing facilities. The actual number of Dutch classes in Antwerp is insufficient, and waiting lists are long.

Besides their obvious integrative function, Dutch language courses also have an important social function, in that they offer chances to meet women from other cultures, including Belgian women. Such contacts broaden the women's horizons and enable closer contact with Belgian society. In our context, one key person—a Belgian woman in Antwerp —has been responsible for several Dutch language courses for foreign women. By organising small outings and informal meetings, she tries to enhance contact with Belgian women, which she sees as very important: *"Many women have very few contacts with Belgians. It is important that they also have contacts in situations devoid of conflict"*.

Yet the most popular leisure activity of the Moroccan women are ethno-religious activities, which may be Arabic lessons or informative meetings on Islamic rules. These are set up almost exclusively by Moroccan organisations and make religion accessible to women. The latter is an important point, since knowledge of Islam forms a necessary basis for engaging in religious debate and for countering Islamic patriarchal structure and male hegemony. Several women interviewed pointed out that women are often misinformed about Islam, due to the fact that they cannot read the religious texts themselves and have to accept everything their husbands say. Our research has shown that ethno-religious activities can definitely have an integrative function. Some of these activities take place in the mosque—for example, those referred to by a Moroccan key person: *"The mosque also makes women know their religion better. They look at what Islam itself says and thus know what their rights really are"*. Since informative ethno-religious activities make women conscious of their rights, they clearly have an emancipatory function.

Social control is obviously omnipresent in the neighbourhood. However, since ethno-religious activities are generally accepted and respected, they do not induce gossip and have an unmistakable social function. Saida (38) regularly goes to the mosque. She grew up in Belgium and participates in different types of activities. She told me that for some women, going to the mosque was the only acceptable outing:

"The mosque is important for women. If I see the women that go there, first they are all non-working women, and most of them don't go anywhere very often; they are always at home. If they might like to go somewhere, their husband wouldn't accept it, but some don't want to go anywhere themselves, because they aren't used to it. But the men can't disagree with going to the mosque, can they? Neither can anybody disapprove of your going to lessons at the mosque, not even classes; all that is acceptable." She clearly stresses the indirect social function of the mosque. She also emphasises the restrictions imposed on women by patriarchal structures and confirms that Islam legitimises women's emancipation. This shows that the main indirect function of ethno-religious activities is that they constitute the most accessible activities in the neighbourhood. For certain women, taking part in such activities is the only way to have a social life outside the family.

5.2 Outside of town

Outside the city, Moroccan women have few social contacts in their neighbourhood. Without exception, they experience problems building up a social network. The reasons are that there are few or no other Moroccan families living in the vicinity, while concurrently, contacts with Belgian women are rather stiff and remain superficial, even after many years. Furthermore, since the share of Moroccans per municipality does not exceed 1% (see above), the ethnic concentration is seldom high enough to make ethnic infrastructure possible or to enable subsidies for specific facilities. These neighbourhoods do not offer anything beyond regular sports and cultural activities. These, however, are scarcely accessible to Moroccan women. Moroccans may simply be unwelcome, or regular activities may not comply with specific restrictions placed upon Moroccan women. Most activities are mixed, with men and women taking part, are not screened off from the general public or cannot be combined with household responsibilities.

Moroccan women who live outside the city thus confront the dominance of the Belgian majority. In addition, interviews have shown that even where two or three families live together, social control can hinder women in such a way that they hardly ever leave the house. Consequently, Moroccan women living in the suburbs also have to take into account male dominance and Islamic rules and regulations. In some isolated Moroccan households, male dominance has even gained such ascendancy that women can hardly ever go outdoors. This thus hampers the most basic forms of social participation, like going shopping or talking with other women. In addition, it impedes women's participation in local activities: in sports or cultural activities, women's participation is very low, given that these do not meet their particular needs. Ethno-religious activities, on the other hand—which are easily accessible for Moroccan women—are

non-existent in this environment (apart from one mosque in one of the towns). Many women indeed consider the lack of adapted facilities as a major disadvantage of the place in which they live.

Proficiency in Dutch is indispensable if anybody wishes to take part in public life in the suburbs. Yet it comes as no surprise that opportunities for learning Dutch are scarce. Moreover, many women had no knowledge of Dutch when they settled in the country, for marriages have brought new brides and grooms to the suburbs. Selma is 27 and has grown up in the suburbs. She has always attended Belgian schools and her Dutch is good. She is, however, concerned about women in the suburbs who do not know any Dutch: *"Dutch lessons are really important. These women do want to participate in society, but they simply don't get the chance. First, not from their husband; but even then, if they repeatedly express the wish to attend Dutch classes and there are none in the neighbourhood, their husband will say: 'Where do you think you are going to do that?'".* With these words, Selma gives us two reasons why women do not take Dutch language courses: their husband and the lack of opportunities in the neighbourhood. She even implies that Belgian society helps Moroccan men exercise unreasonable authority. For these women, the situation seems hopeless, since their immediate surroundings offer them no opportunities at all to become integrated into society.

Men can more easily go into town whenever they like. The reason is, of course, that they are much more mobile than women. For most of the Moroccan women, the use of a car of even of a bicycle is not a given. On top of that, caring for small children further restricts their freedom of movement. Therefore, they are thrown back into their daily environment for most of their social contacts and outings. Informal child care from their mother or sisters, for instance, is not common in the suburbs, which means that some women are bound to the house the entire day. Fadma, who is 25 and lives on the outskirts of town, pinpoints the problem: *"Here, if something happens, I can always bring the children to my mother. But if you live out there, you have nowhere to go. I wouldn't want to live on the countryside either, because you also always need extra support there if you want to go anywhere at all."*

The shortage of easily accessible activities also reduces women's opportunities for social contact. Almost all women, even those who have no language problems, declare that it is hard to make any real contact with Belgian women. Quick chats at the gates of the school cannot replace the tight social network of the ethnic neighbourhood. Even one 40-year-old Moroccan woman married to a Belgian and living in a small town for years, still experiences this: *"People are really afraid, probably that we are a bad lot. I don't know, but they do not try to get in touch with us either."* Women living outside town often experience loneliness. Almost all of them miss having regular contact with other Moroccan women.

6 Conclusions

In the ethnic neighbourhood Old-Borgerhout, Moroccan women can take advantage of the readily available ethnic and social capital. Most of them are part of an elaborate social network consisting of family and neighbours. Local associations also play an important role in the women's social life, because of their social and their emancipatory functions.

This contrasts with the social life of Moroccan women living in the suburbs, which is deficient in all respects. On the one hand, contacts with other Moroccan women are rare, while on the other, these women are seldom accepted into the social networks of the Belgian locals. This proves that living isolated in the suburbs certainly does not automatically entail integration into Belgian social networks. Moreover, automatic integration into local Belgian club life does not occur, either. It is most surprising, indeed, that women living outside are subject to the same restrictions and dominance structures as are women in an ethnic neighbourhood. Therefore, in the suburban environment where 'ethno-customised' activities or ethnic associations are non-existent, Moroccan women find no way to develop any local social network at all. The gap between their activities and the usual Belgian activities is still too wide. For women who do not speak Dutch, few, if any, prospects exist for integration into society. This implies that the belief that Moroccan women who live in the suburbs are all independent and well-integrated is a myth. Keeping up this myth, however, is not without practical effect. It can easily be misused to persuade inner-city Moroccan women of the 'superior' living conditions of their 'free and emancipated companions' living outside town. Or it can serve as an excuse for not having to establish policies to promote women's social integration into society in suburban settings.

At first sight, this appears to contradict other studies on segregation, which stress the adverse effects of social control in ethnic neighbourhoods, especially for women. However, our main conclusion is not that the social control in an ethnic neighbourhood does not impede mobility and participation, but rather that its restricting effects are not confined exclusively to those neighbourhoods. Indeed, our interviews prove that even where only a few Moroccan families live near each other, fear of gossip will restrict the women's social life. In an ethnic neighbourhood, however, the community is large enough to create a positive dynamic among the women.

7 Policy implications

In general, the social isolation of Moroccan immigrant women in the suburbs is difficult to remedy. Policy measures can hardly tackle such issues as the stilted contacts between Moroccan and Belgian women or the subjective importance of contacts with

Moroccan women. Furthermore, mobility is a general problem for anybody living out-side the city, which has no easy solution. Public transport is an unsuitable tool for opening up the vast area of the suburbs. Finally, the problem of informal childcare can only be put to rights through the women's social networks.

Yet what policy *can* accomplish is to increase the amount of facilities available to ethnic minorities in suburban and rural areas. Still more urgent is to extend the number of languages classes in Dutch as a second language (new immigrants are still arriving in Belgium) and meeting-places. Stimulating Moroccan women's participation in local organisations will effectively help them develop a social life and become in-tegrated into a local social network. However, persistent and intensive management is necessary to motivate the women and keep them coming to these activities. In addi-tion, such activities can only be successful when they take into account the specific restrictions that Moroccan women face in their daily life: for instance, it is important to separate the women from the men and to provide childcare. Because facilities outside the cities have not been tailored to the needs of Moroccan women, they are thus barred from participating in any kind of social activity. As might be expected, this lack of activities does not facilitate access to any regular sports and cultural associations. Nonetheless, a solution to the women's limited mobility has yet to be found: for instance, by having a special bus pick up the women taking language classes. Eventually, however, a cost-benefit analysis of such tailored services is an inescapable fact. It is by no means certain whether such long-term and intensive policies to promote the integration of immigrants into society will be politically acceptable.

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Section 4:
Potential impacts of EU enlargement

Loukia M. Moussourou

Integration of immigrant children in school

Until very recently, Greece was a traditional emigration country. All studies about migration dealt with the causes and effects of emigration; and policy measures were aiming at the solution of the social, economic, cultural, demographic and other problems that this phenomenon created or enhanced. Greece's emigration policy mostly focused on how to protect the interests of Greeks living abroad and how to encourage the preservation of the (Greek) cultural identity of those born in other countries. This has meant Greek schools abroad[1]—some depending from the Greek Ministry of Education (as has been the case for schools operating in Germany, for instance) and some falling under the responsibility of the Greek Orthodox Church (schools operating in the USA,[2] for instance). This has also meant after-school language classes attended by a minority of children of Greek descent, whose workload is thus increased as compared with that of their schoolmates.

In the early 1970s, an important change occurred: emigrant workers (particularly those who went to Germany) started returning in large numbers. Because of these returnees, Greek migration became positive[3] for the first time in Greek history. However, also because of the returnees, all the problems that migration had created for those involved (namely the migrants and their children) became apparent and had to be solved on Greek soil. One of these problems was the integration of returnee children into the Greek school system. This has proved to be a much more difficult problem to solve than was initially thought. Eventually (in 1980) 'admission classes' and 'tutorial courses' were created,[4] to bring returnee children up to par in the Greek-language skills necessary for their integration into school and to adapt them to the requirements of the system so that they could be integrated into a class group appropriate for their age. Because the returnee children were overwhelmingly German- and

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[1] By the turn of the century, some 105,000 third- or fourth-generation emigrant children were pupils in Greek schools operating in 40 different countries.

[2] Reportedly, however, more than 70% of all children of Greek descent in the USA do not have any contact at all with Greek education or with learning the Greek language.

[3] This is, emigration was less than immigration—in this case, return migration (and not immigration in the strict sense).

[4] Instituted by Law 1404/1983.

English-speaking, schools for repatriates were created in Attica (English-speaking, 1984)[5] and Thessaloniki (German-speaking, 1985).[6]

During the 1980s and 1990s, large numbers of families of Greek descent came from the ex-Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Balkans to settle in Greece. With the exception of a number of political refugees from the civil war, neither these (so-called) repatriates nor their ancestors have ever lived in Greece. The largest category of these repatriates are Pontians,[7] and both their socio-economic and cultural integration has proved to be a difficult task.[8] The integration of their children into the Greek school system has profited from the experience with and measures taken for returnee children, supplemented by what seemed necessary for teaching repatriate children (Pontians, children from Northern Epirus/Albania, etc.). Thus in 1998, in an attempt to deal with basic problems of school integration Pontian children proved to experience, policy adjustments were made and new measures were taken. The most important of these measures were the following:

1) Teaching Greek as a foreign language.
2) Gradually substituting admission classes with intensive (three-month) Greek-language courses.
3) Hiring teachers who are proficient in the mother tongue of the students who have language difficulties—which may mean two teachers per class for the 'mixed' classes.
4) Educating the educators (teachers) in the new school reality.

Since the early 1970s, it has been apparent that immigrants from Asia (particularly the Philippines) and Africa (particularly Egypt and other North African countries) had started entering the country and taking jobs that Greeks refused to perform. Their numbers were small and their impact on the life of the majority seemed to be insignificant. Though it had already become a 'new' immigration country,[9] Greece could continue to see itself as an emigration country and consider the (mostly illegal) immigrants as

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[5]   Presidential Decree 435/1984.
[6]   Presidential Decree 369/1985. The effect of 'schools for repatriates' on the Greek system has proved to be an extremely controversial issue.
[7]   That is, from the Pont, a region roughly corresponding to the Southern (Turkish) coast of the Black Sea and largely inhabited until about the beginning of the 20th century by Christian Orthodox, Greek-speaking people of Greek descent and a Pontian(-Greek) identity. Many of them moved to Black Sea regions of the ex-Soviet Union.
[8]   An indicator of the difficulties and concern of both Greek authorities and Greek public opinion are the research and publications on Pontians in Greece: see Vakalios (1999) and particularly, Kassimati (1992).
[9]   For more details on Greece as an emigration and a 'new' immigration country and on Greek migration policy, see Moussourou (1991).

exceptions to the rule.[10] Moreover, although the number of immigrants increased during the 1980s, public opinion remained indifferent; and policy-makers unconcerned.[11] Immigrant children remained few and went mostly unnoticed.

This was to undergo radical change at the turn of the decade: in the 1990s, Greece experienced an unprecedented influx of immigrants, not exactly refugees nor economic migrants but something in between. Many of these 'economic refugees' came from Eastern Europe (mostly Russia, the Ukraine and Poland), and the Balkans (usually Albania but also Rumania, Bulgaria and the former Yugoslavia) and Asia (primarily Iraqis, Kurds, Pakistanis and Palestinians). As had occurred a few years previously in Italy, these immigrants entered the country illegally/clandestinely. Initially, the main problem seemed to be the hungry Albanians sneaking in over the border only to come and be caught and deported again. Later, the main problem turned out to be shiploads of illegal immigrants from Asia smuggled into the EU through Greece. The large numbers, illegality, precarious living conditions, different cultures and behaviour, combined with an increasing crime rate (particularly in terms of thefts[12]) and fear of the impact non-vaccinated people living under poor hygienic conditions might have on public health[13] have all turned the Greeks' initial discomfort into anxiety. The traditional Greek 'philoxenia' (friendliness towards stranger), although not extinct,[14] often gave way to xenophobia. The existing legal provisions were of no help: the unclear and controversial status of illegal immigrants contributed decisively to the creation of a complex process of integration and exclusion, often interrelated[15] and undoubtedly operating at many different levels (Veikou 2001). Besides, immigrants themselves display behaviours that contribute to their own exclusion from the (Greek) host society (Moussourou 1998: 73–74).

A persistently high unemployment rate has not helped matters and indeed has fanned the fires against foreigners (for arguments used to justify this, see Limberaki & Pelagidis 2000). However, mainly because of the solvency problems that pension schemes and social security are now facing, the trade unions have led the drive to legalise illegal immigrants.

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[10] Immigrants could be given the right to reside and work in the country if the employer could prove that no Greek citizen was available to perform the tasks of that particular job.

[11] In the meantime, Italy already faced the problem of massive illegal immigration and the Schengen agreement had been signed (by the Benelux, France, Germany and Italy) in 1985. Greece signed it in 1992.

[12] Crime has been associated with specific nationalities (particularly Albanians and, to a lesser degree, Rumanians) and has been the main cause (or alibi?) for a rise in xenophobia. For details, see Kourtovic (2001).

[13] All indications so far show that this fear is not unfounded.

[14] The readiness of island populations to care for the humane wreckage on their shores proves the survival of this cultural characteristic—even under difficult conditions.

[15] That is, integration into one area led to exclusion from another, and vice versa.

The 1997 decision to legalise illegal immigrants (i.e. give them residence and work permits under certain conditions) marks an important turning point: Greece now recognises the fact that it has become an immigration country. Thus, although immigrants had been part of everyday life for more than 25 years, it was only at the end of the 1990s that this reality was accepted and that the need for an immigration policy was recognised.[16]

Even prior to the above turning point, immigrant children had become a cause of great concern—particularly those begging at crossroads in central Athens and Thessaloniki, the so-called 'stop-light children' who were unprotected from all the ensuing dangers and were potential victims of all kinds of abuse.[17]

However, children were not as numerous before legalisation; and although some immigrant communities did set up schools[18] and a few immigrant children were able to enrol in a Greek school, public opinion remained more or less unaware of the problems building up, with only the people involved (parents, children, school teachers) aware of them (Katsikas & Kavvadias 1996).

Legalisation increased both the numbers and visibility[19] of immigrant children. In the 2001–2002 school year, the proportion of repatriate and immigrant children within the total pupil population amounted to 6–9.7% in primary schools and 3.8% in secondary schools.[20] This high proportion (particularly in primary schools) is, of course, not the same in all schools. There are public primary schools in which the proportion of non-Greek-speaking pupils is as high as 35% (Androussou 2001: 51). Moreover, the non-Greek-speaking pupil population is extremely fragmented, and its integration presupposes knowledge of the needs of each specific (cultural, if not ethnic) category.

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[16] The measures taken in 1997 to 'legalise' immigrants were the first step towards an immigration policy. The second (and more important) was a new law for foreign immigration and residence in Greece, the discussions on which had started at the beginning of 1999 and were finally voted on in Parliament as Law 2910/2001. In the meantime, immigrants were given a second chance to legalise their status. Hence, so far, the Greek experience seems to somewhat follow in the pattern of its Italian counterpart: despite repeated attempts at legalisation, there remains a large number of illegal immigrants who choose (or are encouraged by employers) not to 'go legal'. Scholars maintain (Veikou 2001: 125) that in both countries, foreign immigrants may find more opportunities if they work illegally rather than legally. This sounds very plausible for Greece, an EU champion in the 'black' (informal and illegal) economy.

[17] The Church and some NGOs have led a patient (and, to a large extent, successful) campaign aimed at taking these children off the streets into school and a protected environment.

[18] This would mean an illegal school (as there are no legal conditions for running a foreign school) for children who live in Greece illegally. One example of a school operating illegally is the one set up by the Polish community (numbering between 80,000 and 100,000) in Athens (Damanakis, 1997: 316)—incidentally, in a building provided free of charge by the City of Athens!

[19] Legalisation has made family reunification possible and gave children the right to enrol in a Greek school.

[20] I Kathimerini (Newspaper), 23 October 2001.

Existing data (see Table 1) make it possible both to appreciate the importance of missing information and understand (and explain) existing trends.

Table 1: Repatriate and foreign pupils in primary and secondary schools: changes between 1995–1996 and 1999–2000 (with indications for 2000–2001)

Pupils	Primary School			Secondary School		
	1995–1996	1999–2000	2000–2001	1995–1996	1999–2000	2000–2001
Total	*30,193*	*58,671*	*65,946*	*13,900*	*27,667*	*16,475*
Foreign	10,634	40,653		3,957	16,475	
(Albanians)	7,083	33,615		2,192	12,897	
Repatriate	19,559	17,918		9,943	11,192	
(ex-USSR)	11,691	11,831		5,194	6,458	
(Albania)	5,658	4,251		1,825	2,935	

Source: I Kathimerini (newspaper), 23 October 2001

As concerns trends, the following comments can be made on the basis of the above data:

1) In five years (between 1995–1996 and 1999–2000), there was a sizable increase (by 94%) of primary-school immigrant pupils. This period includes the first attempt to 'legalise' immigrants, hence the increase may be due to the effects of legalisation. In one year, between 1999–2000 and 2000–2001, there was a 12% increase. Because the second attempt to 'legalise' immigrants started at the end of 2000, this increase cannot be due to the effects of the second attempt (though it may be partly due to its having been expected).

2) The characteristics of primary-school immigrant pupils changed completely between 1995–1996 and 1999–2000: in 1995–1996, the majority were repatriates, and in 1999–2000, the majority were foreigners. Following the previous remark and because 'legalisation' concerns foreigners, this development was to be expected.

3) The increase of secondary-school immigrant pupils over five years (between 1995–1996 and 1999–2000) is even more impressive than the one outlined above for primary schools: 99%. However, even more impressive is the 40% decrease within just one year (between 1999–2000 and 2000–2001). The reasons for this dramatic decrease may include the following:[21]

   ■ dropping out because of integration difficulties;
   ■ dropping out or not enrolling because of the need to work; and

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[21]   See I Kathimerini (newspaper), 23 October 2001.

- some school directors recording immigrant children as Greeks, out of fear for the status of their school.

4) Finally, while in 1995–1996 repatriates prevailed in both primary and secondary schools, in 1999–2000 foreigners prevailed in primary school and repatriates in secondary. The 'obvious' explanation of this phenomenon (namely that repatriates have more incentives to study the language and the system of the country where their family is now established and where they intend to become integrated, make a living and live their life) may be misleading.

Some of the facts outlined above indicate the importance of the lack of information when it comes to understanding what is really happening and why, as well as what will happen and why. Nonetheless, more: information about quantitatively 'smaller' categories of repatriate and foreign children is not available, nor is there information about their (possible) concentration in specific areas (where they might constitute the majority of repatriates or immigrants). The lack of detailed quantitative information makes reliable[22] qualitative studies that might include integration problems impossible; and qualitative studies would certainly be essential for describing the degree of integration/exclusion of each ethnic, cultural or other category of immigrants, as well as for analysing the causes and effects of integration/exclusion for each, for defining what are the aims and possibilities of each, and for formulating and implementing an effective integration policy based on the wishes and available resources of both sides. This missing information is essential for any adequate evaluation of the difficulties and successes of school integration. Besides, it is not clear whether school integration is an equally important policy aim for both repatriate and immigrant children. We may also ask whether school integration is, in fact, a policy aim in itself or rather a means to confront problems created by trying to educate these children.

The system set up to integrate repatriate children (i.e. returnee children and immigrant children of Greek descent) has been used for immigrant children in Greek schools, with almost no adaptation to the specific reality of immigrants (see Annex 1 for details on the conditions under which repatriate children are accepted into Greek schools). However, immigrant children are different from repatriate children in very important ways. So far, Greek immigration policy has taken an explicit stand for temporary over permanent immigration. A temporary stay[23] and integration (in our case, of schoolchildren) are basically contradictory. Moreover, there are doubts about considering the integration of immigrants as a policy aim. In fact, the question has been raised and clearly formulated but not yet answered: Since these people legally live and work

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[22] There exist many 'opinion polls' concerning attitudes toward immigrants and attitudes of immigrants toward the native-born population, as well as toward their future in Greece.

[23] Which may not be as temporary as expected: has not this been the traumatic experience of European immigration so far?

in Greece, is it better to achieve their maximum possible integration into Greek society or to keep them as a separate ethnic and social group (…)? (Dokos 2001: 68). Having two different perspectives does not help—nor does it help to consider immigrants as one homogeneous group.

A temporary status and becoming integrated are not the only contradiction. There is also a contradiction between the multicultural and multilingual situation already existing and the educational measures taken in order to face it (Damanakis 1997: 90). The problems stemming from this contradiction are not solved by the existing setup, which during the 2001–2002 school year included 500 admission classes (mainly to teach the Greek language) and 700 tutorial courses (in primary and secondary schools), designed to help students who found it difficulty to keep up with their class. Neither are the problems solved by the 'intercultural'[24] schools (see Annex 2 providing a list showing geographic distribution), which have admission classes, tutorial courses and a large number of repatriate and/or immigrant children often belonging to many different ethnicities and cultural traditions.[25] Moreover, although it is too early for a credible evaluation of the success (or failure) of the existing integration system, it has been clear for some years now that admission classes and tutorial courses, mainly aimed at bringing non-Greek-speaking children (initially those of repatriates) up to par linguistically for placement in a mainstream class, are creating a situation that may prove negative for the integration process. By taking the pupil away from his/her class, away from his/her fellow students for two or more hours every day, we create factors for his/her isolation. Away from the class, he/she is missing some hours not of lessons but of contact with the other children, hours that would be important for relationships. Therefore, we are unfortunately making a step backwards. We are cutting the child off from the very environment that we want to integrate him/her in (Natso 2000: 51).

It is too soon to know to what extent school integration is actually taking place, who is being integrated, what is being attempted, what is really happening, and how this experience will affect the future of Greek society and of children (Greek, repatriate and immigrant alike). Yet we have some important indications that may be summarised as follows:

Bilingual teachers are very important (perhaps even essential) for building up common cultural characteristics and events and for creating interest among children in the 'other' culture. A preliminary evaluation of an experiment made in Northern

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[24]   Though less acute than those concerning the term 'multicultural', the theoretical problems involved in understanding 'interculturality'—as well as the practical problems involved in its application to specific educational aims and schemes—are extremely important. They are, of course, outside the scope of this paper.

[25]   Intercultural schools were created by Law 2413/1996.

Greece[26] in an intercultural primary school with Greek and Albanian pupils (primary school of Neoi Epivates, Thessaloniki; see Annex 2) shows that it may be both be easy and enriching for children to come to know and respect one another's cultural tradition—provided that teachers are able to make them see, understand and accept the similarities as well as the differences (Natso 2000).

'Optimal' solutions for integration in class may be too onerous and/or inapplicable in classes with a large number of immigrant pupils (at various degrees of integration and with various abilities for achieving it). In the experiment mentioned above, a bilingual teacher sat in class with the immigrant pupil, translating and helping him/her so as to fit into the Greek-speaking curriculum and into class. Important practical problems may arise if there are many pupils (simultaneously) needing such help and particularly if these pupils speak different languages.[27]

The reaction of the community, and, particularly of the parents of native-born children, may prove to be decisive for the integration of immigrant children.[28] In many cases, parents appear to be very much against their children going to class with the 'foreigners'. Their main argument[29] is that immigrant children 'slow down' the whole class and, hence, their own children do not receive the education they should get. Thus, parents of native-born children may not tolerate integration, at which immigrant children, their parents, schools and (very often) their own children have worked very hard.

The combined effect of (non)correspondence of previous studies (see Annex 1), language problems and the new environment is that many repatriate and foreign children have to enter at a lower grade and/or repeat one. This means that many immigrant children have classmates who are two or three years younger than themselves. This is particularly frequent in secondary school—and it is particularly obvious in schools with no 'admission' classes and no 'tutorial courses'[30] (Vakalios 1999: 33). Moreover, the above age discrepancy may be a crucial factor for dropping out as well as for non-integration (or even exclusion).

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[26] In the context of the program Education of repatriate and foreign students, supervised by Athens University.

[27] In this experiment, all immigrant children were Albanian.

[28] The importance of this remark cannot be stressed enough (see also I Kathimerini, 24 Oct. 2001).

[29] Among other arguments, not necessarily stemming from xenophobic feelings but rather having to do with the inconveniences and 'threats' connected with both immigrants and immigration.

[30] To the extent this is true, it becomes necessary to stress the importance of the effect of the much-criticised setup for the school integration of repatriate and immigrant children.

Given the unique adaptability of children and their special sense of priorities, important things may be happening in schools, particularly in intercultural schools. As the director of such a school[31] put it, "During intermission, 36 different languages can be heard—as many as the homelands of our pupils. But children are children. They do not care about wars or enmities between nations. During the war in Kosovo, Albanian and Serb children were fighting with each other over Panathinaikos, Olympiakos or AEK[32] and gave no thought to what was happening in their homeland."

The specificity of the integration problems that each category of immigrant children faces is not to be underestimated. Studies on Pontians (Vakalios 1999) or Albanians (Lambrianidis & Limberaki 2001) provide support for this remark. In fact, besides the common obstacles of language (which may be common without being the same), some basic differences are recorded—and these have to do with the cultural and social value accorded to education, the beliefs and ambitions of parents,[33] the degree of social acceptance, the kind and degree of economic integration, group solidarity, etc. Comparative studies would reveal the impact of differences on recorded similarities. Such studies are essential for policy-making[34] and, insofar as they do not exist, it is practically impossible either to comment on the implementation and effectiveness of policy measures or to propose policy changes, amendments and additions.

The lack of pupil homogeneity in many schools is in contrast to the educational system, which takes homogeneity for granted: one official language, one official textbook per course for the entire country, a unique way to work (Androussou 2001: 51). The essential inflexibility of the Greek school[35] is an all-powerful factor working against the integration of 'other' children. Because integration means a context of dialogue between equals, such a context cannot be if the different is not accepted as equal. And how can the different be accepted when the different language is left outside of the school, the different religion is often not recognised and when the symbolic practices of the Greek school (such as common prayer, for instance) create a system both closed and impenetrable?" (Androussou 2001: 53).

The combination of the last two points leads to the uncomfortable thought that 'integration' is in fact understood as 'assimilation'—and hence, that policy measures aimed in fact at assimilation tend to deprive both the educational system and society of opportunities for enrichment, renewal and modernisation. Such opportunities

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[31] Director of the second intercultural high school of Hellenikon, Athens (see I Kathimerini, 24 Oct. 2001).

[32] The three largest soccer teams in Athens.

[33] For instance, important differences were recorded between German- and English-speaking parents (Damanakis 1997: 75).

[34] In a report on Social research and social policy published in January 2002, it was pointed out that in Greece, policy-makers have little (if any) use for social-research findings.

[35] An inflexibility that is not touched, in its essence, by the 'intercultural' school.

would be created by a truly intercultural approach[36] (Damanakis 1997: 77), one dependent on social acceptance and means and one leading to a new cultural identity. For the moment, there is no indication that Greek public opinion is ready to accept the eventuality (or is it the necessity?) of a new cultural identity.

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(All texts are in Greek, with the exception of those marked with *)

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[36] Intercultural schools can be considered as an attempt to this decisive turnaround—provided that the educational system leaves room for the innovation necessary for such a turnaround to actually happen.

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Annex 1

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
General Secretariat of Greeks Abroad

Migration and Repatriation Guide

Education

p.11
Transfers of students

1. Primary-school students
Students who hold certificates from foreign schools operating abroad and corresponding to Greek primary schools can enrol in public or private primary schools in Greece at any time during the school year without placement examinations.

Students of recognised Greek schools abroad can register without examinations in a corresponding class, as described above, in their place of permanent residence.

2. Secondary-school students
Students who hold certificates from foreign schools operating abroad and corresponding to Greek secondary schools can enrol in public or private secondary schools in Greece at any time during the school year and without placement examinations.

Students of recognised Greek secondary schools abroad can register without examinations in a corresponding class, as described above, in their place of permanent residence.

p.24
Education for repatriates

A. Bilingual schools for children of repatriate Greeks
To ensure the smooth entry of repatriate students into the Greek educational system and to deal with language problems or other learning difficulties they may have, public schools for the children of Greek repatriates were founded and currently operate in the Prefecture of Attica. These schools (2 primary schools, 2 secondary schools, 2 lyceums) are primarily targeted at students from English-speaking countries.

Moreover, in the Prefecture of Thessaloniki, a primary school, a secondary school and a lyceum for children from German-speaking countries were founded and currently operate. For registration in the afore mentioned schools, the same procedures and pre-conditions apply as for registration in other Greek public schools.

List of schools for expatriate Greek children
- High School – Lyceum of Hellenikon (Athens)
- High School – Lyceum of Varibobi (Athens)
- Primary School of Amphithea, Paleo Phaliro (Athens)
- Primary School of Alsoupoli, Nea Ionia (Athens)
- High School – Lyceum of Thessaloniki, Elaiones, Pylea (Thessaloniki)
- Primary School of Thessaloniki, Xirokrini (Thessaloniki)

B. Admission classes and tutorial courses
For repatriate students in primary and secondary education, admission classes and tutorial courses also operate (Law 1894/90, art. 2) with the aim of providing extracurricular help. The distribution of these extra hours per subject, as well as the precise number of hours, are defined by the school's Teachers' Board. The admission and tutorial courses are held in public primary and secondary schools by order of the local Prefect, while the local Departments of Education are responsibility for the lessons.

Annex 2

Intercultural Schools
(Source: Ministry of Education. Unpublished data)

Primary schools
Alsoupoli, Nea Ionia (Athens)*
Amphithea (Athens)*

87th of Athens
Chania (Crete)
6th of Evosmos (Thessaloniki)
6th of Eleutherio-Kordellio (Thessaloniki)
Neoi Epivates (Thessaloniki)
9th of Ioannina (Epirus)
Sapes (Thrace)
Xirokrini (Thessaloniki)*
Iasmos (Thrace)
3rd of Menemeni (Thessaloniki)
5th of Menemeni (Thessaloniki)

Secondary schools
Ioannina (Epirus)
Elaiones-Pylea (Thessaloniki)*
Sapes (Thrace)
Helleniki (Athens)*
Varibobi (Athens)*
Evosmos (Thessaloniki)
2nd of Acharnai (Attica)
2nd of Athens
2nd of Pentalofo (Kozani)

Lyceums
Varibobi (Athens)*
Helleniko (Athens)*
Sapes (Thrace)
Elaiones-Pylea (Thessaloniki)*

* Also see Annex 1

Notes:
(1) Compulsory education is for 9 years (roughly primary and secondary school).
(2) The concentration of intercultural schools in Northern Greece (particularly in Thessaloniki and Thrace) is remarkable. Northern Greece has been a region of much emigration in the 1960s and of return in the 1970s. It is a region where a large number of repatriates (mainly Pontians) and immigrants (mainly Albanians) settled. Athens (and Attica in general) has a very large foreign population but relatively much fewer intercultural schools.

Claire Wallace

Migration, family and welfare in East-Central Europe

Many people are afraid that the accession of countries in East-Central Europe to the European Union will provoke a flood of migrants. Here I shall look at the patterns of migration into and out of Central and Eastern Europe and argue that although there is still migration it is generally declining. Even the migration that does take place often has the form of temporary commuting for work rather than permanent emigration. Furthermore, some of the East-Central European countries have themselves become targets of migration. Under these circumstances, we might pose the question: why has there not been more East-West migration in the last decade? These trends will be considered in the context of family and demographic patterns which have helped to prevent large-scale migration and will likely continue to do so in the future.

1 Patterns of migration in East-Central Europe[1]

For many centuries, East-Central Europe (ECE) was a region of emigration—and emigration usually meant a one-way ticket to another country and another life. This pattern was continued because of the difficulty of return during the Cold War period and seemed to be reinforced at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, when there was mass emigration from Central and Eastern Europe.

However, if we look at the contemporary patterns of migration, we can see that in many countries, out-migration has been declining. For example, even though Bulgaria, Romania and Poland were high sending countries in the early transition period, the numbers leaving them have declined in recent years. The Baltic States illustrate much out-migration following the break-up of the Soviet Union, but less so now. Many of these could be the ethnic Russians who are leaving. Slovenia also has an unusual migration pattern due to the impact of the refugees who fled there during the wars of the 1990s. However, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia, along with Lithuania are all beginning to show a positive migration balance—more people are coming than are leaving those countries.

There are, however, large migrations taking place in the former Soviet states, especially after the break-up of the Soviet Union as the populations return to their ethnic 'homelands'.

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[1]   Based upon Wallace & Stola (2001).

Thus, the largest migrations are *within* Eastern and Central Europe rather than from East to West. Many ECE countries, especially the more successful ones bordering the EU, have become receiving rather than sending countries in recent years. Like countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal, this is a new role in terms of migration.

Table 1: Net migration 1989–1998 (in thousands)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Bulgaria	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1
Latvia	2	2	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1
Slovenia	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2
Czech Republic	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2
Estonia	2.2	2	1.8	1.7	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2
Romania	2.2	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Hungary	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3
Slovakia	2.1	2.1	2	2	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4
Lithuania	2	2	2	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4
Poland	2	2	2	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.4

Source: TransMonee database, UNICEF

Generally speaking therefore, if these patterns continue, we might expect migration to continue to decline. Under these circumstances, it would seem that the threat of East-West migration might have been exaggerated.[2]

2 Commuting rather than emigrating

In addition, the studies carried out tend to show a strong tendency towards commuting for short periods rather than permanent emigration.

Studies of migration potential confirm that few would like to emigrate permanently and if they do, rather consider the traditional New World countries. On the other hand, many would like to go to the West for a few weeks or months to work or to study.

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[2] See also special edition of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* on the topic of migration and enlargement, 2002.

Table 2: Duration of time respondents wanted to go abroad (in %)*

	A few weeks	A few months	A few years	For ever
Poland	46	37	18	14
Czech Republic	49	44	24	11
Slovakia	56	47	27	10
Hungary	33	30	20	8

Source: IOM Migration Potential Survey 1998. Poland: N = 1141, Czech Republic: N = 961, Slovakia: N = 974, Hungary: N = 973.

* This table brings together data asked in four separate questions. Hence, respondents could have said that they want to go abroad for a few weeks and for a few months and for a few years and for ever. That is why they do not total to 100%.

This makes contemporary migration rather difficult to define as well as to measure (Okólski 2001; Kupiszewski 2002). It means that there are new forms of mobility rather than migration in the classical sense characteristic of the industrial age.

3 Migration potential

In order to further explore the reasons for wanting to migrate and the population groups that are interested in migration, we can now turn to a survey of migration potential carried out for the IOM in 1998 in these four countries. We should be aware, however, that such migration potential data should be treated with caution: only a cross section of the people who were still in the country were asked about their intentions to migrate, not those who had already done so. Furthermore, expressing an interest in migration is not the same as actually leaving, so this can only give us a rudimentary idea of the migration potential, and the real numbers migrating would be much lower. However, it can help us to assess the characteristics of people who might be interested in migrating, since other methods of research with migrants themselves cannot usually be carried out on a systematic basis.

A battery of questions was asked as part of a representative sample survey (N=12,498) in the following countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria.

In each country, we used the same battery of 13 questions: did people want to go abroad for a few weeks to work, a few months to work, a few years to work or for the rest of their lives. The second battery was about what preparations they had made: learning a language, gaining qualifications, selling property, obtaining information, applying for jobs, looking for somewhere to live, applying for a work permit, obtaining information from others and other preparations. We then constructed a migration

index based upon whether people were likely to have answered positively to any of these. To refine the index, we first did a factor analysis in order to eliminate items which did not fit the index. In each country apart from Poland, 'selling property' did not load on the first factor. All other items loaded well on the first factor. We therefore constructed an index which excluded this item, except in the case of Poland. Thus we had three 12-item and one 13-item interval scales upon which to do additional analysis. The 13-point scale was then reduced to a ten-point scale so that the long tail could be reduced and the responses made more consistent for analysis. This index was also turned into an ordinal variable for the purposes of cross tabulations.

Therefore, we find the numbers answering any one question about migration potential are rather high. However, in order to filter out those who were simply interested from those who were more serious, we constructed an index with 13 items. Accordingly, we found that 36% of all people in Poland, 37% of all people in the Czech Republic, 37% of all people in Slovakia and 56% of all people in Hungary had no interest whatsoever in migrating. Indeed, less than 10% of all people in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary scored on more than four items, although this rose to 25% in Poland.

In this way, we could say that the numbers of really serious migrants in these countries was rather low, albeit higher in Poland. This also reflects the trends in migration from these countries. Figure 1 below shows the mean index for the migration potential in each country. Out of 12 possible items, the average score was 2 or less only for Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and this rose to 3 in Poland. Poland had the highest migration potential with a score of 3.109, but it also had the highest standard deviation at 3.2395. Next came the Czech Republic with a score of 2.012 and a standard deviation of 2.2479, followed by Slovakia with a score of 1.8754 and a standard deviation of 2.0447. Hungary had the lowest migration potential of all with a score of 1.371 and a standard deviation of 2.0629. This means that there is also a lot of variation within the population.

Figure 1: Migration potential index

4 Migration motives

Migration is normally considered in the context of 'push' and 'pull' models, despite the numerous criticisms of this hydraulic metaphor (Schmitter-Heisler 1992). Next, we considered what motivations can encourage or discourage migration and a range of 'push' and 'pull' factors. The pull factors included better living standards abroad, the opportunity to earn lots of money abroad, the good experience of others, good employment prospects for people like me, and greater personal and political freedom. The 'push' factors included ethnic problems at home, no economic improvement at home. The results are summarised in Table 3 below:

Table 3: Push and pull factors: reasons for leaving.
Percentage of people mentioning each factor

	Poland	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Hungary
Push factors				
Poor economic conditions at home	61	48	58	45
Ethnic problems	29	25	51	34
Pull factors				
Living conditions better abroad	83	73	77	66
Earn more money abroad	75	67	73	58
Experience of others good	71	55	65	45
Good employment opportunities	73	42	49	45
Greater personal and political freedom	42	36	56	36

Source: IOM Migration Potential Survey 1998, N = 12,498

We can see that push factors such as poor economic conditions at home played an important role in Slovakia and in Poland, but not so much in Hungary and the Czech Republic, whilst ethnic problems were particularly a factor in Slovakia. Almost all respondents recognised that living conditions and wages were better abroad and even one third to one half felt that they would have more personal and political freedom abroad. Economic factors were thus very important in encouraging people to go abroad—but these economic factors are perhaps declining in importance as the economies of the transition countries have generally started to improve since 1995.

In addition to looking at the factors that might cause people to leave their countries, we can also look at the factors which might encourage them to stay instead. Here we have both positive things about the home environment and negative things about the foreign environment. Ties to family and friends were the strongest reasons for not leaving home, followed by a fear of the risks and uncertainty of migrating. A good job in the home country would keep Slovaks and Poles from migrating, but not Czechs and Hungarians. On the other hand, around one half of people (two thirds in Poland) mentioned the difficulties and stigma that they would face as migrants, either due to the bad treatment of migrant workers or the fact that people from their country were not really respected abroad. Between half and two thirds felt that living conditions would improve at home in the long term. Lower numbers were put off by migration legislation and the bad experiences of others.

Table 4: Keep factors: reasons for staying.
Percentage of people answering question

	Poland	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Hungary
Ties to family and friends	86	89	87	91
Uncertainty abroad	73	71	70	71
Good job at home	72		54	
Bad treatment abroad	64	37	52	55
Nationality not respected	63	42	51	52
Living conditions will improve at home	62	42	54	65
Hard to go abroad legally	60	31	53	58
Other people have bad experiences	46	16	23	34

Source: IOM Migration Potential Survey 1998, N = 12,498

5 Migration into Central and Eastern Europe

As I have stated earlier, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have themselves become targets of international migration. What sort of migration into the accession

countries do we find? First of all, we have the in-migration of permanent settlers but those are rather few and, to some extent, can be explained by the fact that countries such as Poland and Hungary have large diasporas of co-nationals living outside their borders. Some of these now start to 'return' to their homelands. Others, having been forcibly expelled during the Communist period, or emigrated to the West, now want to return. A second type of migration is that of the asylum-seekers and refugees, which we find in other parts of Europe as well. These numbers have increased but are still rather low compared to the EU Member States. A third type of migrant are the transit migrants, i.e. people who are using these countries as gateways to go somewhere else. Those numbers are large, but are coming more and more under control with the development of migration policies in the accession countries, so that transit migrants are being stopped more and more at the Eastern borders of the accession countries rather than on the Western borders.

Then there is a boom in tourism, but some types of tourism are actually disguised economic migration—for example, some people who enter as tourists are actually buying and selling goods across the border or are temporarily working. However, this is partly because of the inhibiting regulations for small-scale entrepreneurs and workers. Labour migration also increased, but this tends to be in the tradition of guest workers, people who come for a short period of time, earn money, and then go home again. They come from Ukraine, Romania and from other East European countries, so that patterns of circulation or 'migration systems' have already evolved in the last years. Some of the settlers in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia come from further afield, from China and from the Caucasus as well as from the former Yugoslavia. For these people, Central Europe offers good business opportunities. There is also a more neglected topic, namely that of West-East-migration, i.e. people going from the West to the East. For example, besides the flood of consultants and managers, there has been a wave of young Americans, enough to even form a kind of colony in Prague.

What are the consequences of this for the candidate countries? If we see migration as an issue of people coming into Eastern and Central Europe rather than flooding out (as is often presented in public debates), then a range of new perspectives emerges. First of all, it means that the candidate countries are becoming multi-cultural societies, and that is something new for them (at least in the recent past). It is something that many Western European countries are also struggling with. Although there are already some established cultural minorities, the rise in in-migration raises the issue of new cultural minorities and that requires some rethinking of national identity. Thus, we are also seeing the emergence of more overt forms of xenophobia. Public opinion surveys carried out in East-Central European countries show very high levels of xenophobia compared to Western European countries. This is something that should be addressed in the future.

As we can see from Table 5 below, according to the World Values Survey (WVS), many more people in Eastern Europe are racist than in Western Europe (as measured by this question). However, in both Eastern and Western Europe, the numbers who did not want someone of a different race as a neighbour is declining.

Table 5: Percent who would not like someone of a different race as neighbour[3]

	1980	1990	1995
Austria		8	
W Germany	10	10	2
E. Germany	12	4	
Hungary		23	19
Poland			20
Czech		29	10
Slovakia		36	14

Source: WVS. N = Austria 1990 = 1460; West Germany 1980 = 1305, West Germany 1990 = 2101, West Germany 1995 = 1017; East Germany 1990 = 1336, East Germany 1995 = 1009; Hungary 1990 = 999, Hungary 1995 = 644; Czech Republic 1990 = 9301, Czech Republic 1995 = 1147; Slovakia 1990 = 466, Slovakia 1995 = 1095

In the case of intolerance towards Muslims, this has also sunk in the 1990s and respondents are generally more tolerant towards Muslims everywhere apart from Slovakia, where the proportion rejecting Muslim neighbours has risen considerably. According to these data, Slovaks have an exceptionally high intolerance of Muslims, but in CEE countries generally there is much less tolerance of Muslims than in the West.

Table 6: Percent who would not like Muslims as neighbours

	1980	1990	1995
Austria		14	
W Germany	20	9	
E. Germany	20	16	
Hungary		18	
Poland			26
Czech		47	46
Slovakia		51	68

Source: WVS. N = Austria 1990 = 1460; West Germany 1980 = 1305, West Germany 1990 = 2101, West Germany 1995 = 1017; East Germany 1990 = 1336, East Germany 1995 = 1009; Hungary 1990 = 999, Hungary 1995 = 644; Czech Republic 1990 = 9301, Czech Republic 1995 = 1147; Slovakia 1990 = 466, Slovakia 1995 = 1095

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[3]   Question wording: "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?"

Table 7: Percent who would not like immigrants as neighbours

	1980	1990	1995
Austria		20	
W Germany	20	16	4
E. Germany	18	10	
Hungary		22	25
Poland			21
Czech		33	28
Slovakia		37	18

Source: WVS. N = Austria 1990 = 1460; West Germany 1980 = 1305, West Germany 1990 = 2101, West Germany 1995 = 1017; East Germany 1990 = 1336, East Germany 1995 = 1009; Hungary 1990 = 999, Hungary 1995 = 644; Czech Republic 1990 = 9301, Czech Republic 1995 = 1147; Slovakia 1990 = 466, Slovakia 1995 = 1095

Finally in the case of attitudes towards immigrants, we find that there is also increasing tolerance (except in Hungary) but with very high levels of intolerance in CEE compared with the West.

Nevertheless xenophobia has had very little impact in terms of electoral politics in Central and Eastern Europe, where migration has not yet really been a political issue. This is in contrast to the way in which such issues are used by European-Union politicians and the rise of far-right anti-immigration parties in countries such as Austria, France, Italy and Belgium. In general, there is an increase in tolerance towards foreigners or those of a different religion or race, although intolerance is higher in Eastern than in Western Europe. This also confirms a previous analysis comparing different points in time (Haerpfer & Wallace 1998).

Why are there such high levels of xenophobia in CEE? One answer might be the general isolation of these countries and the tendency to see themselves as culturally homogenous (reinforced by post-1989 independence). Another might the absence of debates about migrants within civil society and the lack of organisations to put alternative points of view to support migrants. The temporary and irregular status of most migrants means that they have no organisational or political lobby and tends to reinforce prejudice against them. Also, the illegal status of many migrants means that they tend to avoid visibility. Furthermore, we could say that the perceived threat from migration does not correspond with the real threat, since Slovakia has the lowest number of migrants, but some of the most xenophobic attitudes towards migration. Finally, our further analysis has indicated that it is the older, rural dwelling and less educated people who are most xenophobic (Wallace 1999). They are also the losers of the transition process and most threatened by the changes that have taken place (Wallace 1997). The younger, urbanised and educated population, whom we could consider the winners of transition, are the least xenophobic.

6 Migration and the family

One of the reasons why migration is not higher is that people have strong ties to their families in the country of origin. This was overwhelmingly the reason given for not migrating to another country (86% in Poland, 89% in the Czech Republic, 87% in Slovakia and 91% in Hungary). It is also the case that the patterns of migration, which take more the form of short term commuting rather than large-scale exodus, tend to encourage the retention of family links at home. Our studies have shown this to be very important in maintaining living standards in countries such as Ukraine or Romania where they have fallen substantially.

Families in Eastern and Central Europe have strong intergenerational links—many of them live in multi-generational households (Wallace & Kovatcheva 1998). Parents and grandparents help children through child minding, growing vegetables and tending animals as well as providing accommodation and material support and using their informal networks to obtain resources (Mozny 1994). These strong patterns of inter-generational support, developed under the conditions of the previous regimes, were even strengthened during the transition. It is through these kinds of household strategies that families were able to survive during the transition period when living standards slumped and unemployment rose (Wallace 2002). In this way, they built up a portfolio of economic resources. The household strategy of many migrants is to send one or more members of the family abroad to earn extra money for the family, whilst children and other family members stay at home in order to go to school and to maintain the family home. This tendency has even been reinforced in recent years as the privatisation process turned many people into property owners (this is the case for 80–90% of the population in Bulgaria and Romania, for example).

Another factor were the well-developed welfare states in Eastern and Central Europe. If the families of people were sick, wanted to be educated or receive pensions, they should remain at home in their own countries. Even the commuting workers themselves are often insured in their own countries rather than the ones to which they are commuting.[4] This combination of economic resources in the household portfolio means that the pattern of commuting migration is a more convenient one, whilst the main family itself is anchored in the home country.

Other factors which may have inhibited large-scale emigration and encouraged short-term commuting include such things as the development of the service economy and the need for introducing flexible labour markets. [5]

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[4]   See Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, special issue on migration and enlargement, 2002.
[5]   See project financed by the European Commission Households, work and flexibility: www.hwf.at

Therefore, in order to understand international migration, it is not sufficient to impute motivations based upon economic indicators such as unemployment, demographic imbalance and wage levels. Rather it is important to look at the motivations and strategies of actors and how they manage resources.

7 Implications for EU enlargement

Many have claimed that the accession of Eastern and Central Europe to the European Union will help reverse the tendency towards an aging population and have argued that migration may be seen as positive in this sense. However, this may not be the case. Not only are fewer people migrating, but the number of children and young people in ECE is declining, and at the same time the death rate is increasing (except in the Czech and Slovak Republics and in Poland) in many countries as we can see in Table 8 below (OECD 2001):

Table 8: Fertility in ECE candidate countries, 1989–1998

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Bulgaria	-217.6	-87.6	-46.5	-67.7	-64.4	-62.7	-50.5	-64.5		
Poland	-24.4	-15.8	-15.9	-11.6	-15.5	-19	-18.2	-13.1	-11.8	-13.3
Romania	-41.4	-96.9	-42.6	-29.4	-17.2	-16.3	-21.2	-19.5	-13.3	-5.6
Latvia	1.2	-0.5	-10.8	-46.9	-27.9	-18.8	-10.5	-7.3	-4.8	-3.2
Slovenia	2.4	2.2	-3.1	-0.4	1.4	0.9	2.5	6.5	2.4	-2.1
Estonia	0.2	-4	-8	-33.8	-13.8	-7.6	-8.2	-5.7	-2.5	-1.1
Lithuania	1.3	-8.8	-8.9	-22.2	-13.1	-2.6	-1.8	-0.9	0.1	0.6
Slovakia		0.1	1.2	2	1.8	4.8	2.8	2.3	1.7	1.3
Czech Republic	1.5	0.6	2.9	11.8	5.5	9.9	10	10.1	12.1	9.5
Hungary	23.9	22.6	17.3	10.8	13.3	13.1	13.2	12.1	12.5	12.1
Russia	115.3	183.8	16.7	252.9	440.3	809.6	502.4	343.5	349	278.6
Ukraine	-108.9	-139.3	-180.4	290.1	49.6	-143.2	-94.8	-131.2	-82.1	-93.6

Source: TransMonee database, UNICEF

Some have put this fertility decline down to 'transition stress' (economic slump, uncertainty about the future). However, if this is the case, we would expect the fertility to have picked up again after the economic upturn of the mid 1990s instead of continuing to decline. Another thesis is that this postponed fertility as patterns of child bearing more and more resemble those of Western countries where women have children less frequently and later in their life course. Another thesis is that the opportunity for consumption along with the decline of social benefits, which were traditionally granted

to young families, may be responsible for this fertility decline. Whatever the reasons, it seems that ECE countries will soon have their own aging populations to deal with.

8 Conclusions

Given the patterns discussed above, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1) Migration from ECE is declining and will likely decline still further as living standards rise.
2) Much of the migration that does take place reflects the need to move backwards and forwards between sending and receiving countries. Migration is increasingly a return ticket rather than a one-way ticket.
3) There is increasing migration into and within ECE countries that we need to take into account—however, most of this is also of a temporary kind.
4) The strong intergenerational family ties of people in ECE, which enable them to survive economically through use of a portfolio of economic resources, is a stabilising factor and a disincentive to migrate permanently.
5) These family circumstances are further reinforced through the increase in property ownership and the role of the welfare states.
6) The new migration role of ECE means that other issues start to become important—especially the new forms of integration necessary for multi-cultural societies and addressing the issue of xenophobia.

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Marek Okólski

The impact of EU enlargement on migration.
The perspective of Poland

The enlargement of the European Union (EU) is likely to have complex and diversified consequences for migration in any individual new Member State (NMS). Compared to what is currently observed, the new Member States may experience substantially different intensities of both the 'outflows' of nationals and the 'inflows of foreigners'; and those flows of migrants may display different composition with regard to forms/types of movements, geographic direction and the socio-demographic characteristics of the people involved.

Coming at the very moment when the accession of a great number of Central East European (CEE) states has become a reality, this issue has provoked an avalanche of speculations concerning its migratory consequences, as well as a handful of in-depth analyses. A large majority of these speculations and nearly all the analyses have adopted the perspective of the present EU Member States. These inquiries into the migration-related effects have been surprisingly homogeneous from the viewpoint of intellectual underpinnings, namely in accordance with neoclassical migration theory. Thus, they assume that the flows will be employment-related and unidirectional, i.e. from the new Member States to the old ones. In addition, taking lessons of earlier enlargements, they have focused on the issue of migration for regular employment. The empirical foundation for the few empirical studies were sought either in the case of the outflow of Greek, Spanish and Portuguese workers in the pre- and post-accession period, or the case of the inflow of migrant workers to the Federal Republic of Germany over a couple of recent decades[1] (Quaisser et al. 2000; European Commission 2001).

The perspective of the candidate countries was omitted in practically all analyses, except for taking for granted that those countries are and will remain an inexhaustible reservoir of migrants willing to move to richer EU Member States. In this paper, I shall attempt to prove that such a view is too simplistic and indeed unfounded. In putting forth my arguments, I shall mainly refer to the results of research projects recently carried out in Poland on international mobility.

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[1]   In addition, some studies—which I would however hardly label 'in-depth'—have used data from various public-opinion polls concerning the migratory intentions of Central and Eastern European populations.

Let me first reflect on the issue of similarity between some previous EU enlargements and the forthcoming one, from the viewpoint of potential labour-migration effects. Indeed, Greece, Portugal and Spain before the accession were lagging behind 'older' EU Member States in terms of labour productivity and relative wages. Moreover, at that time, all three countries continued to send large numbers of migrants to the EU labour markets and, over several decades, generally encountered considerable net emigration. These characteristics seem to be shared by at least a few of the present candidate countries—especially Poland, the largest of them.

There are, however, some important dissimilarities as well. The most striking difference is the absence of any significant recruitment-driven labour migration from the new candidates over the past decades. This means that—as opposed to migrants from Greece, Portugal and Spain—workers from CEE had no chance to establish themselves or build a sound 'ethnic enclave' in the formal labour market of the EU prior to the accession. On the other hand, migrants from new candidate countries used to take employment within the EU, but the forms of their employment substantially differed from what was the rule in the case of Southern European countries during a comparable period.

With regard to these peculiarities of employing CEE migrants in the EU, let us make some observations. First, due to the overwhelmingly propensity of short-term contracts, the annual number of some 300,000 regular workers in the late 1990s (OECD 2001)—which sounds rather modest relative to the size of the EU labour market—translates itself into an average of less than 80,000 workers, which by any standard is very little. Second, a large majority of regular workers found employment in unskilled, highly seasonal agricultural jobs, which prevented them from both exerting a more durable presence and from any occupational mobility in the EU labour market. Finally, a considerable share of all migrants, probably around 50%, worked informally (Frejka et al. 1998; Fassmann & Münz 2000; Wallace & Stola 2000).

The irregular employment of CEE workers (some of them settled immigrants who arrived in EU countries before 1990, others circulating as false tourists benefiting from the visa-free regime introduced after 1990, or people whose status shifted from tourist to long-term illegal immigrant during the 1990s) condemned them to inescapable marginalisation.

These dissimilarities of the pattern of labour migration from CEE to the EU as compared to migration from Greece, Portugal and Spain over a comparable period, resulted mainly from changes in the institutional setup that had meanwhile taken place. These changes were above all reflected in immigration and employment policies and the functioning of labour markets. In fact, since 1973, the labour shortage has no longer been a general structural feature of the Western European economy. Rather, excess demand occurred cyclically and seasonally, involving the so-called 'lower segments' of the labour market. Thus, since the middle of the 1970s, in many now-EU

Member States, the recruitment of foreign labour has been either prohibited or effectively stopped. Moreover, around 1990 or shortly thereafter under the pressure of the mounting inflow of asylum-seekers, the EU Member States severely restricted their rules of entry for all non-EU nationals. The difficulty of legal entry into the EU labour market by third-country nationals (with a distinct exception for corporate personnel), under conditions of strong demand for foreign labour in the lower segments of the market prompted many migrants into irregular employment. Since such irregular employment of foreigners on a grand scale became, so to speak, 'semi-recognised' and tolerated in the EU, the illegal migrants in this category—many of whom come from CEE—have put down roots in various irregular EU labour markets.

Thus, on the eve of the two respective accessions, there is a basic difference in the labour-migration patterns into the EU from Southern Europe and CEE. The former comprised regular semi- or highly skilled workers who profited from fixed-term contracts and full legal protection. These workers generally occupied positions that matched their skills, and their wages were comparable to those earned by nationals. Their foreign employment could extend for years and was relatively stable. Occupational mobility, participation in trade unions, health-care coverage, social benefits—all these were open to a majority of workers from the South. Finally, they could gradually stabilise their stay in the host countries by marrying a resident (a national) or reuniting with family members from their country of origin. In sharp contrast, the pattern of labour migration from CEE is characterised by a prevalence of irregular or secondary labour-market employment in the EU. A large portion of the migrants are not protected by many standard labour-related safeguards. They are either low skilled or offered a position below their skill level. Their contracts are usually informal and short-term (measured in days or weeks, rather than in months), and wages are usually significantly lower than the comparable average. The social participation of these workers is drastically limited; they do not take part in trade unions, only sporadically resort to health services or social benefits, and even in their finances almost exclusively use cash flows (i.e. hardly ever bank accounts or credit cards). Very slim opportunities exist for these workers to legally stabilise their stay in any host country (Jazwinska & Okólski 2001).

Given this basic difference, the coming enlargement of the EU will be without precedent and will certainly involve migration trends that did not come to the fore in past enlargements. By the same token, it seems that a viable analysis of the migration-related consequences of the enlargement to come should focus more on comparisons between the economic levels and structures of the old and new Member States and the current migration patterns observed in these countries, than on any historical analogies. Limited space does not permit a comprehensive examination of such factors here. In the following section of this paper, however, I shall briefly discuss the possible post-accession impact on migration in both the old and new EU Member States,

which might be exerted by two groups of factors: those directly stemming from the enlargement, and contextual factors independent of the enlargement.

Let me begin with the factors that seem grossly independent of EU enlargement, i.e. circumstances of a structural nature that systematically stimulate or constrain migration from CEE or migrant-sending countries in general.

Among these circumstances, the size and age composition of the population influences the potential upper limits of outflows in a rather obvious way. Looking at it from this angle, it might be observed that since the late 1980s, CEE—which traditionally was an area of relatively high fertility and labour surplus—has entered a period of a steep decline in fertility below replacement level. Still, in the second half of that decade, the net reproduction rate[2] was very close to 1.0 and higher than in any other major part of Europe. However, in the late 1990s, it slipped down to 0.6 to become the lowest in Europe (below 0.75 in the Western and Northern part). As a consequence, by 1996–2000, CEE had experienced a decrease in the size of its 'mobile-age' population, i.e. those aged 15–44. This trend, estimated on the basis of the medium-variant UN projection, is represented in Table 1.

Table 1: Changes in mobile-age population (15–44) in old and new (CEE) EU Member States between 1995 and 2020 (in thousands)

Group of states	1995; Number of persons	Decrease (-) in the number of persons			Decrease in %	
		1996–2000	2001–2010	2011–2020	2001–2010	1996–2020
Old (15 Member States)	163,099	1,739	13,055	17,243	8.1	19.6
New (10 Member States)[1]	47,266	701	1,606	3,732	3.4	12.8
Early new (5)[2]	27,985	414	1,030	1,637	3.7	9.3
Poland	17,428	(+)19	560	572	3.2	4.0

[1] *Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, and countries listed below in Note 2.*
[2] *The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.*
Source: UN (2002).

It is evident that in the period of key importance—i.e. in the period between 2001 and 2010, when new Member States will be preparing for accession and ultimately (i.e. after 2004) will become subject to limitations in free access to the EU labour market, there will be a considerable decline in the number of persons of 'mobile age' everywhere. After 10 years, this segment of the population in the present EU-15 will decrease by 17.2 million, i.e. by 8.1%; and in the 10 future Member States by 3.7 million, i.e. 3.4%. This trend will continue over the next decade. In and of itself, this suggests that all parts of the

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[2]   The net reproduction rate (NRR) is a measure of the increase of the stable population implied by age-specific fertility and mortality rates over a period equivalent to the length of a generation. The level of 1.0 is often referred to as 'replacement level'.

enlarged EU will shortly encounter a significant reduction in the number of potential new entries into the labour market. This might substantially reduce 'migration pressure' in sending countries and increase the demand for foreign labour in receiving countries.

The second circumstance of contextual character to be considered here is the current pattern of migration between CEE and the EU. This pattern may be regarded as reflecting a relatively long-standing migration mechanism, and thus, the impact of manifold structural factors. Viewed from the perspective of the 1990s, it might be observed that the volume (and intensity) of population movements between CEE and the EU can differ according to type of flow but generally tends to be rather low (Salt et al. 2000).

Only two types of flows proved sizeable. Both of them fed on the migrants' expectations that the host country might actively assist persons arriving to integrate or settle and thus facilitate the process. One of those flows, namely FRG-supported repatriation of ethnic Germans, mobilised 2.3 million migrants from CEE in 1989–1998, of whom 670,000 came from EU candidate countries. Another flow comprised asylum-seekers attracted by leniency or various statutory gaps in the legislation of EU host countries, as well as their social benefits. Between 1997 and 1997, virtually all CEE countries ranked periodically among the top ten home countries of migrants heading for the EU.[3]

By the end of the 1990s, however, the candidate countries ceased to supply the EU with migrants from these two types of flows. For instance, in 1999, Germany received only 1,400 ethnic Germans from candidate countries (1.3% of the FRG total), compared to the ten-year annual average of 67,300 in 1989–1998 (29.1% of the FRG total). On the other hand, since the early 1990s, the EU has seen a tremendous decline in the number and proportion of asylum-seekers from CEE. Whereas around 1992, EU Member States recorded hundreds of thousands of applications from CEE countries (accounting for far more than 50% of the EU total), in 1997 only 35,000 CEE citizens applied for asylum or refugee status in the EU, of whom 13,000 were from candidate countries (5.4% of the EU total), or only 4,000 (1.7%) if Romania is excluded.

In view of this evidence, it might be concluded that the East-West flows once linked to the institutionalised assistance of migrants in the receiving countries have dramatically declined in importance. Did any other type of migration assume the central role earlier played by those movements? The answer is 'no'. First of all, flows related to family reunion other than those embraced by the movements of 'ethnic Germans' (*Aussiedler*) have long been and have remained very little; and, second, labour migration not only happened on a modest scale but became almost solely reduced to movements related to project-tied or seasonal employment. As a matter of fact, the bulk of labour migration has been connected with the functioning of certain marginal segments of the EU economy, such as activities related to subcontracting foreign firms or

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[3]   Bulgaria topped the list once; Poland three times; and Romania five times.

to highly labour-intensive branches that, at the same time, expressed a highly variable demand for labour. A predominant proportion of the related movements were to Germany, and subject to effective control (OECD 2001).

Under conditions of a strong excess in demand for non-highly-skilled (and cheap) labour in practically all EU Member States—one coinciding with a strong excess in supply in many CEE candidate countries—weak and repressed migratory flows have given way to a peculiar circulation of labour that might be called 'incomplete migration'. Incomplete migration is the movement of false tourists who, during their legal stay in the EU (disguised as tourists), seek short-term informal employment in the secondary segment (usually the foreigners' segment) of the labour market. This seems a major trait of the present East-West migration pattern (Okólski 2001).

Both major types of present-day migration from CEE to the EU, i.e. migration for regular seasonal or subcontracting work and incomplete migration, reveal several common characteristics. Above all, they are relatively stable over time and their size is low compared to the total inflow to the EU and the total foreign employment in the EU labour market. Next, those movements are of a highly temporary nature. Migrants rarely stay longer than three months in the destination countries. Moreover, taking into account the relatively low pay offered to those migrants and the relatively high cost of living in EU Member States, the profitability of such movements for the migrants strongly depends on their ability to economise and live separated from their family and social milieu in general. This, by itself, tends to prompt the migrants to shorten rather than prolong their sojourns in destination countries. Finally, the flows that belong to these two types of migration are, so to speak, demand-driven and, due to the specificity of the demand, hardly involve metamorphoses to other types of movements and mobility—occupational or otherwise—in EU Member States. This may additionally suggest that the current migration from CEE candidate countries to the EU is relatively easy to control by EU Member States.

The third group of contextual circumstances that might be considered here comprises a number of potentially attractive factors related to the social capital of CEE citizens. This is because, in a situation where the source of this capital consists of networks and family contacts linking them with the EU, migration to that area becomes not only relatively easy but also a self-perpetuating process. Since the strength of migration networks stems from its perceived impact on the reduction of real costs and migratory risks, a legitimate question arises of whether the networks established by CEE nationals in the EU are indeed strong enough.

First of all—contrary to popular opinion—there are no extended ethnic communities and no diaspora of CEE origin in EU Member States. The coherence of such groups and their members' solidarity are both rather low. Members of Polish ethnic communities set up over the past few decades, for instance, are highly mobile; they tend to melt into native communities or migrate to other geographical areas (e.g.

overseas) or return to Poland. In many instances, Polish migrant workers tend to compete among themselves rather than assist one another. All this undermines the stability of Polish ethnic communities in the EU. Therefore, the strength of migration networks that might result from their existence is rather negligible. Second, it seems that migrants from CEE have not been able to establish solid ethnic enclaves or take over labour-market niches in EU Member States in the way that migrants from Turkey, Portugal and the former Yugoslavia did in the past. Only incidentally (in certain subregions or cities) could migrants from CEE candidate countries emerge as a group of workers nationally recognisable and sought after; and this mainly pertains to such obscure or ephemeral professions as servants (housekeepers), caretakers for older adults and people with disabilities, or produce pickers. This means that CEE nationals already working or living in the EU cannot be regarded a significant force in bringing in new migrants from that region (Jazwinska & Okólski 2001). Finally, the structure of labour demand in the EU does not seem conducive to radical shifts in the flow of migrants (including sudden rises) from CEE, either. The segment of the labour market that displays an excess structural demand belongs to the very bottom. It is mainly the secondary labour market—especially its foreigners' niches or, in other words, jobs avoided by the nationals. In-depth studies recently conducted in Poland suggest that hardly any migrant was offered a non-manual job in the West, and the great majority of migrant workers assumed simple and unskilled jobs there, a large proportion of them on an irregular basis. Moreover, over the course of time, the incidence of irregular employment of Polish workers in Western countries has been growing (Jazwinska & Okólski 2001).

It seems that the flexible employment policies that have been followed in the EU since the 1970s will continue and contribute to a further expansion of that segment of labour market. This may well lead to the persistence of the current pattern of CEE migrant employment, i.e. the bulk of jobs available to these migrants will be in the secondary labour market, and the flow of migrants to fill the respective job offers will be steady if not slightly greater.

It appears plausible to assume that the factors referred to above will continue to significantly affect migration from the present candidate countries to the present EU Member States following EU enlargement. The enlargement, however, will most likely be, by itself, a distinctively new factor in migration between CEE and the present EU-15; and it will to some degree modify the influence exerted by the 'old' contextual factors. This will happen for at least five important reasons.

Probably the most conspicuous effect of enlargement in terms of migration will be sealing off the borders between new EU members and their non-EU neighbours. In the 1990s, these borders served the purpose of the uninterrupted transfer of persons carrying their labour, merchandise and cash back and forth. It was during that period that Poland and other CEE candidate countries maintained a visa-free regime in trans-

border population movements, along with most of the former socialist countries—among them the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Moreover, they also became new poles of economic attraction within CEE. As a result, a huge inflow of false tourists has been observed in a number of candidate countries. For instance, in the late 1990s, Poland annually recorded 8–9 million new arrivals from CIS countries. A large majority of these visitors earned their living by engaging in petty trade or occasional work in Poland. One estimate for the mid-1990s speaks of some 800,000 Ukrainians alone, who over a one-year period were employed in Poland (Okólski 1997). The movement of false tourists, whose considerable (and growing) proportion qualifies as incomplete migration, has been a means for survival for many migrants and simultaneously for their economic partners in Poland. In addition to individual companies (producers/employers, wholesalers and retailers), the latter also included entire individual branches of small-scale industry and micro-regions located in the borderlands.

By the time of the new EU enlargement, the candidate countries will fully incorporate the Schengen *acquis*. This means, *inter alia,* that their borders with third countries, i.e. the outer EU borders, will be effectively guarded and the Schengen standards concerning the movement and stay of third-country nationals will be fully observed. A likely consequence of this appears to be a dramatic increase in the cost of travelling between Poland and the CIS countries, as well as a sudden drop in the number of arrivals from those countries. It can be argued that somehow a balance will have to be struck between effective control of the EU Eastern frontier and desirable flows of goods and people; but virtually no practical solutions are yet in sight. In this regard, Poland badly needs to maintain close collaboration with her Eastern neighbours, especially the Ukraine, in a way similar to how Italy collaborates with Tunisia or Spain with Morocco. Nevertheless, the case of Poland and other CEE candidate countries may prove to be much more complicated. Poland's borders are long and easy to cross (1,143 km, excluding the border with Lithuania), which makes them more difficult to protect if movements from the Ukraine and other CIS countries are allowed on a massive scale. The alternative might be repressed movements—which, however, may mean a huge rise in illegal immigration (Stepniak 2001; House of Lords 2000).

The next immediate major consequence of the enlargement, in my view, will be an increasing number of CEE people seeking jobs in the shadow economy of the EU. This will mainly stem from the interplay of two factors: the unlimited liberty of trans-EU movements acquired by the nationals of the new Member States, and the introduction of temporarily restricted access to the EU labour market. Thanks to the former factor, the EU space will become more compressed for the new EU citizens, i.e. more quickly and less costly to explore and penetrate. This may prompt many more people than it has up to now to move within the territory of the now-existing EU Member States. However, in the scarcity of legal employment opportunities, and bearing in mind

migrants' natural search for a means of subsistence, many of these persons may resort to the irregular labour market in those countries.

In such a situation, a transition may occur: visitors from the new Member States may be able to move up from the status of economically inactive temporary resident to that of irregular worker. This will undoubtedly be facilitated by certain factors of a contextual nature that are independent of enlargement. These include, above all, the persistence of a relatively high demand for this kind of manpower in the EU and the functioning of social networks established in the EU labour market by CEE migrants, even though the latter seem to be relatively weak at present.

It might be suggested that the duration of these intensified migratory flows from new to old Member States triggered off by the former entering the area of free move-ment, will be neither infinite nor evenly distributed across the populations of the new EU members. On the contrary, it will rather be short-lived and more sizeable in the case of countries with more abundant labour. A theoretical analysis of an increased volume of migration from a 'reference country' in response to more liberalised inter-national economic co-operation (freer trade and investment flows) and economic integration (with 'other countries')—both well known from migration literature—pro-vides a useful clue here. Liberalisation is likely to generate a phenomenon called the 'migration hump' consisting of two phases: a short-lived period of sharply growing population movements and a period immediately following it, which is characterised by declining movements. The first phase takes from a few to a dozen or so years and pre-empts the labour market of the sending country in a crucial moment of its develop-ment. Thus, due to the outflow of workers, the amount of social protection requested by redundant labour in the process of rapid adjustment (and the overall cost of that adjustment) may be considerably lowered (Martin & Taylor 1996).

From the point of view of the labour-market imbalance in Poland, a major trait of which is a very high unemployment rate (probably over 20% at the moment of acces-sion), these two immediate effects of enlargement are expected to be moderate. A decline in the inflow of cheap labour over the Eastern border will reinforce the trend of a decreasing supply of low-skilled workers rather than vacate the equivalent amo-unt of jobs sought by native workers.[4] On the other hand, a post-accession increase in the outflow of Poles who might eventually end up as irregular employees in the EU will, to a large extent, have a similar effect, i.e. a tightening supply of low-skilled wor-kers, which in turn might lead to a slight decline in the number of unemployed and a slight rise in the number of vacancies in the lower segments of labour market. Due to labour-market rigidities and wage inelasticity in the lower segments of that market, this

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[4]   The decreasing supply of that kind of manpower will also be nourished by two other fac-tors: a stronger outflow of the low skilled to the informal sector of the EU economy, and the replacement of older generations by younger generations of workers within Poland.

will hardly prompt any significant transfers of manpower from unemployment to employment or from 'higher' to 'lower' segments of the labour market.

The effect of NMS citizens' free access to the EU labour market, which is the third direct consequence of enlargement, seems both crucially important and, at the same time, very limited in scale. Its importance results from the possibility of introducing the most efficient labour-flow mechanism, i.e. the legal, institutionalised, organised recruitment of workers in the respective CEE countries by EU employers or their specialised agents. It is, however, already obvious that, because of the imposition on the NMS and special clauses regarding the free access into the EU labour market (transitory period), direct recruitment will be confined to certain occupations, certain sectors of the economy or, at best, certain Member States. What seems to be a critical factor here is the exclusion of Germany, so far the most absorbent national labour market in the EU, from the set of countries ready to open their markets to workers from the NMSs.

From Poland's perspective, the principle of limited or selective access to the EU labour market will be seriously amplified by the characteristics of the Polish labour force. On the one hand, this principle usually requires specific, relatively high and elaborate qualifications on the part of the workers; and on the other, the human-capital endowment of a large part of Polish workers is rather poor. For instance, there exists a considerable mismatch between formal education and the requirements of highly advanced technologies and organisational techniques; knowledge of foreign languages is very low; and the ability to function in a modern environment dominated by electronic media and information technology is underdeveloped. The persons who easily meet criteria set forth in the selection process of well-qualified migrant workers find relatively abundant job offers in Poland and are not very motivated to migrate. In the late 1990s, the experience of recruiting Polish workers with selected skills to fill jobs in certain EU Member States seems to fully confirm these arguments. This may imply that limited access to the EU labour market may well suppress outflows from Poland.

Two other consequences of enlargement might plausibly be inferred from economic and migration theory. First, the intensification of trade will bring about a decrease in the outflow of non-highly skilled workers from new to old Member States. This, however, will take effect only after several years, i.e. after a necessary adaptive restructuring of CEE economies has been completed or is at least highly advanced. Second, enlargement may foster capital flows (in the form of direct investment) from old to new Member States. Because increased direct foreign investment is likely to almost instantly bring more human capital with the appropriate characteristics from abroad, this will mean an increased inflow of highly skilled persons into the NMSs (Schiff 1996).

It might be mentioned that in Poland, even in the 1990s, the inflow of capital from abroad, albeit rather moderate, was almost immediately followed by the immigration of well-qualified personnel. Despite the small scale of that flow (and despite its being a

net emigration country), Poland continuously recorded a 'reverse brain drain', manifested in an excess of highly skilled immigrants (with university degrees) *vis-à-vis* the number of emigrants with similar skills (Okólski 2000). This trend may continue and even be reinforced after enlargement.

Furthermore, enlargement will contribute to the removal of all (remaining) barriers to economic activity, both in the new Member States by citizens of the old Member States and *vice versa*. Just by itself, this factor may cause some flow in both directions, though certainly small.

Finally, entry into the EU will help intensify and complete the restructuring of the NMSs' economies that began with the post-1989 transition. It seems that accelerated restructuring will develop into a quite autonomous factor of migration. This may particularly be the case in Poland.

Let me illustrate this by just one example. Poland's economy includes a relatively large agricultural sector that resembles the subsistence sector typical of traditional non-market economies. Of two million private farm holdings, only 47% produce mainly for the market; whereas the output of all other farms serves exclusively or mainly to satisfy the needs of the farmer's family. The share of smallholdings (below 15 ha) whose production goes mainly to the market is merely 25%. These farms, which account for around half of all private holdings, are based on an archaic family division of labour and display strikingly low productivity. In addition, there are one million exclusively subsistence-oriented plots that, due to their tiny size (below 1 ha), are identified in Poland as non-farms (CSO 1997; UNDP 2000).

After enlargement, the competition from modern market-oriented Polish farmers—combined with the competition from EU agriculture—will rapidly make these farms and non-farm plots obsolete and thus compel many economically active persons living there to move to other occupations or migrate to other regions. Some estimates suggest that between 1 and 1.5 million people, who currently work in agriculture, will urgently need retraining, skill upgrading and relocation. Many of them will join the ranks of those already unemployed (Ministry of Agriculture 1999).

It goes without saying that changes in Polish agriculture fostered and amplified by EU enlargement will dramatically increase the existing migration potential in Poland. To what extent this additional potential will transform into actual population movements is open to a separate discussion.

According to the 1996 Agricultural Census, as many as 1,162,000 farm workers in the private sector defined their farms as having no chance for survival (i.e. more than those who were optimistic). Of these persons, 442,000 were of mobile age. 'No chance' could also have been attributed to 1,374,000 persons living on non-farm plots, of whom 458,000 were of mobile age (CSO 1997). In addition, a large majority of agricultural workers were inadequately educated. From among those working on non-farm plots, 70% had not completed secondary education; and the respective share

among those working on privately owned farms was 81%. Generally, the educational level of the agricultural population is far below the national average (UNDP, 2000).

In-depth studies carried out in the 1990s on migration of the population from backward agricultural regions in Poland point to a high degree of immobility. More precisely, persons from these regions can hardly cope with the requirements of the labour market, not only in Western countries but also in their own; and they are generally unable to compete with other workers. Those who are relatively more mobile seek employment in the secondary labour market, in its specific niches where practically no job competition exists. In the 1990s, many of these more mobile individuals explored employment opportunities in the EU, and they generally found them suitable.

A specific pattern of migration of people working in EU Member States developed in the past decade, with the following typical features:

- First, the skill requirements of EU employers are extremely low. In fact, rather than professional qualifications, obedience, devotion and flexibility are expected from those migrants.
- Second, migrants are hardly exposed to the stress related to the contacts with a foreign environment. The language-proficiency requirement, if it exists at all, is drastically limited. A foreign sojourn that might otherwise be a traumatic experience tends to proceed rather smoothly in their case and frequently takes place in a door-to-door form (by means of special coach lines). During the period of foreign employment, migrants hardly contact any institution in the receiving country. This may be understandable in the case of police or local authorities but not for health care, welfare, banks, etc.
- Third, as a rule, migrants take employment, usually on an irregular basis, for the maximum period of a tourist stay determined by the respective intergovernment bilateral agreements. Once that very short time is over, they return home. In many instances, other migrants recommended by them immediately fill the jobs they just vacated. Some returning migrants, after staying in Poland for a while, come back to their previous employer.
- Fourth, during the entire period of foreign employment, migrants continuously stay in touch with their household. All savings, which often mean the lion's share of their total foreign earnings, are transferred (almost exclusively in the form of cash) to the household.
- Fifth, these remittances serve to boost household consumption in Poland (usually above the 'average' level), which suggests that foreign earnings are a means of maintaining or perpetuating the migrant's status in Poland rather than of improving it (Jazwinska & Okólski 2001).

There are no reasons to predict that this pattern will not be continued in the near future, especially right after Poland's accession to the EU. The solution actually binding

in the accession negotiations, one assuming a lengthy transitory period of suspended freedom in worker movement from new to old Member States, may perpetuate (if not increase) the flows of unskilled and marginalised agricultural workers to the periphery of the EU labour market—all the more so because a number of old EU Member States are likely to desperately need such workers.

Last but not least, I would like to briefly address the issue of potential migration between Poland and the EU driven by family-reunification purposes. This, by necessity, brings us back to the exodus from Poland that occurred in the 1980s.

Between 1980 and 1989, around 1.1 million people became long-term emigrants, and 1.3 million stayed abroad for the period of 3–11 months. A large majority left Poland under the guise of tourism; thereafter, those persons continued to be registered as residents of Poland. They were predominantly relatively young well-educated persons. The EU was an initial destination for 78% of the long-term migrants from Poland (the FRG alone accounted for 51%) (Sakson 1997). Little is known about how many of them are still living outside Poland, and even less about the number of their close relatives living in Poland. According to 1995 Microcensus data, as many as 900,000 Polish residents[5] were 'temporarily' (for at least two months) staying (living?) in foreign countries. Unfortunately, the Microcensus did not inquire into the geographical distribution of their foreign residence. Around 770,000 migrants were family members[6] and around 130,000 were non-family members (members of one-person households). Of 417,000 families whose members took part in migration, 155,000 left Poland *in corpore;* whereas in case of 262,000 families, at least one member was still staying in the home country. The structure of family members staying abroad is presented in Table 2.

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[5] Strictly speaking, these are persons of Polish nationality registered in Poland as permanent residents.

[6] Family has been conceived in its formal sense as a marital union. Members of a family are married partners and their dependent children.

Table 2: Persons registered in Poland as permanent residents being family members, staying abroad (for more than two months) at the time of the 1995 Microcensus by family category and age

Migrant family category	Number of families (in thousands)	Number of migrants (in thousands)	Partners in union at mobile age (%)[1]	Children's age (%)		
				0–14	15–24	25+
All family members are migrants	416.8	770.2	62.5	29.1	32.1	38.8
All members are living abroad	154.7	464.4	.	.	.	.
Childless couples	31.5	62.9	38.0	-	-	-
Couples with dependent children under 25	73.7	278.5	78.7	60.7	36.2	4.1
Other couples	7.7	25.5	7.1	-	21.8	78.2
Single parents with children	41.8	97.5	66.5	54.6	27.7	17.7
At least one family member is still in Poland	262.1	308.8	.	.	.	.
Childless couples	12.3	12.3	26.0	-	-	-
Couples with dependent children under 25	115.2	138.9	74.5	6.7	63.0	30.3
Other couples	73.8	90.0	12.4	-	11.1	88.9
Single parents with children	60.8	67.6	58.8	1.1	22.2	76.7

1 'Mobile age' means below 45.

Source: Central Statistical Office of Poland.

It appears from these data that, although the number of families potentially subject to family reunification was rather large in 1995 (262,000), many family members were either married partners of immobile age or single parents with grown-up children. The only category that seemed to represent a strong potential for family reunification were families with both parents and children under 25. In approximately half of these families (around 55,000), at least one child and one of the parents were still living in Poland.

A national survey on the standard of living carried out two years after the 1995 Microcensus revealed, however, that only 178,000 persons registered as permanent residents in Poland (and living in households comprising at least two persons, of whom at least one was present at the time of the inquiry) stayed abroad for more than two months. Even when controlling for basic differences in the definition of the sampling unit between both inquiries, it is still legitimate to conclude that the number of Polish nationals living in foreign countries (the EU in particular), and at the same time registered as a permanent resident of Poland and having a family/household member still there, declined substantially between 1995 and 1997.

The place of temporary residence of two thirds of temporary migrants identified by the 1997 survey (67%) was the EU, with Germany accounting for more than 50% and Italy for 25% of the EU total. Around 79% of the Poles staying in the EU were

migrant workers. A small proportion of all the migrants (27%) were those who left Poland before 1995, not to mention the period before 1991 (9%). Bearing additionally in mind that precisely half of them were single (i.e. never married) and very young at that time, it might be hypothesised that the potential for family reunification of Polish migrants in the EU and elsewhere (which was still relatively high in the middle of the mid-1990s) has already been greatly reduced (Kostrzewa 2000).

Based on the migration experience of Poland over the past 25 years, and considering the most probable developments in the near future, it might be concluded that the EU enlargement could bring about relatively modest changes in migration movements between Poland and the EU. This will be due to two major groups of factors, one dependent on enlargement and one independent of it:

Enlargement as such may generate a short-lived migration hump related to the post-accession exploratory movements of people from Poland. Because of the distinct possibility that a rule of limited or selective admission of Polish workers (and workers from other new Member States) will be introduced, a great proportion of these movements will eventually be contained by the informal EU labour market. In turn, any attempt to recruit highly qualified personnel from Poland, herself short of adequately educated labour, will yield rather limited results. Besides, due to the accelerated transition of Polish agriculture, enlargement will 'lay off' huge numbers of peasants. However, due to the advanced age and insufficient human capital of peasants made redundant by the economy, this will be transformed into a relatively thin migration potential. Finally, at the time of accession the stock of Polish immigrants in the EU eligible for family reunification will probably be more or less depleted; thus, migration due to family reasons will not be sizeable.

Among the group of factors independent of enlargement are the following:

■ The impact of the demographic situation will be insignificant if not adverse.
■ The current pattern of labour migration will tend to preserve a weak propensity of the highly skilled to migrate and, at the same time, the long-established trend of unskilled workers moving to lower segments or the informal sector of EU labour markets. Additionally, it will prevent any major shifts on the part of those workers from irregular to regular employment or from lower to higher segments.
■ Migration networks will remain relatively weak and will not contribute to any substantial increase in the outflow from Poland.
■ The structure of EU labour markets, in turn, will most likely continue to encourage an increasing inflow of low-skilled temporary migrants from Poland, regardless of official EU immigration policy or the effects of the 'transitory period' limiting free access into the EU labour market.

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This volume contains the papers presented at the Annual Seminar of the European Observatory on the Social Situation, Demography and Family held in Helsinki in June 2002. The Seminar highlighted different aspects of the immigration process, paying special attention to families. Section 1 deals with the demographic aspects of migration, Section 2 focuses on the role of families and relatives in the immigration process, Section 3 addresses the socio-economic situation of migrants, and Section 4 analyses the potential impact of EU enlargement from different perspectives.